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ABSTRACT 
According to agency theory, the separation of ownership and control and the resulting 
misalignment of principal and agent interests can lead to corporate underperformance. 
Takeovers are often regarded as a direct response to these agency conflicts and the breakdown 
of internal corporate governance systems in companies. The literature claims that takeovers 
are the most efficient device in the market for corporate control since M&As rapidly transfer 
resources and control from inefficient managers to efficient ones. 
This thesis examines whether the market for corporate control works effectively through 
takeovers. The relationship between underperformance and takeover likelihood is 
investigated using accounting- and stock market-based measurements from companies in the 
UK, US and Canada over a period of 17 years (1988 - 2004) applying hierarchical binary 
logistic regression. 
Despite the general wisdom of the finance and economics literature that there are economies 
where the external market for corporate control is said to work actively as a disciplinary 
device through takeovers, this study could not confirm these outcomes. No significant 
association between takeovers and firm perfon-nance was detected, implying that the 
disciplinary takeover is statistically non-existent and that the market for corporate control 
does not work effectively through takeovers in the three countries under investigation. It has 
to be concluded that there is no consistent direction for investors confronted with acquisition 
opportunities who wish to maximise economic gain. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
The business world of today is increasingly turbulent. Fundamental technological, political, 
regulatory and economic forces are radically changing the global corporate environment. In 
such a climate sound strategic thinking, analysis and deci sion. - making are considered to be of 
particular importance (Mills, 1994). Many corporations, however, are developing confidently 
in the wrong direction. While these companies are aiming to become leaders in their markets, 
they are turning into attractive targets for takeovers instead. Often the failure of a company 
has nothing to do with the quality of its products and services or employees; it is rather caused 
by incompetent management and poor strategy (Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 1990, Monks 
and Minow, 2002). According to the agency theory, this problem arises from the separation of 
ownership and control and its resulting incentive misalignment between the principal and 
agent. According to the literature, takeovers are regarded as one of the most efficient devices 
in the market for corporate control since they rapidly transfers resources and control from 
inefficient managers to efficient ones. Jensen (1986) takes the view that takeovers are a direct 
response to the breakdown of internal corporate governance systems and agency conflicts in 
companies. The success of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in terms of overcoming agency 
conflicts, however, remains up to today unfounded in practice. 
This thesis aims to empirically investigate: 
(1) Whether the market for corporate control actually works, by measuring the extent to 
which companies are taken over following a period of underperformance in the US, 
UK and Canada over the period from 1987 until 2004 and 
(2) Whether a relationship exists between financial characteristics and takeover likelihood 
of underperfon-ning companies in the US, UK and Canada. Financial variables under 
investigation include underperformance, capital structure, asset structure and firm 
size, accounting also for industry and economic effects. 
The most important feature of this thesis is that the study focuses solely on underperforming 
firms and their likelihood of being taken over as a result of their underperformance. This is 
critical since the market for corporate control should rectify underperformance through a 
14 
takeover and most studies do not focus on this particular aspect but investigate this area more 
broadly. 
The literature review for this study investigates how corporate governance systems mitigate 
agency conflicts. It further analyses the role the market for corporate control plays in 
resolving agency conflicts, with a particular focus on M&As as an option for overcoming 
such problems. The literature in the field of corporate governance and agency theory is 
discussed in detail in Chapter Two. The implications that the separation of ownership and 
control and the resulting misalignment of management and shareholder interests have on the 
varying contracting parties in general and for mergers and acquisitions in particular are 
examined. A further focus of this chapter lies in the analysis of potential agency costs such as 
residual loss, monitoring and bonding costs as well as the potential of the latter two to 
overcome agency conflicts. 
Chapter Three investigates the role the market for corporate control plays for corporate 
governance and discusses the five main control forces available for the market to control 
agency conflicts: (1) the board of directors, (2) legal and regulatory systems, (3) the capital 
markets and the managerial labour market, (4) the product and factor markets as well as (5) 
M&As. This chapter will in particular investigate the role takeovers play as a disciplining 
device. 
The impact capital structure has on corporate governance and on the success of a firm is the 
focus of Chapter Four. The theory of an optimal capital structure and the impact debt has on 
corporate value is discussed in theory. One particular focus of this chapter is the mitigating 
role of debt on agency conflicts. Financial choice considerations are continuously related to 
mergers and acquisitions with a particular focus on the impact of capital structure on the 
likelihood of acquisitions and the resulting changes of capital structure due to acquisitions. 
In Chapter Five this thesis reviews the literature on mergers and acquisitions as one important 
option of mitigating agency conflicts in the market for corporate control. It provides an 
analysis of takeover motives and downside risks, including economic, financial and corporate 
control considerations; as well as managerial aspects. As one further issue this chapter 
introduces and discusses various research areas in the field of M&A with a particular focus on 
research in the field of takeover likelihood models for takeover targets. 
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Chapter Six provides a description of the type of research design and methodology that will 
be used for the empirical study. In this thesis the relationship between underperformance and 
takeover likelihood will be examined empirically using stock market-based measurements and 
accounting-based financial data from companies in the UK, US and Canada over a period of 
17 years (1988 - 2004) applying a hierarchical binary-logistic regression analysis. This study 
examines if companies are actually taken over following a period of underperformance. By 
applying a set of financial characteristics, relating to underperformance (Hypothesis 1), 
capital structure (Hypothesis 2), asset structure (Hypothesis 3) and firm size (Hypothesis 4), 
accounting also for industry and economy effects (Hypothesis la, 2a, 3a, 4a), this study 
additionally investigates the reasons why some underperforming companies are taken over 
whereas other underperforming companies are not. 
In Chapter Seven this thesis provides a step-by-step explanation of the data compilation and 
data clearing process to come up with a sample of underperforming companies. This is a 
particularly vital part of this thesis's methodology since the sample of underperforming fin-ns 
forms the basis for the overall investigation into the likelihood of firms being taken over. This 
chapter will furthermore explain the selection process of the sample of acquired companies 
that is matched against the sample of underperforming companies. 
Chapter Eight details and discusses the results of the study into the takeover likelihood of 
underperforming fin-ns. Outcomes of the hierarchical binary-logistic regression model, which 
is to be applied to test the thesis' four main hypotheses and its four sub-hypotheses for 
Canada, the UK and US, will be presented by analysing each of the financial variables on an 
individual basis. This study further applies a multinomial logistic regression analysis to all ten 
variables together in order to investigate their impact on the likelihood of becoming a 
takeover target for an underperfon-ning finn. This analysis is regarded as particularly 
important since it takes all influencing factors into account, which might also result in 
counterbalancing effects. Research outcomes of this study will be related to the literature and 
previous empirical research and will be discussed on a per country basis. 
In the concluding chapter (Chapter Nine), the preceding chapters and the main findings of the 
empirical study are summarised. In addition, this chapter describes the contribution and the 
limitations of this thesis and introduces potential areas for further research. 
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Chapter Two 
Corporate Governance and Agency Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
The theory of the firm has been an important focus of theoretical and empirical research for 
almost a century. Research efforts have been particularly centred on the relations between 
markets and hierarchies, corporate governance systems and the agency problems caused by 
conflicts of interests among a firm's contracting parties (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988). 
The groundbreaking work by Jensen and Meckling (1976) has intensified research in this 
field, particularly investigating the nature of conflicts and the means available to solve them. 
This chapter looks at the various corporate governance aspects associated with the problem of 
ownership and control separation and focuses in particular on agency problems as a 
motivating force behind takeover activity as well as takeover resistance (Walkling and Long, 
1984, Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld, 1985). In this context, the chapter investigates what 
effect the misalignment of managerial and owner interests have on the varying stakeholders. It 
introduces and discusses the monitoring and bonding mechanisms available to the various 
contracting parties in order to re-align interests and to reduce potential agency costs. 
2.2 Corporate Governance 
Monks and Minow (1995,2002) define corporate govemance as the relationship between the 
internal and extemal participants in a corporation. As pointed out by McMenamin (1999), 
corporate govemance is not only concemed with the relationship between managers and 
owners but also with the interaction of the board, shareholders and other stakeholders such as 
creditors and employees. According to Bain and Band (1996) in McMenamin (1999; 5 6), 'the 
central concem of govemance is to add value to as much organisational stakeholders as is 
practicable ... that by having appropriate standards of govemance the long-term performance 
is raised and total shareholder return is enhanced. ' 
Schmidt (2003) describes corporate governance as a system incorporating the entire range of 
mechanisms and arrangements that shape the way in which key decisions are made in 
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corporations. ' Essentially, corporate gover-nance is about the distribution of decision and 
control rights; it is about goveming and monitoring management; and it is about influencing 
business policy and about protecting stakes (Blair, 1995, Zingales, 1998, Schmidt, 2003). For 
authors including Shleifer and Vishny (1997), corporate gover-nance is more narrowly 
concemed with the most effective system of making management act strictly in the interest of 
shareholders. 
Thus, corporate governance is there to overcome potential efficiency losses resulting from 
conflicts of interests between the firrn's various contracting parties. These conflicts have 
become one central focus of research in this field. As claimed by Jensen (1993), this research 
did not only enlighten the general field of corporate finance but also impacted on other areas 
such as the effects of leverage, governance arrangements 2 and large shareholdings on 
incentives and organisational efficiency. This field of research has helped to better understand 
the interdependencies among the internal and external participants of a corporation. 
Megginson (1997) and Ferreira and Laux (2007) further highlight the critical importance of 
corporate governance issues for the individual finn. Governance issues such as the 
organisational form, corporate control rules and their effectiveness as well as managerial 
incentive policies all play an important role for the success of a firin. 
As pointed out by Hart (1995), corporate governance problems in a corporation mainly result 
from two main aspects. First, Hart refers to the agency problem or conflict of interest between 
internal and external participants of the firrn and second, he cites the transaction costs (agency 
costs), which result from this agency conflict. These aspects will be introduced and discussed 
in detail in the following sections. 
2.3 Agency Theory 
Berle and Means (1932) introduced the classical agency theory with their view that ownership 
and control were often separated in large corporations. They argue that the separation of 
I Corporate governance encompasses aspects of company law, product markets, market for capital and labour as 
well as both the formal organisational structure of a company and any informal organisational arrangements, 
which may exist and function alongside the formal structure (Schmidt, 2003). 
2 Governance is referred to as 'the top-level control structure, consisting of the decision rights being possessed 
by the board of directors and the CEO, the procedures for changing them, the size and membership of the board 
and the compensation and equity holdings of managers and the board'. (Jensen, 1993; 871) 
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ownership and control might result in management pursuing their own private goals and 
objectives, which in turn results in the waste of corporate resources to the detriment of the 
owner(s). 
The agency problem is also an important component of the contractual theory of the firm, 
proposed by Coase (1937; 386), who describes the firm as 'a nexus of contracts', which 
comes into existence as a response to the inefficiencies of incomplete contracts in the market. 
As argued by Coase, a corporation is more than just the sum of all agreements between the 
contracting parties; a corporation has the advantage that the owner can simply direct his 
employees to do the right thing. Against these benefits of corporate integration, Coase 
recognises costs such as 'diminishing returns to management' (394) and 'waste of resources' 
(395). 
Over half a century after these famous works, substantial progress has been made in 
developing the theories of Berle and Means and Coase further with important contributions by 
authors including Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Williamson (1975,1985), Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Fama and Jensen (1983 a, b), 
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). As already highlighted by Berle and 
Means (1932) in the modem theory of the corporation, control and ownership are no longer 
exclusively attributed to the owner(s) or residual claimants. The owner no longer has control 
over his assets and wealth but is solely a capital provider and the ultimate risk taker. As a 
result, corporate control is attached to the agent (Berle and Means, 1932, Monks and Minow, 
2002). This statement stands in direct contrast to claims made by Manne (1965,1967) and 
Fama (1980) who see that, despite the separation of risk and control, the monitoring and 
disciplining of management remains largely the domain of the 'entrepreneur', the owner. 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972), however, object to the view that authority directs a firm's 
activities but stress the role of contracts as the instrument of voluntary exchange. 
In their approach, Jensen and Meckling (1976; 311) develop Coase's (193 7) and Alchian and 
Demsetz's (1972) 'nexus of contracts' conception of the firm further by viewing the firm as a 
'set of contracting relationships among individuals'. They further stress that it is misleading to 
personalise the firm since it is not an individual but a legal fiction. By legal fiction Jensen and 
Meckling (1976; 3 10) mean 'the artificial construct under the law, which allows certain 
organisations to be treated as individuals. ' The authors stress the complexity of the creation of 
19 
a contract, since it aims to bring the conflicting objectives of individuals internal and external 
to the corporation into equilibrium. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were among the most important contributors in the field of 
agency theory. They define an agency relationship 'as a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf, which involves delegating some decision-- making authority to the agent' (308). In 
general, the principal and the agent agree on a contract that clearly states what the agent is 
expected to do with the principal's funds and how returns are shared between the agent and 
the principal. 
According to the Jensen-Meckling theorem, the principal and the agent would sign a complete 
contract that identifies exactly what the agent does in each and every circumstance and how 
the profits are distributed. The authors stress the complexity of creating such an agency 
relationship contract, since it aims to bring the conflicting objectives of the agent and the 
principal into equilibrium. In practice, however, it is impossible to perfectly contract for every 
possible action between an agent and principal in advance. As the future holds for unforeseen 
events, complete contracts are unrealistic. This is the central focus of the original Jensen- 
Meckling argument. 
The agency theory does not follow a unifon-n research method but, as pointed out by Jensen 
(1983), comprises two separate approaches which focus on distinct aspects of the problem. 
The principal-agent literature, often referred to as the formal agency literature, focuses on 
issues of efficient risk bearing and the rr)rmative aspects of the agency relationship including 
aspects of contract structure and how contracting costs can be minimised (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, Jensen 1983). The positive theory of agency in contrast, focuses in particular 
on the effects of market and institutional mechanisms on the contracting process. This second, 
less fon-nal approach is concemed with 'the technology of monitoring and bonding on the 
fon'n of ... contracts and organisations' (Jensen, 1983; 334). 
The agency theory does not by itself see a role for corporate governance. However, corporate 
governance structures have become necessary since complete contracts are impossible to 
write. Governance systems help to allocate residual rights of control over the firm's assets, 
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which have not been specified in the original contract (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and 
Moore, 1990, Hart, 1995). 
2.4 Agency Costs 
In contrast to the original Jensen and Meckling (1976) zero- agency- cost- base case, where 
management owns 100% of the firm's equity, the reality is that no publicly traded fin-n is 
entirely owned by management. When management owns less then 100 % of the firm's equity 
it is impossible for the principal to guarantee that the agent will make all decisions in line with 
the principal's objectives at zero cost. As pointed out by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), if both the 
principal and the agent are utility maximisers, it is highly unlikely that the agent will always 
3 perform in the best interests of the principal but pursue his own objectives . Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) see this misalignment of interests between the firm's agent and the finn's 
principal(s) resulting in agency costs. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) confirm the predictions made 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and conclude that agency costs are indeed higher among firrns 
that are not 100% owned by their managers and that these costs increase as the managerial 
ownership stake of the agent declines. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of (1) residual losses, (2) 
monitoring costs and (3) incentive expenditures accrued to the corporation's various 
stakeholders. Each of these potential agency cost factors will be discussed separately in the 
following sections. Williams (1987) regards residual loss as the key element since the other 
two only arise as a result of trying to reduce residual loss in a cost-effective way. As pointed 
out by Bolton and Scharfstein (1998), understanding the agency costs stemming from the 
divorce of ownership and control has become one of the central issues in corporate finance for 
some time. Taking the example of takeovers, Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim that since 
agency costs are evident to prospective buyers, bidders will only pay a price for the projected 
performance of the firm, which takes into account all three agency costs. As a direct 
consequence, 'the (entrepreneur) will bear the entire wealth effects for these expected costs so 
long as the equity market anticipates these effects' (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 314). 
3 The risk that the agent pursues his own objectives is termed 'managerialism' (Arnold, 2002). 
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2.4.1 Residual Loss 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Williams (1987) define residual loss as the costs resulting 
from the incomplete alignment of the agents' and owner(s)' interests and refer to it as the 
reduction in the value of the firm as a direct consequence of the transfer of profits as a result 
of managerialism induced by the dilution of ownership. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
commonly refer to this as the moraý hazard problem 4. 
As described by authors including Hart and Moore (1990) and Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), a 
manager may believe that, on an ex-post basis, he can beat the game by overpaying himself 
and by consuming on the job through shirking and perquisites. A considerable amount of 
empirical evidence, including authors such as Baumol (1959), Williamson, (1964), Jensen 
(1986) and Grossman and Hart (1988), has documented the prevalence of managerial 
behaviour that neither serves the interests of owners nor investors, particularly shareholders. 
Most of this evidence comes from the capital market in the form of event studies. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1988) introduce the case of managers 
investing in inefficient but power-enhancing or empire-building projects, resulting in no gain 
for the firm, however, leading to a larger profit for themselves. According to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988), takeovers are a good example for managers pursuing private benefits of 
control. Managers might pay too much for acquisitions or even boycott any takeover attempt 
only to achieve their private objectives such as expanding their empire or to protect their 
position. This in turn increases agency costs. Murphy (1985) and Jensen (1986,1993) in this 
context, argue that managers may have incentives to grow their fin-n beyond the optimal size, 
for example, via M&As, since company growth increases managers' power by increasing the 
resources under their control. Executive compensation and promotion are an increasing 
function of company size as described in studies by Baurnol (1959), Donaldson (1984), Baker 
(1986), Stulz (1988) and Conyon and Murphy (2000). Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988), for 
example, find that this relationship is independent of the acquisition's impact on firm value. 
They suggest that this result may explain the large amount of corporate resources being spent 
inefficiently on va lue- destroying takeovers. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) remark that if the 
4 Moral hazard may be defined as actions of economic agents in maximising their own utility to the detriment of 
others, in situations where they do not bear the full consequences or, equivalently, do not enjoy the full benefits 
of their actions due to uncertainty and incomplete or restricted contracts, which prevent the assignment of full 
damages (benefits) to the responsible agent. 
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stock price declines following an agent's announcement, for example regarding a takeover, 
then the managerial action is implied to be more in the interest of managers, instead of 
shareholders. According to the economics and finance literature, share prices are often 
diminishing to reflect agency costs resulting from managerialism. Managerial aspects as a 
motivating force behind takeovers will be further discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
Murphy (1985) and Jensen (1986,1993) further argue that there are agency costs associated 
with free cash flow 5, potentially resulting in over- investment. Cash provides managers with 
the flexibility to make investment decisions without being subjected to the monitoring of the 
capital market. If managers are empire-building and perquisite- consuming, cash allows them 
to pursue these activities (Pinkowitz, 2002). Jensen believes that self-interested managers 
have incentives to hoard and misuse free cash flow to benefit themselves rather than 
shareholders. Easterbrook (1984) adds that since managers may have incentives to expand 
firm size and purchase assets via takeovers, management have the option to use free cash flow 
to finance these projects internally. Jensen (1986) and Mann and Sicherman (1991) add that 
the use of free cash flow for takeovers is likely to be perceived negatively by shareholders, 
because they prefer a dividend increase or wish that the firm obtained capital externally 
through debt holders or in the capital market, which makes it easier to monitor managerial 
behaviour. The authors argue that share prices are often diminishing to reflect agency costs 
resulting from a firm's free cash flow abuse. The field of free cash flow will be further 
discussed in Chapter Four in relation to capital structure aspects and in Chapter Five in 
relation to being a takeover motivator. 
Agency theory also claims that managers may have goals which are more beneficial to owner 
interests but that are still inconsistent with value maximisation (Fama, 1980, Hart, 1995, Ang, 
Cole and Lin, 2000). Donaldson (1984; 3) in his study concludes that managers are often not 
aiming to maximise the value of the firm but rather to increase corporate wealth, which he 
defines as 'the aggregate purchasing power available to management for strategic purchases 
during any given planning period'. In the worst-case scenario, another potential source of 
residual loss may be found in managers being incompetent to run the company. As argued in 
Jensen and Ruback (1983), poor managers who resist being replaced might be the costliest 
expression of the agency problem. 
5 Free cash flow is discretionary cash flow available to managers in excess of the funds necessary to finance all 
positive net present value investment projects (Mann and Sicherman, 1991). 
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Conflicting interests may also exist between shareholders and managers with regard to the 
timing of investment decisions. Whereas shareholders take an indefinite perspective with 
regards to future cash flows, management is only concerned with the cash flow for the time of 
their employment. Management is therefore somewhat short-term orientated, preferring 
investment opportunities with short-term high accounting returns instead of long-term 
positive net Present value 6 projects (McColgan, 2001). 
Authors including Amihud and Lev (1981), Cremers and Nair (2003) and Scholten (2003) 
further point out that risk-taking is one area where the interests of managers and shareholders 
may oppose each other, leading to potential agency costs. Risk-averse managers generally 
tend to choose projects that reduce the uncertainty of their un-diversifiable 'human capital' 
investment in the firm and lessen the probability of bankruptcy (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
which, however, results in a lower expected return than for riskier ventures. Shareholders 
have the opposite preference and want managers to behave as risk takers. Bagnani, Milonas, 
Saunders and Travlos (1994) conclude that managers' interests therefore are close to the 
interests of bondholders, who, like managers, are exposed to the downside risk of negative 
investment returns and do not share significantly in upside return outcomes. 
Studies by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shavell (1979) and Marcus (1982) confirm the theory 
of risk aversion on the part of managers as an additional source of agency costs. Amihud and 
Lev (1981), Donaldson (1984), Agrawal and Mandelker, (1987) and Baker, Jensen and 
Murphy (1988) argue that as management's employment is dependent on changes in fin-n 
value, an increased variance of the firm's returns reduces the certainty of his employment. 
The manager therefore has an incentive to reduce his employment risk by increasing firm size 
and by diversifying the firm's portfolio. This is often seen as a motivation for unrelated M&A 
activity. Research by Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld, (1989) and Cremers and Nair (2003) 
confirm these findings and show that M&As are often referred to as examples of risk- 
reducing investments which at times are taken knowing that the potential associated 
consequence is a decline in share prices. 
Management, however, may not only reduce shareholder value through acquiring the wrong 
companies for the wrong reasons, they might also reduce shareholder value by resisting 
6 Net present value is defined as the difference between the present value of future cash flows and the present 
value of the investment's cash outlays discounted at the firm's cost of capital (McMenamin, 1999). 
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takeovers, even when acquirers offer large premiums (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1998). Jensen 
and Ruback (1983) remark in this context that management often actively seek to unden-nine 
any takeover potential of the firrn since it may result in the loss of personal wealth and 
reputation. Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) remark that such managerial behaviour occurs in 
connection with low ownership stakes being held by management. In sum, as argued by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), evidence increasingly shows that managerial interests rather than 
shareholders interests direct a fin-n's acquisitions, which will be further investigated in 
Chapter Five. 
2.4.2 Monitoring Costs 
According to Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), agency theory has not only investigated managerial 
discretion as one form of agency costs but has also put the various external and internal 
monitoring and bonding mechanisms at the centre of attention. Monitoring costs are defined 
by Fama and Jensen (1983 b) as expenditures paid by the principal to supervise, measure and 
control managerial behaviour 7. Although the principal may initially pay for these costs, agents 
are the ultimate risk bearers since management compensation will be corrected to balance 
these expenses. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) add that effective monitoring is not only 
restricted to the principal but to a number of specific parties. As Easterbrook (1984) explains, 
managers, investors and other contracting participants all benefit from setting up controlling 
devices such as monitoring and bonding as well as incentive mechanisms to ensure that 
management acts in the investors' interests. 
Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) take a different view and claim that too much monitoring 
will affect managerial initiative and decision making negatively. Himmelberg, Hubbard and 
Palia (1999) suggest in that context that an optimal level of monitoring is dependent on a 
corporation's unique contracting situation. 
The work by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) differentiates between seven control mechanisms: 
the first three broad mechanisms and the four ways to facilitate the fourth broad mechanism. 
'The use of debt [as a bonding or monitoring mechanism] relies on the capital market for 
monitoring. Similarly, the market for managers relies on prospective employers; the market 
7 Monitoring costs may include the cost for audits, writing executive compensation contracts and eventually the 
cost of replacing managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). 
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for corporate control relies on prospective acquirers; insider (i. e. top management) 
shareholding relies on inside owners; institutional shareholding relies on institutional owners; 
block holding relies on large outside owners; and use (i. e. effectiveness) of outsiders on the 
board relies on these (same) board members' (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; 380). The authors 
stress that the last three control mechanisms, however, cause their own agency conflicts and 
monitoring problems. It also needs to be stressed that there is a tendency of interaction 
between each type of control mechanism of the fin-n (McColgan, 2001). The following section 
investigates the firm's various contracting parties, their monitoring activity and related 
potential costs more in detail. 
2.4.3 Monitoring Activities of Contracting Parties 
2.4.3.1 Minority Shareholders 
As Easterbrook and Fischel (1982,1983) show, agency costs for monitoring managers are 
high for each shareholder and as a result shareholders do not undertake enough monitoring 
activity, apart from having the right to participate in the election of the board of directors at 
the annual general meeting 8. Generally, there are two primary reasons for the shareholders' 
limited monitoring activity. First, as noted by Berle and Means (1932), the large number of 
shareholders divides power among too many small parties and secondly, as pointed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), dispersed shareholders have little or no incentive to monitor 
management. As Easterbrook (1984) explains, a shareholder would incur all monitoring 
overheads but would benefit from his monitoring activity only proportionately to his 
shareholdings. This is due to the well-known free-rider problem in spending for quasýpublic 
goods, such as monitoring efforts. 
Research by Prowse (1994) found that ownership concentration is relatively low in the UK in 
comparison to the US, Japan and Germany. Research by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) further 
shows that expenditure on monitoring by shareholders decreases as their individual share 
ownership declines and that shareholders pursue their monitoring function only when they are 
concerned about the firrn's profitability and its ability to pay off debt or secure future funds. 
8 Individual shareholders who invest in an equity stake of the firm are not guaranteed any payments in return, 
albeit dividends are paid out at the discretion of the board of directors. Shareholders furthermore have no claim 
on any of the firm's specific assets. Their only principal right is the voting right for the board of directors, which 
is only of real use if individual shareholders concentrate their vote (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
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With reference to Williams (1987) monitoring activity is expected to decline if the firm's risk 
of bankruptcy is not imminent. As Sinha (2004) concludes, diffuse share ownership reinforces 
the separation of ownership and control as it encourages impersonal share ownership. 
As minority shareholders have only a limited monitoring role, these shareholders prefer 
dividend payouts to potentially risky investments, which they cannot control. Dividends 
thereby indirectly limit the power of managers and control for Pmential agency problems 
(Jensen, 1986). Easterbrook (1984) points out that dividend payouts are perceived positive 
since they result in a higher debt-equity ratio, which keeps them from wasting money to 
bondholders and as pointed out by Jensen (1986) redires financial slack9. 
2.4.3.2 Large Shareholders and Block Holders 
If control deficiencies allow managers to pursue their own goals rather than act in the interest 
of their owners, then according to Demsetz and Lehn (1985) a higher ownership concentration 
in forin of large shareholdings or block holdingsiO will help to develop a tighter controlling 
mechanism between managerial action and the shareholders' interests, leading to higher profit 
rates. 
Evidence on the significance of large shareholders as a monitor of management is increasing. 
Studies by Franks and Mayer (1990,1996), Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Gorton and 
Schmidt (1996) all come to the conclusion that large shareholders are an important part of the 
corporate governance system for monitoring managen-ent. Jensen (1993) agrees and stresses 
the significance of large shareholders for a well- functioning governance structure since block 
holders are financially interested in assessing the firm's management. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) agree and add that concentrated shareholdings most efficiently align cash flow and 
control rights between management and outside investors as block holders have the interest in 
getting their money back and they have the power to demand it. According to Burkart, Gomb 
and Panunzi 0 997,2000), by virtue of their proportionately large shareholdings, block 
holders are motivated to monitor management in order to be able to make more informed 
9 Financial slack means having cash and/or spare debt capacity (Copeland and Weston, 1992). 
10 If stakeholders own a share of at least 5% of the firm*s stock, they are referred to as block holders (Denis, 
Denis and Sarin. 1997). 
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decisions, which in turn will increase share value. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) remark in this 
context that large shareholders get round the traditional free rider problem. 
Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) report that block purchases initially result in a positive market 
reaction, which, however, disappears immediately if no corporate restructuring follows this 
initial acquisition. McConnell and Servaes (1990) furthermore detect a positive relationship 
between large institutional ownership and market value. 
Research by Burkart, Gomb and Panunzi (1997,2000) shows that the expertise of large 
shareholders gives them greater discretion, since ordinary shareholders are prepared to leave 
the decision to the 'more informed' large shareholders. In addition, block holders accumulate 
substantial power to directly influence the firm's decision- making. This is especially the case 
when firms have an otherwise dispersed ownership. As Shleifer and Vishny (1986) comment, 
large shareholders have in some cases even enough voting rights to direct management 
through a takeover. 
Hart (1995), Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), however, 
add that a large shareholder may use his power to pursue his own interests, which at some 
instances may be at the expense of other dependent parties such as minority shareholders, 
creditors and employees. For example, as stated by Burkart (1995), the counter-bidding by 
large shareholders does reduce the likelihood of a takeover, which could, however, be in the 
other stakeholders' best interest. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) state that large shareholdings 
can impact negatively on the liquidity of a stock and it can reduce the amount of company 
information being provided to the market. Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv 
(1988) further add that the large investors' own preferential treatment at the expense of other 
dependent parties is particularly apparent when their control rights are considerably above 
their cash flow rights". As research by Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998) concludes, 
although block holders may be beneficial in influencing corporate gowmance, for example, 
in the case of takeover attempts, there is evidence that they are tempted to become as self- 
serving as the management they are intended to monitor. 
II In this case, large investors have the additional power to distribute cash flow solely to themselves. instead of 
on a pro-rate basis (Shleifer and Vishny. 1997). 
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Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988 a) investigate the relationship between share ownership of 
block holders and the company's profitability. Their study detects that profitability increases 
when share ownership ranges between 0 and 5%, however, they also find that profitability 
declines with higher ownership stakes than 5%. The authors explain their findings with the 
fact that if ownership exceeds a particular level, large stockholders have most of the control 
and are wealthy enough to use their power to expropriate private benefits of control. In sum, 
agency costs are not only rising in association with fragmented ownership but also as a result 
of large share ownership and entrenchment. Research has detected a concave relationship 
between block holdings and monitoring effectiveness (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988b, 
Stulz, 1988, Wruck 1989, McConnell and Servaes 1990). Hart (1995) concludes that although 
agency problems may be reduced, large shareholders do not eliminate them. 
2.4.3.3 Large Creditors and Investors 
The role of creditors in monitoring borrower behaviour has been the focus of much research 
including evidence from Diamond (1984), Berlin and Loeys (1988), Seward (1990) and 
Besanko and Kanatas (1993). Research by Fama (1985) on the financial role of large creditors 
portrays banks as 'special' as they provide a unique financial service. This view was 
consequently supported by evidence by James (1987) which suggests that what is 'special' is 
that banks fulfil a monitoring as well as a lending function. Schmidt (2003) and Jacoby (2007) 
points out that this view is particularly true in countries such as Germany and Japan, where 
relationship banking plays a key monitoring role as part of the national corporate governance 
system. 
Lenders incur monitoring costs to secure individual interest payments and to protect their 
loans overall. Therefore, creditors force firms to become a more efficient operation with 
better-utilised assets. Creditors, in addition, often monitor the consumption of perquisites to 
imProw financial performance. As a result, small creditors and shareholders are able to 
benefit from bank monitoring, which may lead to lower agency costs. Research by Ang, Cole 
and Lin (2000) also found some evidence that delegated monitoring of small firms by banks 
reduces agency costs. Empirical support is given to the theory that creditors are capable 
monitors and there is compelling legal and financial argument in support of extending the 
monitoring role of these investors (Black, 1992). 
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Amihud and Lev (1981) and Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) refer to large creditors being risk- 
averse investors resulting in potentially conflicting interests of bondholders and shareholders 
leading to agency costs. Risk-averse creditors generally tend to finance projects which reduce 
the uncertainty of their interest payments to protect their loans overall, which, however, might 
result in a lower expected return. Shareholders have the opposite preference and want 
creditors to also consider riskier ventures with an upside return potential. Hart (1995) adds 
that riskier ventures enrich shareholders at the expense of creditors, because shareholders do 
not pay any of the gains to bondholders, yet bondholders bear part of the risk of corporate 
failure. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) see (Drisiderable similarities between large creditors and large 
shareholders. They believe that large investors might misuse their power to the disadvantage 
of managers and employees. When managers and employees feel too closely monitored by 
investors with the risk of easily losing their employment, they might cut down on their finTi, - 
specific human capital investments. Schmidt (1996) and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) 
raise the particular issue that the high-powered incentives of principals can degrade the efforts 
of an agent. Research by Shleifer and Summers (1988) come to a similar conclusion by 
studying takeovers. It becomes apparent that large investors are, similarly to large 
shareholders, easily tempted to pursue their own objectives, which in turn impacts on 
managers' incentive payments. This in turn has a negative impact on ex-ante managerial and 
employee incentives, which is the focus of the next section. 
As already stated, countries differ widely in their regulatory regime applicable to the banking 
system. For example, there is no separation of commercial banking from securities and 
investment business in Germany. German banks therefore offer their customers custodial 
services for shares and vote on behalf of them at shareholder meetings. As a result, 
differences in banking regulations lead to very different roles played by banks in corporate 
governance. There is also considerable variation with regards to the legal limitations of bank 
ownership of non-financial firms across different countries. The ability of banks to own 
equity of firrns enhances their ability to be effective monitors. Until recently banking 
regulation in the US such as the Glass-Steagall Act severely limited the banks' ability to hold 
stocks in manufacturing firms and in general to combine banking and commerce. Countries 
with lender ability laws and equitable subordination laws also limit the ability of banks to be 
effective monitors. Economies like Gen-nany and Japan, however, are described as effective 
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monitors and are characterised as having a low cost of bank monitoring. On the other hand, as 
stated by Kose and Simi (2002), economies, where the environment is not conductive to bank 
monitoring, are regarded as having a high cost of bank monitoring. Country differences in 
governance systems will be further discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
In sum, whereas all contracting parties participate in setting up effective monitoring 
mechanisms, there is a tendency of interaction between each type of control mechanism 
within the firm and it has been shown that they all cause their own agency conflicts and 
monitoring problems. 
2.4.4 Bonding and Incentive Costs 
As explained by Shleifer and Vishny (1988), the incentive theory claims that managers, who 
are rewarded for good performance and penalised for poor performance, are motivated to 
improve corporate results and value. As pointed out by Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) and 
Denis and Kruse (2000), the optimal incentive/bonding contract should offer corporate 
management sufficient incentives to align their decisions with shareholders at the lowest 
possible cost to shareholders and bondholders. As described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
and Fama (1980) incentive contracts exists in various forms such as accounting- based 
performance bonus schemes, share ownership, stock options, long-term incentive plans or a 
threat of dismissal if income is below expectations. 
Empirical literature on incentive contracts and management ownership indirectly dates back 
to Berle and Means (1932) who argue that in large firms management ownership is too small 
to make managers interested in profit maximisation. Some of the early studies, including 
Baumol (1959), Cyert and March (1963) and Williamson (1964), disagree with the view of 
Berle and Means and reject the classical model of an entrepreneur, or owner-manager, who 
single-mindedly operates the firm to improve profits. They prefer 'behavioural' and 
I managerial' theories that look at the motivation of management who do not own but control, 
which is very different fom the 'classical economic man'. These studies document a general 
positive relationship between pay and performance, thus rejecting the extreme hypothesis of 
complete separation of ownership and control. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Gaver and 
Gaver (1993) have investigated the extent to which compensation policies cause managers to 
emphasise long-ten-n investments over short-terin investments. Research by Murphy (1985) 
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and Ferreira and Laux (2007) finds that managers' pay responds positively to stock 
performance. Studies by Brickley, Bhagat and Lease (1985) and Tehranian and Waegelein 
(1985) further show that stock prices improve when incentive-based compensation schemes 
are introduced. Bagnani, Milonas, Saunders and Travlos (1994) conclude that in the absence 
of any incentive mechanisms managers would pursue their own interests by choosing lov,,, -risk 
projects at the expense of the stockholders and to the general benefit of bondholders. 
To reduce potential agency costs, authors including Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Leland 
and Pyle (1977) regard managerial ownership as an important control tool for shareholders. 
Authors including Gompers, Ishi and Metrick (2003) agree and argue that increased 
managerial ownership has a direct impact on managerial diligence and perquisite 
consumptions, because managers bear their share of any potential costs resulting from poor 
management. Research by authors such as Amihud and Lev (1981) and Benston (1985) 
support this view. As further pointed out by Barron (1983), Walkling and Long (1984), Song 
and Walkling (1993) and Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) managerial ownership provides an 
additional control tool to deter or accept acquisitions. Top management will only support 
acquisition offers, which provide an overall wealth gain both for management and 
shareholders, which in turn also potentially results in higher takeover premiums being 
negotiated by managers. Stulz (1988), Stulz, Walkling and Song (1990) and Song and 
Walkling (1993) support this view and claim that firms with large managerial ownership tend 
to be less likely acquisition targets, not only because they tend to be more expensive but also 
because increased managerial ownership reduces agency costs and thus any potential 
acquisition gains. Research, which supports this ýew include studies by Lewellen, Loderer 
and Rosenfeld (1985), Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), Mikkelson and Partch (1989) and 
Song and Walkling (1993). 
As already pointed out earlier in this chapter, managerial risk aversion is known to be a source 
of potential agency costs. Empirical research by Ross (1973), Stiglitz (1975), Holmstrom, 
(1982), Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), Haugen and Senbet (1981) and Bagnani, Milonas, 
Saunders and Travlos (1994) gives evidence that when management holds large managerial 
share holdings, he is induced to choose riskier corporate investments, which is commonly in 
line with shareholder interests but potentially to the harm of bondholder interests (Haugen and 
Senbet, 1981, Bagnani, Milonas, Saunders and Travlos, 1994). Amihud and Lev (1981), on 
the other hand imply that the relation between managerial stock holdings and risk taking may 
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not always be positive. Their research outcome supports the view that managers with small 
shareholdings have an incentive to reduce the finn's overall risk. They refer to the fact that 
managers owning minimal stock holdings are often undertaking conglomerate mergers, 
presumably to reduce the variability and risk level. As argued by Agrawal and Mandelker 
(1987) and Goh (2006) this implies that decisions of corporate investment and financing may 
be dependent on the degree of managerial share holdings. 
Other studies including Ross (1973), Stiglitz (1975) and Holmstrom (1982) come to the result 
that the optimal incentive contract is dependent on management's individual risk aversion. 
This might be one explanation for the fact that research, focusing on the relation between 
managerial ownership and risk taking in investment decisions, comes to conflicting results in 
terms of not always detecting a positive relationship. 
Another problem with high-powered incentive contracts is, as noted by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), that they result in enormous opportunities for managerial self-dealings. Managerial 
ownership provides management with additional voting power, which they may exploit to 
pursue their own private wealth considerations and employment position. For example, 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988 a, b, 1990), Gompers, Ishi and Metrick (2003) and Goh 
(2006) note that managers with a high ownership stake might become entrenched, which in 
turn may increase their ability to resist external discipline and may misalign interests between 
managers and shareholders as well as managers and bondholders. Their research, however, 
found out that in practice corporate executives generally own only a small share in the 
corporation. 
Research by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988a, b), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Hennalin 
and Weisbach (199 1) and Bagnani, Milonas, Saunders and Travlos (1994) revealed a non- 
linear relation between the fraction of stock being held by management and firm perfonnance. 
This implies, that management with an ownership stake display a preference for riskier 
investments only up to some threshold. They claim that when managerial shareholdings are 
very large their decision- making becomes more risk-averse since management starts to worry 
about their potentially non- divers if able, noný-human wealth and hence aim to protect their 
private benefits and personal objectives. In sum, managers with high ownership stakes align 
their interests not with shareholders anymore but their decision- making sympathises more 
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with bondholder interests. Shleifer and Vishny (1988) therefore conclude that it is problematic 
to infer that incentive contracts would totally resolve the agency problem. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) refer to another common bonding mechanism between 
management and shareholders by posing the issue of investors bribing the management with 
cash to ensure that management only undertakes efficient projects. As pointed out by 
Walkling and Long (1984) and Lambert and Larcker (1985), golden parachutes are good 
examples of bribing activity, since they induce managers to agree to hostile takeovers. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) remark that shareholders should not brbe managers since such 
threats would be against the managers' legal 'duty of loyalty' to shareholders. Although this 
legal duty prevents efficient ex-post bargaining between managers and shareholders it, 
however, also avoids shareholders getting into the ituation of having to constantly bribe 
managers to achieve any efficient action at all. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) conclude that 
shareholders should keep away from bargaining since it only exposes them to threats from 
management. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a review of the theory and research undertaken in the field of corporate 
governance with particular focus on agency theory. It investigated the implications that the 
separation of ownership and control and the resulting misalignment of management and 
residual claimants' interests have on the varying contracting parties. 
It was shown that the separation of ownership and control not only results in a residual loss 
due to costs arising from an agent's action such as wasteful management but also through 
costs arising from monitoring and bonding agents in order to keep residual losses to a 
minimum. However, as pointed out by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), it is incorrect to 
state that existing monitoring and incentive tools keep managers from pursuing personal norl-- 
value maximising objectives. 
Another conclusion, which can be drawn from the literature, is the reoccurring controlling 
importance of ownership on the relationship between all contracting participants. As has been 
shown, a certain level of ownership stake being held by the various stakeholders such as 
shareholder, bondholders and management itself can impact positively on agency costs, 
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whereas these positive impacts on agency conflicts disappear again beyond a certain level of 
ownership. 
The following chapter will focus on the role the market for corporate control plays for 
corporate govemance and agency conflicts. 
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Chapter Three 
The Market for Corporate Control 
3.1 Introduction 
Whereas the previous chapter investigated the role agency conflicts play for the various 
contracting party of a firm, the following chapter analyses the role the market for corporate 
control plays with regard to corporate governance. Manne (1965,1967) regards the external 
market for corporate control as an important tool to overcome the misalignment between 
managers' decision- making and those that are best from the standpoint of shareholders and 
bondholders. 
There is sizable empirical literature analysing the effect of the market for corporate control on 
these agency conflicts. In line with Jensen's (1993) research, this chapter distinguishes 
between four control forces, which are internal control systems such as (1) the board of 
directors, (2) legal and regulatory systems, (3) the external capital and the managerial labour 
market as well as (4) the external product and factor markets. Varying practices across 
countries are highlighted and discussed for the various control systems. This chapter also 
investigates M&As as a fifth external control force, which is often referred to as the capital 
market's last resort for rectifying managerial inefficiency and overcoming agency conflicts. 
3.2 The Board of Directors 
3.2.1 The Role of the Board of Directors 
In theory, the most important legal right of shareholders is the privilege to elect the board of 
directors at the company's annual general meeting. The board of directors is the main intemal 
mechanism through which shareholders try to constrain managerial choices, since the board 
has at least nominal power to hire and fire the chief executive officer (CEO) and to block any 
major corporate investment decision including M&As (Manne, 1965, Easterbrook and 
Fischel, 1983). For this reason, the board of directors is recognised as an important element of 
corporate structure and govemance (Blair, 1995, Monks and Minow, 2002). 
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The board can be defined as 'the institution to which managers are accountable and the 
institution, which is accountable before the law for the company's activities' (Oxford 
Analytica Limited, 1992; p7). McMenamin (1999) and Monks and Minow (2002) add in this 
context that members of the board are regarded as the middlemen between the principals and 
the agents of a corporation. The authors refer to the board's legal duties, the duty of care, in 
exercising reasonable caution and due diligence in making decisions, and secondly, the duty 
of loyalty, in demonstrating reliability to the company's shareholders. Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) see the important function of the board of 
directors in monitoring and controlling management and its performance and to enforce its 
replacement if necessary 12 . Gertner (2000) further regards it as the board's duty to advise and 
support management with expertise and experience in its decisio n- making. 
3.2.2 Election and Structure of the Board 
Until'the mid-to-late 1980s, it was general practice to (reýelect directors, which were 
nominated by executives, at each annual shareholder meeting. Blair (1995) in this context 
remarks that the voting rights of shareholders were limited in that shareholders could only 
vote for the directors, which were selected by the directors themselves, or could choose not to 
vote. The exceptions were proxy contests. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Blair (1995) further 
add that the election of the board by shareholders does not oblige directors to act in 
shareholders' interests. 
However, as a consequence of the takeover wave in the late 1980s, companies have started to 
implement the protective device of electing directors on a three-year term. This helped by 
reducing the risk of raiders seeking director votes from shareholders. As pointed out by 
Monks and Minow (2002), management argued that this staggered board structure assured a 
more continued board service, however, i ignored the interests of shareholders, who might 
have preferred to vote on an annual basis. 
Another important determinant of the effectiveness of the board of directors is often referred 
to as board size. According to research by Yermack (1996) and Conyon and Peck (1998), a 
12 The board's responsibilities include the appointment and replacement of the CEO, negotiating the CEO's 
compensation, nominating directors, monitoring and overseeing financial reporting and approving important 
strategic and financial decisions such as M&As (Gertner, 2000). 
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board, which comprises of too many directors, becomes inefficient. The benefits of improved 
monitoring through larger boards are offset by problems related to asymmetries of 
information. It is being suggested that a board should not exceed the size of ten members. 
Jensen (1993), for example, states that a board with more than seven or eight members is 
likely to act ineffectively and that larger boards are easier to control by the CEO. 
The last twenty years have been characterised by the trend of increasingly including 
independent outside directors in the board of directors (Monks and Minow, 2002). In theory, 
outside directors are free from conflicts of interests and are in a better position to protect the 
owners' interests. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997) 
believe that outside directors have more incentives to promote shareholder interests and to be 
more objective in evaluating the costs and benefits of an investment decision, such as M&As. 
However, the definition of director independence varies. According to one view, board 
members should be completely independent of the corporation's business affairs and must 
have no connection to the company other than the seat on the board (Blair, 1995, Monks and 
Minow, 2002). As pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny (1988), this independence of board 
directors is often partly spoilt by the CEO asking the board to put interests of internal 
stakeholders before those of shareholders. An alternative theory of independence was outlined 
by Porter (1992) who proposes that boards of directors should not only comprise of insiders 
but of a combination of all important stakeholders in the firm, e. g. customers, suppliers, 
financial advisers, employees, etc.. Porter's view is argued to have limitations when applied to 
large publicly listed corporations, however, his model has found wide application in many 
smaller businesses. 
Some studies by authors including Weisbach (1988), Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1991), Black (1998) and Bhagat and Black (1999) show that a board of 
independent directors do a better job than a board comprising of non- independent members, 
particularly if the board's most important task is the replacement of the CEO. The stock 
market thus values the importance of independent directors and studies have shown that stock 
prices increase as a result of appointing additional outside directors. 
Another area of debate is the effectiveness of a dual or joint function of the CEO and 
chain-nan in a corporation. The majority of large US corporations have a CEO who is also the 
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chairman of the board. Views regarding the effectiveness of the CEO's function as the board's 
chairman are conflicting. Whereas one view stresses the importance of a company being led 
by one person, there are other authors who argue that separating the role of the CEO and 
chairrnan is of less importance, since the role of the chairman was only to chair the meetings. 
However, other authors including Monk and Minow (2002) argue that a board of directors, 
which is chaired by the CEO, cannot represent the interests of shareholders and impartially sit 
in judgement himself. A separation would help to more objectively evaluate the CEO and the 
corporate success thus creating an envirorunent of greater accountability (Jensen, 1993, 
Monks and Minow,, 2002) 13 . Empirical work in this particular field is limited, however, a 
study by Rechner and Dalton (1991) found that corporations separating the CEO and 
chairman position consistently outperform their peers with a joint leadership position. 
3.2.3 Board Structures across Countries 
Internal control systems vary greatly across the world, even across the developed countries. 
They range from two-tier supervisory and management boards in Gen-nany with strong 
relationsh ip- banking devices and in si der- dominated boards in Japan to mixed boards in the 
UK and US (Charkham, 1994). Boardrooms are usually made up of internal top executives 
and external directors to the firm. However, countries vary considerably in their exact 
boardroom structure and in the mixture of executive and nori-executive directors. A further 
country- specific distinction can be made with regard to the (non)separation of the chairman 
from the CEO position (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988, Constantinou and Constantinou, 2003). 
The Anglo-Saxon economies, particularly US corporations, are often characterised by having 
only inside board members or in the case that outsiders are selected, the selection is strongly 
influenced by corporate insiders or the CEO himself. Research by Weisbach (1988) shows 
that boards in the US, particularly those which are dominated by outside directors, are 
sometimes in the position to remove top managers but only as a result of very poor 
perfon-nance. Mace (1971) and Jensen (1993) argue very strongly that, as a general rule, 
corporate executives dominate corporate boards in the US. CEOs in the US often serve as 
joint chairman of the board, whereas according to Jacobs (1993) UK chairmen of publicly 
traded companies are commonly outsiders. 
13 However, it needs to be borne in mind, that combining the two positions does not inevitably mean that a joined 
CEO/chairman certainly uses his power to manipulate the board. 
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Overall, the Anglo-Saxon economies are known to be much more stock market-oriented and 
the distinction between investors and managers is very strong. This heavy reliance on an 
active stock market is often regarded as an inefficient way to monitor and if necessary, correct 
corporate action (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988, Jensen, 1993). These externally controlled 
governance systems for example, rely heavily on the capital market for detecting managerial 
deficiencies with takeovers serving as an importart means of rectifying these deficiencies. 
Germany in contrast employs a two-tier board structure to supervise the company's strategy 
and operation. The supervisory board consists of a large number of outside directors, which 
are representing the corporation's various interest groups, with the strong universal banks 
taking an important role. In general, German banks have considerable power and influence on 
corporate governance, which is often significantly greater than for banks based in more stock 
market-oriented countries. The second board is referred to as the executive board whose role 
is to implement the strategy (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Overall, research by Jacobs (1991), 
Kester (1991) and Kaplan (1994 a, b), however, concludes that despite the presence of a 
separate independent supervisory board, German supervisory boards are rather passive. 
In contrast to Anglo-Saxon countries, the stock exchange plays a less critical role in 
monitoring and guiding corporate actions in Germany and the rest of Continental Europe, thus 
takeover activity is almost non-existent. Instead debt finance providers play an important role 
in this principle agent relationship, which is in general, governed much more by rules and 
legal restrictions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Other European countries such as France and Italy are also principally controlled by 
executives who wield significant power and who are rarely challenged by the owners and 
other stakeholders (Thompson, 2001). 
Japanese shareholders also tend to be passive and with little power, since the boards of 
directors are essentially regarded as a managerial extension with no independent power. Japan 
is characterised by large industrial groupings [Keiretsu], which are held together by a number 
of cross- shareholdings, joint ventures and product- development agreements. Typically, 
commercial banks are at the centre of such industrial groups, not only to satisfy any financial 
needs but also to exercise direct managerial control, particularly if the company encounters 
operating or financial difficulties (Aoki, 1990, Jacobs, 1991, Kester, 1991, Berglof and 
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Perotti, 1994, Kaplan, 1994 a, b, Megginson, 1997, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Schaede, 
2006, Jacoby, 2007). 
As pointed out by Thompson (2001) and Rose (2007), corporate governance systems have an 
increasing impact on corporate strategies across all countries as a result of globalisation and 
cross-country takeovers and joint ventures. The effectiveness of the different kinds of board 
structures in various countries is oDntroversial and evidence remains mixed (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Overall, despite a large variety of board systems and structures, corporations 
in many countries are still dominated by management with shareholders only taking a passive 
role. Interests of shareholders are thus often placed below those of the controlling 
management. 
3.2.4 The Effectiveness of the Board of Directors 
Fama and Jensen (1983) and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) remark that internal control 
devices such as the board of directors are cheap to operate and are more in line with long-term 
planning of the present management, which is in direct contrast to governance systems such 
as the rapid-fire mechanisms of takeovers. 
Practice, however, has proven that boards of directors are rarely effective in stopping the non- 
value maximising behaviour of corporate executives. Despite the board's theoretical relevance 
and despite the existence of a legal framework to monitor and control the board's function, 
directors and managers have been involved in a large number of corporate scandals since the 
early 1980s (McMenamin, 1999). One of the most recent boardroom scandals involves 
Deutsche Bank's CEO and his personal involvement as a non-executive director in the recent 
Mannesmann - Vodaphone hostile takeover deal 
14 
. These scandals have highlighted and 
increased the general concern that the standards and the code of conduct of top executives in 
leading corporations are evidently deteriorating. 
As a result, corporate governance by internal control systems has increasingly become an 
important issue of public debate. Many researchers have undertaking a vast amount of 
14 One of the world largest hostile takeovers to date, the Mannesmann - Vodafone deal in 2000 for over a$ 100 
billion has highlighted EUs failure to adopt a Anglo-Saxon style, takeover-friendly common code. The 
Mannesmann battle has also drawn attention to the slow pace of Germany's own corporate law overhaul, 
intended to replace a voluntary takeover code and remove a host of legally sanctioned anti-takeover defences 
open to target managements (Goldstein, 2000). 
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research into the field of internal control mechanisms in order to increase the understanding of 
the ineffectiveness of corporate boards of directors. Particular areas of research include the 
election and structure of the board, the board's (dis)ability to fulfil its function (due to the lack 
of infori-nation, involvement and consensus) as well as the lack of shareholdings being held by 
directors, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Jensen (1993) remark that the duty of the board of director to 
shareholders is often restricted by a lack of involvement, insufficient knowledge and expertise 
as well as the lack of consensus about goals and interests to be served, to assess and challenge 
the corporation and its strategy effectively. Board members are not only dependent on the 
information provided by the CEO and internal executives, which is often on purpose selective 
and limited, but also on obtaining additional outside information which is costly and time- 
consuming. 
The effectiveness of the board as monitor of management is further weakened by the fact that 
board members are not fully involved in the corporation's activities and the industry as a 
whole (Blair, 1995) 15 . As explained by Monks and Minow (2002), directors are responsible 
for the overall picture, not the day-to-day business decisions which, however, makes it 
difficult to monitor and evaluate the corporation correctly. Therefore, limitations on 
infon-nation and involvement hinder the effectiveness of the board's monitoring function 
considerably and this constraint is often referred to as the biggest obstacle to the board's 
governance. Board members do not have adequate procedural mechanisms to obtain the most 
effective overview. 
The lack of consensus and the confusion about corporate priorities among the board members 
are also regarded as an important reason for board ineffectiveness (Lorsch and MacIver, 
1989). This lack of consensus among directors has also become a central element in the 
debate on corporate governance. Research by Mace (1971), Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988), 
Weisbach (1988) and Jensen (1993) show that boards of directors are not effective in the 
monitoring function, resulting in limited corporate restructuring activity. Corporate 
redirection often occurs only as a result of external threat and detection of legislative 
misconduct. According to Mace (1971; 3) board directors are brnaments on a corporate 
Christmas tree'. 
15 outside directors frequenfly hold senior offices of other companies or are accomplished professionals from 
another field who may serves on numerous other boards (Blair, 1995). 
42 
Jensen (1993) sees another major problem of the board's effectiveness arising from directors 
not owning shares themselves in the company. Independent directors of hostile takeover 
targets are generally known to have less stock in the corporation than their counterparts of 
directors of non, -targets. Jensen (1993) and Black (1998) therefore recommend encouraging 
outside directors to hold considerable shareholdings in the company to emphasise their role as 
the 'true advocates' of shareholder interests. Monks and Minow (2002; 210) conclude that 'no 
director is going to remain passive if his investment is at stake. ' 
Despite the many weaknesses and deficiencies of the boards of directors, Blair (1995) regards 
this internal control device as the most important corporate governance mechanism Gertner 
(2000) also refers to the fact that a large number of board structure issues are being tackled 
and that corporate governance activists have strengthened board independence in order to 
overcome agency conflicts. As pointed out by Black (1998), recent efforts have been directed 
at giving independent directors appropriate structures for monitoring and evaluating 
corporations more effectively. Activities include issues such as board composition, 
compensation, retention, and succession. Boards are increasingly becoming more 
systematised through the institutional isation of various board committees, namely the audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees. Shareholders are increasingly aiming to participate 
actively in setting board service criteria and in choosing board candidates themselves, which 
incorporates the important role of independent directors vis-A-vis other directors (Padgett and 
Shabbir, 2005). Non-statutory proposals recommend eliminating a joint CEO/chairman 
position for the board of directors, and advise to have at least three independently minded 
outside executives on the board. An increasing proportion of director compensation is being 
paid in form of stock and stock cptions to 'incentivise' board director performance (Monks 
and Minow, 2002). 
Nevertheless authors including Black (1998) and Monks and Minow (2002) remark that 
despite the welcomed rise of independent outside directors, revised board structures have 
seldom contributed to a more effective monitoring and controlling management and that 
directors still do not act sufficiently in shareholders' interests. As Gerner (2000) concludes, 
the board of directors still lacks power and instruments to become truly indeperdent and to 
improve its ability as an infon-ned judge of important strategic corporate decisioný- making on 
behalf of shareholders. 
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The effectiveness of the different kinds of board structures in various countries is 
controversial and evidence remains mixed (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Rose, 2007). Overall, 
despite a large variety of board systems and structures, corporations in many countries are still 
dominated by management with shareholders only taking a passive role. Interests of 
shareholders are thus often placed below those of the controlling management. 
3.3 Legal, Political and Regulatory Systems 
Legal, political and other regulatory systems are generally referred to as the principal remedy 
for agency conflicts, as they give outside investors, including shareholders, some degree of 
controlling power to secure their investment against managerial expropriation (La Porta, 
Lopes- de- Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000, Menjucq, 2006). As pointed out by Manne 
(1965) and Easterbrook and Fischel (1983), shareholders benefit from their legal right to vote 
on important corporate matters such as mergers and acquisitions as well as to elect the board 
of directors, who in turn represent shareholders' interest vis-A-vis management. 
As has already been mentioned in this chapter, a wide variety of legislation and other 
regulatory rules have been established across countries to align directors' actions with the 
actions of shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that legal restrictions on managerial 
self-dealings are the most common aspects of the duty of loyalty. Common offences include 
outright theft from the firrn, unjustifiable compensation or allocation of additional stock 
equity to the management or even family. 
Many countries, including the UK, have seen the creation of a number of public committees, 
which attempt to improve the accountability of board members (Constantinou and 
Constantinou, 2003, Rose, 2007). Reports of these committees, which include the Cadbury 
Report (1992), the Greenbury Report (1995), the Hampel Report (1998) and the Higgs Report 
(2003), all share the view that the board's prime responsibility lies in determining the 
corporate board strategy and ensuring its implementation. Legal practice in these countries is 
that companies confin-n their compliance with criteria proposed in the committee reports on 
corporate governance mentioned above. Non-compliance needs to be declared in special 
statements (McCoglan, 2001). 
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La Porta, Lopes- de- Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) claim that legal protection does not 
only depend on the content of the laws; it further is largely reliant on the quality of law 
enforcement. The authors view the latter as an important tool to reduce agency costs. La 
Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) refer to the fact that the degree of legal 
protection of outside investors varies a lot between countries, similarly to the boards of 
directors. Despite all the apparent benefits of legal regulation, Jensen (1993) remarks that the 
legal, political and regulatory system has the problem of being far too slow and bureaucratic 
to cope with wasteful managerial actions effectively. 
Legislation has also become an important issue with regard to corporate governance systems 
in the particular case of takeovers (Menjucq, 2006) . As pointed out by Copeland and Weston 
(1992), views regarding takeover regulations are conflicting. One view supports stricter tender 
offer regulations to protect shareholders from undesirable takeovers and to enable them to 
receive more information and time to make their decision. Other researchers, including 
Dairies (2002), claim that legislation significantly alters the effectiveness of the market for 
corporate control16. 
High levels of legal protection can increase competition and premium payments for a takeover 
through information leakage and thus reduce the effectiveness of market control (Marshall 
and Anderson, 2006). It is argued that although these higher premiums might be beneficial to 
target shareholders in the short-term, they also create an artificial barrier against takeovers, 
which in turn might reduce the incentive and likelihood of the acquisition overall. This might 
leave the shareholders worse off by regulation in the long run. Copeland and Weston (1992; 
727) therefore conclude that 'regulation is seen as providing an advantage to incumbent 
(positively inept) management and mitigating the disciplinary effect of the market for 
corporate control'. 
Countries including the UK and US, in particular, with their well-developed national financial 
sectors have adopted takeovers as an important governance mechanism with functioning legal 
frameworks (Menjucq, 2006). Sinha (2004), for example, found out that the proportion of 
hostile takeovers in relation to total takeovers is significantly larger in the UK than in the US. 
Other countries, such as Continental Europe, however, are struggling to bring their 
16 For example, Daines (2002) shows how the Delaware Law makes firms more prone to takeovers. 
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governance practice in line with the more developed financial markets to emerge as a more 
unified and liberalised capital market (Dixon, 1999). 
Much attention with regard to existing corporate governance systems have focused on the 
differences of the systems in the advanced economies of the world (Rose, 2007). On the one 
hand, in Japan and Germany, managers are monitored by a combination of banks and large 
corporate shareholders with little or no role for the market for corporate control. On the other 
hand in the US and UK, the market for corporate control is an important mechanism for 
disciplining management with little or no monitoring by banks and large shareholders (Kose 
and Simi, 2002). 
3.4 Product Market Competition 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) regard product market competition as one of the most powerful 
forces to discipline managers and per se to improve economic efficiency. Jensen (1993) also 
emphasises the power of the product market competition, as its self-regulating punishment is 
inevitable. It is common rule of the product market, that firms, which do not provide a service 
or product that consumers want at a competitive price are destined to fail. However, as 
pointed out by Jensen (1993), product markets and factor markets are often too slow to react 
in time to save the company. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Cremers, Nair and Peyer (2007) 
further see the limits of product market competition to reduce agency costs and corporate 
governance issues. As they explain, product market competition is a suitable tool to reduce 
the amount of cash available for managers, however, managers are still in the position to 
expropriate any residual returns available. 
3.5 Capital Market Mechanisms 
In contrast to the corporate governance mechanism of product market competition, which 
comes into action when it is often too late to rectify the situation, capital markets present an 
efficient mechanism to force companies to change and correct their actions in order to avoid 
losses (Jensen, 1993). As mentioned earlier in the context of large shareholders and creditors, 
firms have a need to approach the external capital markets for additional funds from time to 
time. As La Porta, Lopes-de- Si lanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) point out, funding provisions 
and related borrowing terms are very much dependent on the fin-n's reputation and credit 
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rating which in turn controls managers in their expropriation activity. As shown by research 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) Williamson (1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986), 
managerial opportunism, whether in form of expropriation of investors or misallocation of 
company funds, often leads to an ex-ante inefficiency, which reduces the amount of resources 
investors are willing to put up ex-ante to finance the fin-n. A study by Franks and Mayer 
(1996) finds that equity issues by financially distressed companies supply the most significant 
mechanism for disciplining management. 
Kreps (1990) claims that reputation building is also regarded as an important motive for 
managers to fulfil their obligations. As shown by research including John and Nachman 
(1985) and Mann and Sicherman (1991), reputation building reduces agency costs, however, 
as pointed out Bulow and Rogoff (1989) within some limits. Although Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) agree with the general importance of the reputation model, they, however, claim that 
reputation building is probably not the whole explanation for companies coming to the capital 
market. 
Another important reputation issue is related to the labour market for managers. Fama (1980) 
takes the view that management's remuneration is dependent on the market's perception of 
the overall alignment of managerial activities with shareholder interests. Management's 
employment and remuneration is therefore dependent on its reputation of achieving 
shareholder interests. Jensen and Murphy (1990) believe that the labour market mechanisms 
are likely to reduce the occurrence of poor managerial performance. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) in this context regard the threat of displacement as a powerful tool to discipline 
underperforming managers. The danger of being fired and the related embarrassment as well 
as private monetary damages may motivate the agent to align its interests according to those 
of the shareholders or principal. However, as empirical evidence by Weisbach (1988) and 
Kaplan and Reishus (1990) and arguments by Jensen and Murphy (1990) show, it takes a 
prolonged period of poor performance to result in the removal of even the poorest managers. 
Fama (1980) refers to the wage revision process, where managers will always be remunerated 
in accordance with their achievements in line with shareholders. Fama, however, admits that 
due to market imperfection a full ex-post settling up is not realistic. He nevertheless argues 
that the controlling function of the capital and labour markets are adequate to solve a variety 
of corporate governance issues. Managerial labour markets are rational and foresee any 
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managerial shortcomings. Managerial assessments of ex-pOst deviations from the 
employment contract, for example, can be automatically incorporated into contracts on an ex- 
ante basis, for example, through a wage adjustment. 
3.6 Takeover Mechanisms 
Much of the evidence of the effects of corporate governance arrangements on agency conflicts 
is derived from analysing managerial behaviour during takeover threats and from examining 
acquisition announcements (Manne, 1965, Goldstein, 2000, Scholten, 2003). As already 
discussed in the previous chapters, agency conflicts are often the motivating force behind both 
acquisitions as well as takeover resistance. An enon-nous amount of research papers on 
mergers and acquisitions has emerged, studying areas such as takeover motives and potential 
downside risks, which is the focus of Chapter Five. 
Takeover attempts are regarded as an important disciplining device of the external market for 
corporate control (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The takeover market ý often referred to as the 
6court of last resort' for replacing inefficient corporate management (Megginson, 1997). As 
pointed out by Monks and Minow (2002), the takeover era created all kinds of financial tools 
to finance M&As of any kind and size, which challenged and threatened the decision- making 
of managers. Jensen (1986) takes the view that takeovers are a direct response to the 
breakdown of internal corporate governance systems in companies, which have inefficient 
board structures, financial slack and wasteful managerial policies. Jensen (1993), for example, 
holds the failures of the boards of directors responsible for the advent of hostile takeovers, 
which are the predominant instrument vis-A-vis friendly takeovers. 
Research by Marine (1965), Jensen (1988) and Scharfstein (1988) supports the view that 
mergers and acquisitions are a good tool for solving governance problems. Authors including 
Palepu (1986) and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (I 988a, b, 1989) point out that takeover targets 
are often underperforming companies. The evidence in research by Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989), for example, shows that bidders take advantage of apparent managerial 
inefficiencies and poor internal control mechanism such as the board of directors and 
incentive pay. Re search in the field of underperforming companies becoming takeover targets 
is investigated further, in detail, in Chapter Five and constitutes also the central focus of this 
study. 
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R... -Isearch by Martin and McConnell (1991) shows that management is often replaced 
immediately after a successful takeover. As indicated by Jensen and Ruback (1983) profits of 
the combined firms are likely to increase after takeovers. They claim that target shareholders 
benefit in particular from takeovers with significant wealth increases, which implies the 
failure of previous management. 
Megginson (1997), however, notes that although disciplinary takeovers might work 
effectively, they need to be regarded as the most brutal method of exercising corporate 
control. In addition, there are also a number of problems related to the effectiveness of M&As 
as a mechanism of corporate governance. There is not only a high level of organisational costs 
associated with takeovers but, as stressed by Grossman and Hart (1980), it is the takeover 
premium the bidder has to pay to target firrn's shareholders, which increases the costs of a 
takeover, often to unjustifiable levels. Considering the high level of associated costs of 
takeovers, alternative methods of corporate governance need to be investigated to align 
manager and shareholder interests. This is also discussed further in Chapter Five. 
According to Monks and Minow (2002), takeovers are often combated strongly by the target's 
board of directors and management, who jointly try to protect their companies from hostile 
threats, however, at the same time ignoring their shareholders' interests. As pointed out by 
Black (1998), recent board structure reforms have also impacted on managerial acquisition 
behaviour. Boards with independent directors, for example, are less prepared to allow their 
bidding management to overpay the target. Research by Byrd and Hickman (1992) shows 
that bidders with majority- independent boards offer lower takeover premiums and earn 
roughly zero returns from acquisitions, while bidders with a board dominated by inside 
directors are prepared to pay higher premiums and thus often suffer losses. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced and discussed the corporate governance function of the market for 
corporate control, particularly investigating the effectiveness of the board of directors, legal, 
political and regulatory systems, product market competition, capital market mechanisms 
including the labour market as well as the correcting function of takeovers in overcoming 
potential agency conflicts due to the separation of ownership and control. 
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All control functions prove their relevance in theory; however, empirical research showed that 
each of them displayed weaknesses and deficiencies in practice. Whereas the board of 
directors is still very much wielded by decisions made by corporate executives, legislation, 
product market competition, capital and labour market mechanisms are generally appreciated 
as one way of controlling management, however, law enforcement is weak in many countries 
and corrective action often occurs far too late. 
This chapter has also investigated takeovers as part of the corporate governance system. 
M&As offer, within some limits, a last resort for replacing inefficient management. Takeovers 
have the advantage of speed and guaranteed corrective action; however, the associated high 
costs are one main disadvantage. 
Overall, there is only one clear conclusion to be drawn from this literature review, which is 
also exemplified in takeovers, corporate governance mechanisms, which might be optimal in 
one particular situation for one company in one country might not be ideal for another. As 
Kole (1995) and Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) summarise, agency conflicts are 
heterogeneous across different firms in different industries with differing contract 
environments. 
After investigating various corporate governance mechanisms of the market of corporate 
control, the following chapter will now focus on the relevance of the choice of capital 
structure for mitigating agency conflicts. 
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Chapter Four 
Capital structure 
4.1 Introduction 
There is a growing agreement among academics and practitioners that financial structure 
plays an important role in the running of corporations and that it can positively impact on 
corporate governance, as already mentioned in the previous chapters. Finance theory has long 
been concerned with the debate on the optimal capital structure and its effect on firm value in 
general and how the choice of debt and equity in a corporation mitigates agency conflicts in 
particular. The majority of work undertaken in this field has centred on what has been 
described by Lewellen and Emery (1986; 415) as the following question 'whether the 
presence of debt when included as a component of a corporation's capital structure, will 
favourably affect the market value of the firm. ' 
This chapter investigates the aspects which impact the choice of capital structure, including 
tax advantages of debt and bankruptcy costs. This forms the foundation for a review of 
relevant research in the field of optimal capital structure, particularly drawing on examples 
from M&A studies. This chapter furthen-nore examines the mitigating impact debt and equity 
has on agency conflicts. Financial choice considerations are continuously related to the 
particular case of merger and acquisitions. This chapter concludes with an investigation of the 
impact of capital structure on the likelihood of acquisitions and looks at capital structure 
changes, which were caused by M&As in particular. 
4.2 The Theory of Capital Structure 
According to Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2002) firms should choose a capital structure, 
which will result in the highest firm value and therefore will have the most valuable effect for 
stockholders. In choosing the most value-enhancing capital structure the firm needs to 
consider the characteristics of debt and equity. Whereas debt is a repayable amount with an 
additional cost in form of interest payments on the outstanding debt, equity is understood as 
an investment payment made in a firrn, which, however, does not provide the shareholder 
with any guarantee of potential return (Ward, 1993). Williamson (1988) further claims that 
whereas debt is controlled by rules and is applicable for investments with highly deployable 
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assets, equity on the other hand allows discretion and is used for investments with less 
deployable assets. 
The implications and consequences of the use of debt or equity as a means of financing have 
lead to wide controversy during the last decades. As pointed out by Ross, Westerfield and 
Jaffe (2002), one view claims that the financing of firms is cheaper when debt instead of 
equity is being used, since shareholders require a higher rate of return than creditors. This is 
based on the fact that debt is less risky than equity issues, since lenders have a priority in 
claims on income in the case of liquidation. Debt, in addition, often requires debtors to 
provide a security and imposes covenants. The use of debt capital is also cheaper than equity, 
due to tax advantages resulting from debt interest being deducted from profits before tax, 
which results in a lower annual tax bill. A further advantage of raising debt capital versus 
equity is that governance costs including agency costs are generally lower for raising and 
servicing debt than for equity. With regard to equity finance, Ward (1993) explains that while 
new equity issues restrict firms operationally to a much lower extent than debt, equity finance 
dilutes corporate ownership and thus increases agency costs. 
However, as pointed out by authors including Brealey and Myers (2001) argues that while 
debt capital does not impact on operating risk, it nevertheless adds financial risk. This 
incorporates an additional cost factor due to the resulting increase in borrowing risk and cost 
of equity, which might outbalance the typical cost advantages of debt at some level. 
4.2.1 Research into Capital Structure 
Research into the field of capital structure and the implication of debt and equity was 
revolutionised by Modigliani and Miller (M&M) (1958,1963) with their controversial 
theorem. They claim that in a world without taxes and bankruptcy costs, the market value of a 
company does not depend on its capital structure 17 . It is argued that although debt seems to be 
cheaper than equity financing, a replacement of equity by debt cannot reduce the firm's 
overall cost of capital. A firm, which adds debt, increases the riskiness and cost of the 
remaining equity, which offsets the cost advantages achieved in the higher proportion of the 
fin-n's low-cost debt finance. Overall M&M (1958) demonstrate that these two effects 
17 , The average cost of capital to any firm [in the absence of bankruptcy costs and tax subsidies on the payment 
of interest] is completely independent of its capital structure and is equal to the capitalisation rate of a pure 
equity stream of its class' (M&M, 1958; 268/269). 
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precisely counterbalance each other, which results in that neither a firm's value nor the overall 
cost of capital is affected by changes in debt or equity. With reference to their pie model, 
which constitutes the various financial claimants of the firm (debt and equity), M&M argue 
that whereas the proportion of debt and equity might change, the actual size of the pie, 
meaning the company's value, does not. 
Early works by authors including Myers (1968), Levy and Sarnat (1970), Schall (1972), 
Rubinstein (1973) and Higgins and Schall. (1975) apply M&M's approach to mergers and 
acquisitions and their research confirms the M&M proposition. They conclude that in a 
perfect capital market, M&As cannot only gain from financial effects. That does not mean 
that M&As have no potential of generating real synergies, which might lead to value 
enhancements but they stress that in the absence of real synergistic effects, an acquisition will 
not result in a change of the market value of the combined firms. 
M&M's (1958) groundbreaking idea led to wide controversy with a lot of researchers 
criticising M&M's empirical work. Hamada (1969,1971) and Rubinstein (1973), for 
example, argue that it is not correct to assume the same operating risk exists for all investment 
choices or projects. As pointed out by Copeland and Weston (1992), the cost of equity is 
dependent on the systematic risk of the individual firm's after tax operating cash flows. 
Authors including Lewellen (1971), Lee and Barker (1977) and Marschall, Yawitz and 
Greenberg (1981) detect potential financial benefits resulting from capital structure choices 
due to imperfections in the capital market, which in fact do impact on value. According to 
Asquith and Kim (1982; 1211), examples of these financial benefits are 'reductions in 
corporate tax liabilities, reductions in agency costs and reductions in expected bankruptcy 
costs', which will be investigated in more detail in the next section. 
Jensen (1993) also finds apparent counter examples for M&M's theory based on evidence 
from M&As and leveraged restructurings. He claims that organisational efficiency and value 
creation can be affected dramatically through ownership strtuture changes in general and debt 
issues or payout policy in particular. Other authors agreeing with this research stream include 
Wruck (1990), Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) and Ofek (1993). 
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4.2.1.1 Tax Effects of Leverage 
Following this controversy, M&M (1963) extended their original proposition (1958) to take 
tax and bankruptcy effects into consideration. They argue that since interest payments are 
potentially offset against taxable profits, tax subsidies provide large incentives for firms to 
maximise debt financing. This results in tax savings, which on the one hand lead to higher 
distributable payments to security holders and on the other hand, indirectly reduce the real 
cost of debt capital. As concluded by Kim (1978) Mauer and Lewellen (1987), firm value 
increases as debt replaces equity in the capital structure of the firm due to potential tax 
benefits, commonly referred to as tax shields. 
Fama and Miller (1972) agree with M&M's revised proposition and attempt to quantify the 
potential value gain from tax benefits by claiming that risky debt will increase the value of the 
firm by the market value of the tax shields. They conclude that any potential gain in firm 
value will only be attributable to the equity providing an incentive to maximise the use of debt 
until the wealth effects of agency costs offset the wealth benefits resulting from tax subsidy. 
The importance of tax shields for using debt for financing takeovers is also shown by Bruner 
(1988) and Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell (1993). They observed post- acquisition 
performance by highly leveraged firms and argue that M&A activity is often simply reflecting 
potential tax benefits of higher levels of debt. This means, if highly leveraged firms finance 
their acquisition with additional debt, the potential gain and value enhancement may just be a 
result of the anticipated tax shields of the leverage increase. As pointed out by Maloney, 
McCon-nick and Mitchell (1993), this argument, however, has the problem that if tax shields 
are profitable by themselves, the firms should already have taken advantage of them prior to 
the merger. 
Miller (1977) in his famous paper 'debt and taxes', challenges the M&M proposition and 
claims that firms are indifferent to alternative capital structures. However his attempts to 
explain this with the fact that in equilibrium, the personal tax disadvantage of debt is offset by 
the corporate tax advantage have not been successful. Myers (1984), for example, claims that 
Miller's model wrongly assumes that all firms have the same marginal tax rate. 18 
18 Myers (1984; 579) argues that 'extensive trading of depreciation tax shields and investment tax credits through 
financial leases and other devices proves that plenty of firms face low marginal rates. Any firm paying a lower 
tax rate would see a net loss to corporate borrowing and a net gain to lending. ' 
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M&M's line of argument implies, as suggested by Salomon (1963; 103), that 'the Modigliani- 
Miller proposition, amended to take the tax deductibility of interest into account, would 
postulate that ... the recipe for optimal leverage ... is that companies ought to be financed 
99.9% with pure debt. ' The resulting conclusion - the higher the amount of debt the greater 
the value of the firm - however, is not of great intuitive appeal because the repayment and re- 
financing of debt has some associated risks as well (Baxter, 1967, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
Levy and Sarnat, 1988). With regards to this observed inconsistency, M&M (1963; 442) 
comment 'the existence of a tax advantage for debt financing ... does not necessarily mean 
that corporations should at all times seek to use the maximum amount of debt in their capital 
structure. ... there are as we point out limitations imposed by lenders ... as well as other 
dimensions.... ' 
As pointed out by Baxter (1967), it is impossible to obtain unlimited debt financing in the real 
world, since creditors normally secure their debt provision against a sufficient equity cushion 
to minimise the risk of bankruptcy. As soon as the maximum amount of debt is passed, the 
required rate of interest will increase to reflect the increased risk of default, which may result 
in a rise of the cost of capital for the debt-burdened firm. 
4.2.1.2 Bankruptcy Effects of Leverage 
Debt obligations require a firm to make regular and pre-determined interest and principal 
payments. As explained by Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2002), if firms do not comply with 
these obligations, they are confronted with the risk of financial distress, liquidation or 
bankruptcy. Financial distress is a result of payment obligations not being met or met with 
difficulties and according to Myers (1984,580), 'costs of financial distress include agency, 
moral hazard, monitoring and contracting costs'. There are also costs resulting from 
liquidation which include the indirect cost of reorganisation, various administrative payments 
to third parties and the loss of tax credits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Kim, 1978). 
Whereas early authors, including Warner (1975), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Haugen 
and Senbet (1978) generally claim that the average costs of bankruptcy are remarkably small, 
other theorists including Baxter (1967), Titman (1984) and Altman (1984) have taken the 
contrary view. As the risk of financial distress rises with the gearing ratio, bondholders 
55 
demand an increasing rate of return, which has a negative effect on the weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC) as the value of tax relief is offset by a rise in debt and in turn a reduction 
in firm value. Jensen and Meckling (1976), however, regard this theory as deficient, since it 
implies that debt should never be used unless tax subsidies exist and bankruptcy costs are 
minimal. Jensen and Meckling, in contrast argue, that even in the absence of tax benefits, debt 
would still be utilised if there were the potential of profitable investment opportunities, which 
exceeded the resources of the owner. Robicheck and Myers (1965), Baxter (1967) and 
Hirshleifer (1970) conclude that costs of financial distress are the key to the existence of an 
optimal capital structure. Altman (1984) extends this conclusion by suggesting that direct and 
indirect bankruptcy costs in sum are significant enough to provide proof for a theory of 
optimal capital structure. 
4.2.2 Theory of Optimal Capital Structure 
The conventional view is that a firm's capital structure decision can be thought of as a 'trade- 
off between the tax benefits of debt and the cost of financial distress. This approach is 
therefore referred to as the trade-off model of capital structure. The implication is, that under 
various assumptions regarding capital market imperfection and bankruptcy costs, there is 
claimed to be an optimum amount of debt for any individual firm. If the fin-n's target debt 
level is not attained, firm value is not maximised (Myers, 1984, Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 
2002). Whereas this trade-off model claims that there is the potential to improve performance 
by utilising the optimum amount of debt in the capital structure, it, however, does not explain 
actual company practice. 
Copeland and Weston (1992) pose the important question: at what point does the increase in 
the present value of debt, equal the increase in present value of the tax shield? This level of 
debt results in an optimal capital structure, which reduces the WACC to the minimum and 
increases the value of the fin-n to a maximum. Beyond this optimal capital structure, costs of 
financial distress accelerate faster than the benefits of the tax shield, which results in a 
reduction of finn value if debt is further raised. In this context, it has been argued by Baxter 
(1967) that the relation between tax benefits arising from debt and the risk of bankruptcy 
appears not to be linear but rather 'u, -shaped'. 
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Early studies in this field which provide support for this optimal capital structure theory and a 
target debt level include Bosworth (1971), Stiglitz (1969,1972) Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1973), Ang (1976), Scott (1977), Taggart (1977) and Kim (1978). One approach to determine 
the optimum debt level for a particular firm combines Miller's (1977) model with the 
balancing theory of optimal capital structure (Kim, 1978, DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980, Kim, 
1982, Brennan and Schwartz, 1984a, b). For example, the model by DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) develops a framework of optimal capital structure, which considers various tax shield 
impacts and find an individual firm's unique optimum debt level reached when the expected 
tax shield of debt is in balance with the expected cost of debt. 
Another stream of research investigates actual debt structures of companies and concludes 
that actual debt ratios are inconsistent across comparable firms. This would either mean that 
firms deviate from their targets for an extended period or that the target's debt capacity is 
dependent on unknown aspects (Myers, 1984). A number of explanations have been proposed 
to explain the wide variation of debt-to-equity ratios across firms and industries. The most 
well-known approach, the pecking order framework, was introduced by Myers (1984). 
According to this framework, firms do not adhere to a target debt-to-equity ratio but base their 
financing decision on the basic assumptions that they prefer internal to external financing and 
debt to equity to avoid any potential dilution of shareholder wealth. This theory is criticised 
for not explaining all the capital structure regularities observed in practice. As pointed out by 
Jensen (1993), it lacks an explanation for how taxes and bankruptcy costs influence the 
company's actual debt ratio. In addition, the pecking order theory ignores significant agency 
problems which can easily arise. Myers and Majluf (1984), for example, claim that managers 
would only consider issuing new equity in the case of the firm's shares being overvalued or if 
the firin is already too highly geared. As pointed out by McColgan (2001) the pecking order 
of financing stands in direct contrast to the revised M&M proposition, which implies the 
existence of an optimal capital structure. 
Further research has shown that there are numerous other issues influencing a company's 
financial structure. These include the company's sensitivity to economic activity and volatility 
of earnings (Baxter, 1967, Williamson, 1981, Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984); differences in 
the type of assets held by the company (Williamson, 1981, Myers, 1984, Titman, 1984, 
Titman and Wessel, 1988); industry- specific structures (Scott, 1972, Ferri and Jones, 1979, 
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984, Brander and Lewis, 1986, Maksimovic, 1988, Maksimovic 
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and Zechner, 1991, Hart, 1995) and fin-n size (Smith, 1977, Warner, 1977, Ang, Chua and 
McConnell, 1982, Titman and Wessel, 1988). One stream of research in the field of M&A 
takes a related view and claims that a firm's probability of acquisition likelihood is not only 
dependent on the single variable of leverage but a number of influencing factors, which xe 
often only indirectly related to debt levels. This will be further discussed in detail in Chapter 
Five. 
Despite the common agreement that there is a trade-off between tax benefits of leverage and 
potential bankruptcy costs and that there is an optimum amount of debt for each individual 
firm, it needs to be concluded that the difficulty of precisely establishing an optimum capital 
structure scientifically remains. There are many complicating multi-facetted factors, which 
influence the optimum capital structure adopted by firms and it remains difficult to express 
financial distress costs in a precise way. For this reason, it can be concluded, that although 
there might be a ushaped dependence between tax benefits arising from debt and potential 
bankruptcy costs, it is not possible to precisely estimate an optimum debt capacity. This could 
be one explanation for the great variation in debt levels across industries and comparable 
firms. 
4.3 Agency Aspects of Debt 
Most traditional capital structure models assume rather simplistically that a manager's choice 
of capital structure is governed only by the interest of shareholders. However, as already 
shown in Chapter Two, research increasingly recognises that managers often pursue their own 
interests, which can lead to financing choices contradicting the interests of shareholders 
(Donaldson, 1969, Jung, Kim and Stulz, 1996). 19 The agency costs of debt20, introduced by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), have been widely discussed. One particular aspect refers to the 
potential mitigating effects of debt on agency problems, which include the role of debt as a 
control and bonding device and its incentive effect on management. 
19 An early example is Donaldson*s (1969) field study of financing choices, which emphasised goals such as 
organisational survival and growth. Recently. Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) identified security issue decisions that 
seem inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximisation. 
20 The agency cost of debt in sum consists of the opportunity wealth loss caused by the impact of debt on the 
investment decisions of the firm, the monitoring and bonding expenditures, which are passed on as higher 
interest rates and the bankruptcy and reorganisation costs lowering the firm's value (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
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4.3.1 Control Hypothesis of Debt 
Jensen (1986; 324) refers to the potential benefits of debt in controlling and motivating 
managers and their organisation to be efficient as the 'control hypothesis' of debt creation and 
Harris and Raviv (1990; 321) describe debt as 'a disciplining device'. The company's choice 
of debt is one important source of disciplining managers (Berger and Bonaccorsi die Patti, 
2006, De La Bruslerie and Latrous, 2007). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart (1982), Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) treat 
debt as a bonding device for management and its creditors. Jensen and Meckling (1976), for 
example, claim that managers prefer debt financing because it grants them a greater portion of 
the company's equity and as claimed by Jensen (1986,324), 'debt creation ... enables 
managers to efficiently bond their promise to pay out future cash flows'. Grossman and Hart 
(1982), in addition, argue that the main benefit of debt comes from the diminishing tendency 
of managerial perquisites for three reasons: (1) bondholders tend to closely monitor debt- 
burdened firms; (2) companies with a debt-burdened capital structure have an increased 
bankruptcy risk, which (3) confronts management with the potential threat of personal 
embarrassment. The authors further claim that leverage is also a very good tool to discourage 
wasteful takeovers. 
Easterbrook (1984) claims that managers who need to raise money consistently and 
periodically are likely to act both in bondholders' and shareholders' interest. Firms with debt 
finance have to provide their lenders with access to relevant infori-nation and must incur 
external capital market monitoring, thereby reducing managerial discretion over resources. As 
summarised by Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell (1993,189/190), 'the consensus of this 
theoretical research is that, while leverage has costs, the necessity of making periodic, legally 
mandated, unalterable payments to bondholders forces managers to take extra care in 
decisioný- making'. 
In this context the issue of short-term versus long-ten-n debt financing has become another 
important aspect in controlling agency problems (Harris and Raviv, 1990). Kanatas and Qi 
(2001) argue that whereas short-term debt is claimed to be an effective tool of controlling the 
agency problem, since it requires the borrower to apply for funds and refinancing more often, 
long-term debt is offen only a continuation of the incentive conflict for the term of the credit. 
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Kanatas and Qi, however, state that short-term lenders often rely on the acquisition of firm 
information to control moral hazards. They further claim firm insiders have the incentive to 
manipulate the information reaching the lenders, which in turn will ensure refinancing. As a 
result, the control of one agency problem might result in another or may be useless. 
Furthermore, there are other parties who have an interest in manipulating the inforrnation 
purchased by the firrn's insiders. Kanatas and Qi (2001), in this context admit that a firm's 
periodic refinancing need is a two-edged sword, since it also encourages the fin-n's rivals to 
influence the creditor's perception of the firm's credit worthiness. Evidence by Chevalier 
(1995a, b) and Kanatas and Qi (2001) show that rival firms compete more aggressively against 
firms having significant amounts of debt. 
Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) and De la Bruslerie and Latrous (2007) observe a positive 
correlation between several proxies for the ability of shareholders to control management and 
a firrn's debt level. For example, corporate executives tend to make more aggressive use of 
debt in the case of control threats or if they have an incertive to create shareholder value (e. g. 
stock-based compensation or outside directors). Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) and Berger and 
Bonaccorsi die Patti (2006) in this context, provide evidence that debt restrains finns from 
investing in poor projects. 
A mlated stream of literature including authors such as Townsend (1978), Gale and Hellwig 
(1985), Harris and Raviv (1990) and Rajan and Winton (1995), regard debt as an optimal 
contracel, to overcome agency problems, while research by Rajan and Winton (1995) claims 
that the presence of a debt contract extends the bank's monitoring activity, since lenders and 
their returns become increasingly dependent on this information. According to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), it provides lenders with the power to practise their right of control. The latter, 
however, is debatable since creditors only obtain control when the firm is in financial distress 
(Bolton and Scharfstein, 1998). 
As pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), this stream of research stands in contrast to the 
original capital structure theorem, which regarded debt only in relation to a particular cash 
flow stream. This new approach sees the important feature of a debt contract in the power of 
21 Debt is a contract in which a borrower receives some funds from the creditor, and assures to repay the loan 
with a pre-specified stream of future payments. In case the borrower breaks the contract and, particularly, if he 
defaults on interest pay ments, the creditor has certain rights and if comes to the worst the power to make the firm 
bankrupt (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
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lenders to practise their right of control. This also means that if the borrower does not adhere 
to the contract, the lender is entitled to transfer some control rights from the borrower to the 
lender. This property rights approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Grossman and Moore, 1990) 
has been very useful for understanding the control issues related to the choice of capital 
structure with managers retaining power under non-default conditions and creditors taking 
control under default conditions. Research, which supports this view of control rights include 
Harris and Raviv (1989), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Stulz (1990), Diamond (1991) and 
Hart and Moore (1994). Hart and Moore (1994), for example, see the power of a debt contract 
in that the fear of potential default and bankruptcy secures debt repayments. A model by 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) shows that upon default, creditors gain sufficient power to take 
the firm off the capital market, which in turn blocks future financing altogether. 
Some researchers investigate the debt contracts framework in more detail by focusing on the 
process of shifting control from managers to creditors. Aghion and Bolton (1992), for 
example, make use of this theory and describe leverage as a tool for creditors to grant 
managers control in good states of the world and creditors taking over control in bad states. In 
this context, Aghion and Bolton (1992) have proven that debt contracts and their potential 
control shifts can be regarded as an ideal device to overcome potential agency conflicts. 
Further authors who support the contract model of debt include Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1994) who refer to debt holders in bad times as 'tough principal' and shareholders as 'soft 
principal' in good times. Berglof and von Thadden (1994) further claim that short-term debt 
holders, which they describe es the 'tough financiers', should obtain control under bad 
conditions. 
However, Schleifer and Vishny (1997) claim that the Aghion and Bolton model only 
incorporates the idea that control reverts to the creditors in the case of some sort of bad state, 
however, without considering the case of default. Authors including Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1998) criticise the deficiency of current debt contract models, as they cannot sufficiently 
explain the allocation of control implicit in capital structure decisions; for example, why 
creditors only obtain control when the firm is in financial distress. Mahrt- Smith (2000) further 
disapproves of the model, since it does not incorporate any considerations of ownership 
structure, monitoring, or institutional effects. 
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4.3.2 Free Cash Flow Hypothesis and Financial Slack 
Chapter Two already introduced the importance of free cash flow on agency conflicts. 
According to the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) 22 , debt is also acknowledged as an 
important tool to avoid wastage of fee cash flow (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2002). Rozeff 
(1982), Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986,1989) and Stulz (1990) argue that debt reduces free 
cash, limiting managerial resources to waste on unprofitable transactions. Instead of being 
wasted, free cash flow is committed to debt services which in turn decreases related agency 
costs and increases firm value (Smith and Kim, 1994). Jensen (1986) concludes that the free 
cash flow control effects of debt are important factors in deten-nining capital structure. 
Grossman and Hart (1982) further claim that debt services are more effective in restricting 
free cash flow than dividends, due to the direct threat of bankruptcy in case of default. Jensen 
(1986) adds that a debt contractually requires a manager to pay out future cash flow, which is 
not the case for dividend payouts, as they have no legal obligations. Ross, Westerfield and 
Jaffe (2002) therefore conclude that according to the free cash flow hypothesis, an increase in 
the debt proportion and the resultant reduction in the equity proportion will increase firm 
value. 
Research by Jensen and Smith (1985) and Jensen (1986) applies the free cash flow theory to 
the field of mergers and acquisitions. They find that leverage -increasing transactions result in 
significantly positive increases in common stock prices. Consistent with this, the free cash 
flow theory predicts that debt issues tie management to use free cash flow for debt 
repayments, which in turn reduce shareholder concerns about free cash flow being wasted. In 
contrast, share prices will fall with a reduction in dividend payments or if management 
requests new equity injections instead of issuing debt. High levels of gearing have often 
accompanied merger activity in recent decades. Rees (1995) argues that although an 
increasing leverage may be desirable the debate over the issue of reaching an optimal capital 
structure prevails. 
22 According to the free cash flow hypothesis, managers might be reluctant to distribute free cash flow to 
shareholders but rather prefer to use the funds for potentially unprofitable projects, which. however, makes firms 
grow in size and increases dependence on management (Servaes, 1994, Smith and Kim, 1994). 
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Some models of capital structure incorporate financial slack to illustrate the benefits of 
moderate leverage. This slack can become an extremely valuable tool to make profitable 
investments at any time. For this reason Smith and Kim (1994) see firms restricting debt 
levels below that of the 'optimal' gearing level. Myers (1977) and Myers and MaJluf (1984) 
present a financial slack model, which claims that a firm with high debt lets a project with a 
low positive return and a low variance pass and justifies this with the fact that these projects 
tend to benefit bondholders rather than shareholders. Williamson (1988) refers to this line of 
thought as the 'selective intervention' problem. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) recognise that according to the financial slack hypothesis managers 
and shareholders have asymmetric information about firm value, which provide managers 
with the advantage of identifying potential opportunities of value creation. According to 
Myers and Majluf (1984), a firm with slack can pursue new investment opportunities without 
issuing equity or other risky securities, which means that a certain degree of financial slack is 
of benefit to firms since according to the financial slack hypothesis information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders lead to higher issuing costs. 
Myers and MaJluf (1984) also find that the particular case of M&A provides an option to 
transfer slack between the merging firms and that this avoids the asymmetry problems and the 
resultant adverse market response of new equity or debt issues. Lewellen (1971), in this 
context, points out that prospective acquirers can also take advantage of the target firm's 
modest borrowing behaviour. As mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, the acquirer can carve out 
further valuation gains from merging two fin-ns simply by correcting this deficiency and 
making use of the target's latent debt capacity either as part of financing the merger or as part 
of the post-merger strategy. Lewellen (1971) recognises that the opportunity to realise such 
gains are not unique to the act of merging. It is rather the result of poor capital structure 
management, which can be overcome in exactly the same amount if the firms stay apart and 
just review their financial planning. This aspect will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Five. 
4.3.3 The Incentive Effect of Debt 
It is often being claimed that debt can be a more influential incertive instrument in controlling 
management than a typical incentive scheme. While an ordinary incentive scheme tries to 
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encourage managers to maximise performance and investment opportunities through 
presenting them with a financial reward, the incentive power of debt lies in that it can be more 
forceful in requesting management to hand over control in the case of default (Hart, 1995). 
According to Grossman and Hart (1982), debt increases the amount of resources available at 
the manager's discretion. This in turn creates an incentive effect for the manager who aims to 
align these incentives with the firm's shareholders, in order to benefit from the resulting 
market value effect and the diminishing threat of bankruptcy. 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) in this context, however, regard ordinary managerial incentive 
schemes as a more direct and often less expensive way. Authors including Maloney, 
McCormick and Mitchell (1993) disagree with the incentive argument of debt and regard 
leverage more as an obstruction bmanagement, since the focus is centred on providing 
adequate interest payments instead of running the corporation efficiently as a whole. This 
view appears to be supported by a wave of bankruptcy filings in the early 1990s by firms, 
which had dramatically increased their debt level. 
Another important argument against the managerial incentive effect of debt was introduced by 
Myers (1975). Assuming that debt often matures after the options must be taken, companies 
are sometimes forced to refuse potential investment opportunities since they would only 
benefit bondholders instead of equity holders. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe, this 
potential decline in firm value shows that there are conditions under which incentive effects 
create agency costs ofdebt. 
Research by Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) introduces an approach of financing 
preferences which is centred on managerial incentives, since management aims to defend its 
control stake and benefits of incumbency in the corporation (as an antiýtakeover device). 
Their model shows that increased debt limits the value of outstanding equity, which in turn 
provides management with control over a larger equity stake with the same investment. As 
explained by Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) and Sinha (1991), substituting debt for equity 
reduces the proportion of votes held by passive investors, which are easily acquired by a 
potential raider. This reduces the risk for the manager to become a victim of a contest for 
corporate control. 
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Research on the relation between managerial ownership and leverage, however, shows a 
negative correlation, which according to Friend and Lang (1988) is a direct result of debt 
presenting a greater norý- divers i fi able risk to management than to public investors. 23 Friend 
and Lang (1988) also argue that corporations with large managerial holdings display lower 
debt than firms with large outside shareholdings. In this context, Harris and Raviv (1988), 
Stulz (1988) and Israel (1991) explain that higher leverage impacts negatively on the equity's 
total value and increases the risk of bankruptcy, which in turn potentially lowers the price for 
the potential bidder to take over control. Therefore, as pointed out by Lang (1987), this threat 
of bankruptcy and control loss might tempt management to use less than the optimum amount 
of debt. Authors including Grossman and Hart (1982) and Levy and Sarnat, (1988) and 
Bagnani, Milonas, Saunders and Travlos (1994) support this view. It can be concluded that 
the relation between the proportion of debt and managerial ownership is negative and nort. 
linear. 
However, it remains difficult to empirically test the relation between managerial 
shareholdings and the financing choices, since firms, as claimed by Amihud, Lev and Travlos 
(1990), are not providing information on individual investment projects publicly, with the 
exception of M&As. One focus of M&A research investigates the relationship between 
managerial financing choices and the likelihood of acquisitions. As claimed by authors 
including Harris and Raviv (1988), Israel (1988,199 1), Stulz (1988), Nolan (1999) and De la 
Bruslerie and Latrous (2007), debt can be used to consolidate and maintain control over the 
firm. Management avoids potential takeover attempts by higher debt levels and by using the 
proceeds to concentrate managerial shareholdings and voting rights. This proportionately 
reduces the amount of outside equity and thus makes it harder and more expensive to displace 
management through takeovers. As concluded by Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990), debt 
financing concentrates the control with management and provides an important tool to 
discourage takeovers. However, it needs to be investigated if leverage provides an adequate 
proxy for insider shareholdings and in turn, if leverage provides a good indication of the 
degree of managerial entrenchment, which is, according to Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992), 
often not an ideal scenario from the shareholders' point of view. 
23 Friend and Lang (1988) find the correlation between debt and managerial ownership to be significantly 
negative. Their research suggests that debt decreases as the level of managerial shareholdings in the firm 
increases. 
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4.3.4 The Informational and Signalling Role of Corporate Debt 
Debt also plays an important role in generating infori-nation. Harris and Raviv (1990), for 
example, emphasise the importance of debt in enabling investors to collect and generate 
information which is needed to effectively monitor and control management's implementation 
of efficient operational decisions. Jensen (1989) regards the recent increase in corporate 
leverage in part as being the result of these debt-related information benefits. 
Debt is also recognised by authors including Williamson (1988) as an important signalling 
tool to overcome information asymmetries between managers and investors. Healy and 
Palepu in Stem and Chew (1998) stress the importance of capital structure choice as a signal 
for management's judgement of future earnings and risks. For this reason, capital structure 
changes present shareholders with essential information on the management's expectations 
and the firm's prospects. In earlier models by Ross (1977), Leland and Pyle (1977), Heinkel 
(1982), Myers and MaJluf (1984) and Miller and Rock (1985), debt issues are signals of a 
firm's high quality, since it exposes the firms to a higher risk of ruin and more stringent 
monitoring activities, which enables the stock market to review their share value. These 
models take the view that managers are better informed about their corporation than 
shareholders and investors. Management's better knowledge of the ('intrinsic' value of the) 
finn's prospects implies that capital structure changes are valid signals communicating inside 
information to investors. Leland and Pyle (1977), in this context, add that the manager's 
willingness to invest in his own project can be regarded as a signal of the project's superiority. 
The manager is understood to only maintain large shares in equity if prospects of future cash 
flows are high in relation to the corporation's current value. Leland and Pyle (1977) detect a 
positive relationship between equity held by the owner and firm value, a prediction, which 
was also made by authors including Myers and MaJluf (1984) and Miller and Rock (1985). 
It can be concluded that the financial choice of debt can play an important role in reducing 
agency costs. Whilst it has been shown that debt provides an important tool to control 
managerial actions and decisioný- making (incorporating examples from free cash flow and 
financial slack theories), it has been claimed by authors including Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1990) that current debt contracts remain deficient. The review has shown that debt has the 
potential to take on an effective managerial incentive function, however, research has shown 
that the proportion of debt in the capital structure and managerial ownership tends to be 
66 
negative and non- linear, indicating that management prefers to stay below the optimal debt 
level. It was argued that debt could also play an important signalling function, which provides 
management with a tool to convey inside information about the value of the firm. 
4.4 Capital Structure Changes through M&As 
4.4.1 Debt-financed Takeovers 
As previously pointed out in Chapter Two and Three, an investment decision such as an 
acquisition usually results in a change of capital structure of the combined firms. Maloney, 
McCormick and Mitchell (1993) claim that debt-financed takeovers are often accomplished 
by a leverage increasing restructuring of the bidder. Chowdhry and Nanda (1993), in this 
context, argue that a bidder with already high levels of debt may bid aggressively for targets 
with high financial slack, since part of the acquisition costs might be covered by the target's 
latent debt capacity. 
Research by Crabbe, Pickerung and Prowse (1990) and Schianchi and Mantovi (2006) 
investigate M&As and claim that takeover activity is often accompanied by high levels of 
debt rather than equity issues, which leads to the conclusion that M&As might force bidders 
to obtain a higher than optimal debt level. Higher levels of debt in an acquisition result in a 
higher financial risk profile and a larger appreciation of debt value of the merged firm, which 
automatically encourages creditors to require higher interest payments (Lev and Mandelker, 
1972, Israel, 1991). As a result, there will be an increase in the cost of equity, which, under 
perfect capital market conditions, counterbalances any potential economic value gains by the 
acquisition. As summarised by Ward (1993,163), 'if the debt financing gain is not totally 
offset by the increased risk perception as may occur under real market conditions, the gain in 
value is not really generated by the acquisition of the target company but by the change in 
financial strategy of the acquiring company. ' 
This strategic motive for debt financing is inconsistent with the observation that merged firms 
often attempt to lower debt levels immediately after successful acquisitions. As pointed out by 
Leland (1989) and Kaplan (1989) such post- merger debt reduction is contradictory with the 
theory of tax benefits of debt and other agency theory explanations made by authors such as 
Jensen (1986). 
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4.4.2 The Coinsurance Effect of Corporate Debt 
An effect of debt, vNhich is unique to the case of M&As, was introduced by Lewellen (1971) 
as the 'coinsurance effect for corporate debt'. According to authors such as Lewellen (1971), 
Lintner, (1971) Higgins and Schall (1975), Lee and Barker (1977) and Comment and Jarrell 
(1995) multýdivision firms provide a greater earnings stability, spread the risk, reduce the 
probability of default and expected bankruptcy costs and thus raise debt capacity, which in 
turn provides tax advantages. A merger forces creditors to review debt capacity, which in the 
presence of a co- insurance effect should be higher than the debt limits of the bidder and target 
taken individually. As concluded by Lewellen (1971; 525) 'mergers therefore create 
additional borrowing capacity as an inevitable consequence of consolidation. ' Lewellen 
(1971) in this context further stresses that this increased debt capacity is not the result of 
exploiting the merging firms' unused debt capacity but that additional leverage is being made 
available due to the merged firm satisfying other debt service criteria. Lewellen concludes 
that conglomeration benefits stockholders. 
However, it must be admitted that the coinsurance effect does not provide much of a rationale 
for related mergers, which for their justification appear to rely on realising certain operating 
efficiencies. The consolidation of unrelated companies, on the other hand, creates greater debt 
capacity as a result of the portfolio effect of debt24 (Lewellen, 1971). Higgins and Schall 
(1975), Galai and Masulis (1976) and Kim and McConnell (1977) agree with Lewellen. Kim 
and McConnel (1977), in particular, argue that the combination of uncorrelated assets reduces 
the merged firm's risk of default. Higgins and Schall (1975), for example, argue that while 
total value remains unaffected by conglomeration, the value of equity tends to drop as a result 
of conglomerate mergers. This, however, might be counterbalanced by tax subsidies of debt, 
if there are any and coinsurance costs 25 . 
Authors including Higgings and Schall (1975) and Kim and McConnel (1977) argue that 
Lewellen's thesis fails to consider the effect of coinsurance on the value of the merging fin-ns' 
previously existing debt. Higgins and Schall (1975), for example, claim that coinsurance 
24 According to the portfolio theory by Markowitz, (1959), a relatively small number of unrelated firms are 
required in a portfolio to achieve a considerable reduction in the variability of earnings and to achieve the 
majority of potential value gains. 
25 Higgins and Schall (1975; 106) define co-insurance cost as costs resulting 'from a loss of some of the limited 
liability advantages of holding equity in separate firms as opposed to merged firm. ' 
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potential can also be a threat of additional costs, which may deter potential bidders, an issue 
which was already highlighted by Rubinstein (1973). Shrieves and Stevens (1979) remark that 
in order for mergers to provide benefits to shareholders, the cost of co-insurance needs to be 
more than covered by the potential cost savings of tax shields. One further option to 
counteract or neutralise the coinsurance cost may be achieved through renegotiations with 
debt holders (Kim and McConnell, 1977, Billett, 1996). Higgins and Schall (1975), for 
example, suggest to retire all active debt at its Pre-merger market value and to raise new debt 
for the combined firm. However, the costs of such transactions effectively diminish potential 
shareholder wealth gains of a merger (Kim and McConnell, 1977). 
Despite all its theoretical relevance, the coinsurance effects of debt in conglomeration have 
not proven to result in value gains for the acquirer in practice. Research by Bhagat, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1990), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Lang and Stulz (1994) and Comment 
and Jarrell (1995) shows that diversification results in low returns compared to other 
acquisitions. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a review of research in the field of financing choices, highlighting 
tax advantages of debt, (Modigliani and Miller, 1958,1963, Fama and Miller, 1972 and Miller 
1977) and the threat of bankruptcy (M&M, 1963, Altman (1984), to provide the basis for a 
theorem of optimal capital structure (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980, Myers, 1984). A common 
agreement on the existence of one target debt-to-equity ratio, as suggested by the trade-off 
theory, however, could not be identified by the literature since there appear to be a variety of 
systematic influences on the leverage choices firms actually make. 
The benefits of debt in mitigating agency conflicts have also become an important aspect to 
be incorporated in capital structure considerations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Grossman and 
Hart, 1982, Jensen, 1986, Harris and Raviv, 1990, Stulz, 1990). Mitigating effects of debt on 
agency problems include factors such as the control hypothesis of debt, the role debt plays to 
reduce free cash flow/financial slack and the incentive effect of debt as well as the 
informational role debt plays for a corporation. It can be concluded that all mentioned debt 
aspects play an important role in realigning owner and stakeholder interest in theory, 
however, practice has shown that agency problems are not overcome in reality. 
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The importance of leverage in financing acquisitions and the role of debt as an antiwtakeover 
device is recognised in the finance and economics literature. It was further shown that the 
coinsurance effect of debt provides merging firms with the potential benefit to increase debt 
capacity but also with the potential burden of coinsurance costs, which might discourage 
potential acquisitions. It can be concluded that the choice of capital structure is a delicate 
balancing act of continuously adjusting the debt level to achieve the maximum amount of 
economic benefit. Increased leverage provides both potential benefits as well as disadvantages 
to the bidder as well as the target company. 
After highlighting the main aspects, which impact the choice of capital structure and their 
implications on agency conflicts and acquisitions, the following chapter will introduce and 
discuss potential motivations and risks of takeovers. 
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Chapter Five 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
5.1 Introduction 
Millions of Pounds are invested year-on-year in mergers and acquisitions presenting a rapid- 
fire mechanism to overcome agency conflicts and in turn to achieve control, power, growth 
and value. However, as the literature suggests, the predominant part of resources is being 
wasted on M&As and outcomes remain controversial. 
The following chapter investigates the various motives and potential downside risks of 
M&As, incorporating economic and financial aspects, corporate control issues and managerial 
considerations. This chapter also provides an introduction into the various research areas of 
takeovers with the particular focus on the field of takeover likelihood. It concludes with an 
investigation into potential explanations for varying research outcomes. 
5.2 Introduction to Mergers and Acquisitions 
Mergers and acquisitions are characterised by a corporation transferring the control of the 
firm's assets to a more effective management (Jarrell, Brickley and Netter, 1988) or as 
Ingham, Kran and Lovestram (1992) put it, a takeover is essentially a game of strategy in 
which the management of one company attempts to gain control over another. Lichtenberg 
and Siegel (1987) define an acquisition as a mechanism to correct for lapses in an inefficiently 
managed firm, which, according to Palepu (1986), can be rectified by taking the company 
over and in turn replacing its management. The expected economic benefits of the acquisition 
are the incremental cash flows generated by the combination of the previously independent 
firins (Halpern, 1983). Shleifer and Vishny (1997; 756) conclude: 'Takeovers can thus be 
viewed as rapid- fire mechanisms for ownership concentration. ' 
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There are several types of M&As, including mergers 26, takeovers 27, proxy contests 28 and 
leveraged buyouts 29 as well as others. In line with the majority of research, this literature 
review will use the terminology merger, acquisition and takeover interchangeably, however, 
bearing in mind that there are considerable differences in accounting terrns and treatments. 
M&As are further distinguished between related 30 (horizontal and vertical) and unrelated 
(conglomerate) takeovers. 
Periods of accelerated merger activity of all types have been witnessed in the past century 
which are commonly referred to as merger waves. Whereas conglomerate mergers dominated 
the 1950s through to the 1970s, strategic related combinations of much broader scope marked 
the 1980s and 1990s (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998). However, since the 1980s, a trend toward 
increased corporate focus has been documented by authors including Liebeskind and Opler 
(1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995) and John and Ofek (1995). 
After several years of merger activity slowing down, partly as a result of global economic 
downturn in the early 2000s, not to mention the September II th terrorist attacks, strong signs 
of a recovery in deal activity is being witnessed since 2003. Reasons for this can be partly 
attributed to the growing importance of globalisation, a sharp recovery of the equity markets, 
increasing levels of access corporate liquidity as well as attractive financing environments 
with low interest rates. 
26 In a merger, which is predominantly friendly, the acquirer reaches an agreement with the management of the 
target on the offer's conditions, which is then decided and voted on by the target shareholders (Jarrell, Brickley 
and Netter, 1988, Damodaran, 1997). 
27 The use of the word takeover is often preferred to describe a hostile acquisition, which is opposed by the target 
company's management (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989, Ingham, Kran and Lovestam, 1992). 
28 A proxy contest is characterised by a dissident group trying to gain control of the target's management through 
obtaining support and the vote of the firm's shareholders (Jarrell, Brickley and Netter, 1988). 
29 Leverage buyouts are often initiated by a firm's incumbent management, which is trying to buyout the 
shareholders' equity. This type of acquisition is generally heavily financed by debt (Jarrell, Brickley and Netter, 
1988). 
30 Related acquisition is defined as the development away from present products and markets but still remaining 
'tangibly related to the collective skills and strength possessed originally by the firm' (Rumelt, 1974; 11). 
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5.3 Motivations of Mergers and Acquisitions 
Over the last decades a number of motives and theories have evolved concerning M&A 
activities which include (1) economic and financial considerations, (2) corporate control and 
(3) managerial motives. 
5.3.1 Economic and Financial Motives 
According to the value maximisation theory, the main motive of an acquisition lies in 
achieving an economic value gain for shareholders (Rappaport, 1998a). This most important 
economic motivation is captured by the term synergy, or the 2+2=5 phenomenon, in which 
the combined value of the two firms exceeds their value as two independent operations 
(Rumelt, 1974, Jensen and Ruback, 1983, Barney, 1988, Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
Grinblatt and Titman (1998) declare that synergistic gains are realised if the combined cash 
flow of the merged firms surpasses the combined cash flow of the previously separate firms. 
Copeland and Weston (1992) state that, considering long-tenn strategic planning, M&As 
present a less risky and hence more likely option to achieve a positive net present value. 
Shrieves and Stevens (1979) and Halpern (1983), however, stress that an acquisition only 
becomes economically feasible if the economic gain is not only allocated b the target 
shareholders but also if it provides the bidder with a normal rate of return for the investment. 
According to Bradley (1980), Halpern (1983), Palepu (1986) and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(I 988a, b, 1989), an acquisition is primarily motivated by bidders' desire to gain control over a 
poorly performing target. The bidder wants control over the target, for example, to substitute 
an incumbent management or to oblige current management to pursue the bidder's own profit- 
maximising strategy. The overall aim is to earn a profit from operating the target more 
effectively (Bradley, 1980, Halpern, 1983, Martin and McConnell, 1991). Takeover targets 
tend to have poor prior performance as measured by, for example, the price to book value 
ratio (Schwartz, 1982) or by Tobin's ý' (Hasbrouck, 1985, Palepu, 1986). Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1988a, b) found that targets of hostile takeovers tend to be firms which have 
underperformed others in the industry. Underperforming firms and their likelihood of being 
31 Tobin's q is the ratio of the market value of shares to the replacement value of the company's assets 
(Hasbrouck, 1985). 
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taken over will become the focus of this thesis' investigation and will be discussed in more 
detail in the methodology chapter 
Authors including Porter (1985), Harrison, Hall and Nagundkar (1993) and Hitt, Harrison, 
Ireland and Best (1998) explain that synergistic benefits arise as a result of taking advantage 
of identified commonalties or strategic fits 32 to be shared between the target and bidder. 
Potential sources of synergy can be divided into four main groups, namely revenue 
enhancement, cost savings, tax benefits and lower cost of capital, which will be discussed in 
the following sections. 
5.3.1.1 Revenue Enhancement 
Firms often pursue acquisitive strategies since they believe that a combined corporation may 
achieve higher revenues than separate ones, due to reasons such as potential strategic benefits 
and market power. Prahalad and Bettis (1986) and Hoskisson and Hitt (1990) believe that 
acquisitions provide a parent company with potential strategic benefits particularly with 
regard to the opportunity to capitalise on the firm's dominant logic 33 and distinctive 
competencies (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986, Thompson, 1993, Luffman, Sanderson and Kenny, 
1996). The result is that these unique combinations of competencies might give firms a long- 
term competitive advantage, because they reduce the possibility of imitation (Teece, 1986, 
Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland, 1991). This in turn allows the corporation to demand a 
premium price for its higher innovation skills (product innovation, time-to-market, etc) 
(Grinblatt and Titman, 1998, Dickson, 2000). These value-creating skills of the parent 
company might also impact positively on efficiency and profitability (Weston, 1970, 
Chandler, 1977, Williamson 1986, Campbell, Goold and Alexander, 1995). 
Enlarging an operation and reducing competition might also provide the corporation with 
increased market power and with potential elements of monopoly control (Halpern, 1983). 
According to empirical evidence, increased market power should not only benefit the acquirer 
32 Strategic fit can exist anywhere along the business' respective value chain - in the relationship with suppliers, 
in research and development (R&D) and technology activities, in manufacturing, in sales and marketing, or in 
distribution activities (Thompson and Strictland, 1998). 
33 Dominant logic is defined as the way in which managers develop the business and make critical resource 
allocation decisions, which are based on operating requirements prevailing in the firm's dominant business. This 
logic affects the attitudes, knowledge. and ability of executives to manage conglomeration successfully (Prahalad 
and Bettis, 1986; 490). 
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but all fin-ns in that sector, as the price of that industry product rises (Ross, Westerfield and 
Jaffe, 2002). Research by Stillmann (1983) and Eckbo (1983), however, suggests that such 
mergers do not positively affect the share performance of competitors. 
5.3.1.2 Cost savings 
It is often being claimed that efficiency improvements and thus cost reductions are the most 
basic reasons for mergers. Potential cost savings arise from economies of scale and/or scope 
and vertical integration, complimentary resources and managerial inefficiency elimination. As 
pointed out by Dickson (2000), acquisitions have traditionally been regarded as an effective 
tool of achieving economies of scale particularly in divisions such as manufacturing, research 
and development, administration, logistics and sales functions. 
Horizontal mergers can particularly provide cost savings by taking advantage of excess 
capacities in certain production factors and thereby increasing the variety of products which is 
commonly referred to as economies of scope. Authors including Nayyar (1992), Dranove and 
Shanley (1995) and Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (1997) regard economies of scope as an 
important motivation for an acquisition as it provides the opportunity to achieve cost savings 
by eliminating costs along the value chain by operating two or more businesses under the 
same corporate umbrella. Vertical mergers can also create synergistic gains by easing the co- 
ordination of closely related operations and thereby overcoming a number of co-ordination 
issues providing bargaining potentials between the customers and suppliers. As pointed out by 
Dickson (2000), for example, synergistic gains result from the merged firm's ability to 
transfer resources and skills from one unit to the other. A merger provides the opportunity to 
gain access to competencies and capacities in a particular line of business, which are difficult, 
time-consuming and sometimes more expensive to develop from scratch in-house (Copeland 
and Weston 1992). 
5.3.1.3 Cost of capital 
As already pointed out in Chapter Two and in Chapter Four, one financial motive for 
takeovers stems from the potential to exploit unused debt capacity and to overcome financial 
slack. 
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Prospective acquirers, for example, can take advantage of the target firrn's modest borrowing 
behaviour. Stulz (1988) and Chowdhry and Nanda (1993), in this context, argue that firrns 
which display high levels of unused debt capacity are seen as attractive targets, since those 
firms do not maximise their firm value to full potential. Palepu (1986) and Jensen (1988) 
further explain that the acquirer takes advantage of the unused debt capacity by either 
acquiring additional assets in order to gain extra value or by reducing the purchase cost since 
they use the target's available debt capacity to finance the takeover. As pointed out by 
Stevens (1973), Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and Nolan (1999) and Schianchi and Mantovi 
(2006), M&A activity is often characterised by bidder firms taking on considerable amounts 
of debt, to finance acquisitions. However, Weston, Chung and Hoag (1990), Dranove and 
Shanley (1995) and Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (1997) see the increased debt capacity and the 
availability of capital at a lower cost as an important prospect for acquisitive investments. 
A change in capital structure, however, is not only the result of the M&A financing 
instrument, but more interestingly, even unsuccessful takeover attempts are typically 
associated with leverage increases by the target firm to become less attractive for the bidder. 
Early reseamh by Grossman and Hart (1982), Jensen (1986) and Palepu (1986) and Stulz 
(1988), for example, detects a negative relationship and explains this with the fact that an 
increase in leverage can discourage potential bidders as it limits any potential value gain 
being achieved from taking over control. Higher levels of debt make an acquisition less 
attractive due to the increasingly restrictive debt covenants and the diminishing possibility to 
raise further debt. However, the rising threat of bankruptcy in turn makes the debt-burdened 
company a potential takeover target. 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992), in this context, show that acquirers seem to bid for 
companies with a high percentage of tangible assets 34 since these companies tend to have 
greater debt capacities. The target's own assets can even be taken as a security for debt 
financing the takeover, which in turn reduces the bidder's direct acquisition costs. 
Furthermore, as pointed out by Eddey (199 1), firms with a high proportion of tangible assets 
make ideal candidates for asset striping by 'raiders'. However, authors including Dickerson, 
34 In accounting terms one can distinguish between asset tangibility and asset specifity (Williamson, 1988). 
There may be a secondary market for intangible tradable assets such as patents and trademarks which are in fact 
then becoming 'tangible'. However. values are not determinable and therefore this distinction cannot be made in 
this study. 
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Gibson and Tsakalotos (2002) claim that the proportion of tangible assets in total assets has a 
negative impact on the probability of takeover 35 
Myers and Majluf (1984) also find that the particular case of M&A provides an option to 
transfer free cash flow or financial slack between the merging firms. Grossman and Hart 
(1982) and Jensen (1986) in this context suggest that takeover likelihood should be increasing 
in the amount of free cash flow available to bidders' managers. Song and Walkling (1993) 
add in this context that a firm's probability of becoming an acquisition target is also 
dependent on the target's excess liquidity. A firm with large amounts of free cash flow is an 
attractive target since it provides the bidder with the opportunity to achieve financial synergy 
by using the target's resources to finance the acquisition. Smith and Kim (1994) further 
extend this approach and claim that M&As can solve potential problems of resource 
allocation. This can be achieved by merging slack-poor bidders with targets high in free cash 
flow. Lewellen (1971) and Smith and Kim (1994) conclude that the opportunity to realise 
such gains is based partly on using acquisitions to resolve poor capital structure management 
by overcoming both under- and over- investment. 
However, Bruner (1988) shows that bidders tend to have more financial slack than targets. It 
is also suggested that bidders with high free cash flow tend to pay considerably more for their 
targets. Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) conclude in this context, that firms with high free 
cash flow are more likely to make bad acquisitions. 
This view goes in line with research by Harford (1999) and Pinkowitz (2002) who claim that 
target firms with financial slack are less likely targets of successful takeovers. This negative 
relationship of takeover likelihood and the holding of excess cash can be explained in terms of 
the takeover- deterrents effects of corporate activity. Excess cash enhances the ability of a 
target to defend itself against an unwanted bid. Such defences include repurchasing stock, 
acquiring a competitor of the bidder and filing private antimtrust legislation or turning around 
to acquire the suitor itself (Bagwell, 1991, Stulz, 1988 and Dann and De Angelo, 1988). In 
addition, excess cash held by the target increases the bidder's uncertainty about the value of 
the target since it can be used to engage in bidder-specific negative net present value 
activities. Thus holding excess cash may serve as a deterrent to would be bidders (Faleye, 
35 Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (2002) explain that this circumstance is perhaps a reflection of the different 
opinions regarding firm valuation. 
77 
2004). The literature therefore is ambivalent as to whether excess cash makes potential targets 
more likely to attract bidders. 
Another cost of capital motivation refers to potential diversification benefits of an acquisition 
(Gort, 1962,1966), which Lewellen defined as the 'coinsurance effect of debt' (see Chapter 
Four). According to authors such as Lewellen (1971), Lintner, (1971) Higgins and Schall 
(1975), Lee and Barker (1977) and Comment and Jarrell (1995) multi-division f irms provide a 
greater earnings stability, spread the risk and reduce the probability of default and thus 
expected bankruptcy costs. This in turn often leads to a greater debt capacity, potentially 
resulting in a bwer cost of capital for the firm. Research by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1990), however, shows that diversification results in low returns compared to related 
acquisitions. Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Lang and Stulz (1994) and Comment and 
Jarrell (1995) confirm this finding by detecting that diversification has an adverse effect on 
company valuation. 
5.3.1.4 Tax gains 
Despite the financial burden associated with high premium payments and despite the 
associated negotiation and coordination costs, acquisitions present a considerable number of 
tax-related financial benefits. As already mentioned in Chapter Four, tax gains may be a 
powerful incentive for some acquisitions and it is generally acknowledged that acquisitions, 
which are primarily funded with debt, provide the acquirer with tax savings due to the fact 
that debt interest payments are tax deductible and paying taxes at personal income tax rates on 
ordinary income can be avoided (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998). A further potential tax 
advantage results from the acquisition being paid by with stock, which results in capital gain 
taxes being deferred until the actual sale of the stock (Copeland and Weston 1992). Under US 
tax legislation, no taxes at all are paid on dividends remitted from the bidder in an acquisition 
(Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2002). 
Grinblatt and Titman (1998) refer to unused debt capacity as an important reason for 
acquisitions. In cases when the target and the bidder are under- leveraged for reasons such as 
incentive schemes and personal tax costs associated with increased leverage, an acquisition 
can be regarded as a method of raising their combined debt-to-equity ratio while keeping 
taxable costs at a minimum. Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2002) ftirther emphasise the 
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advantage of using surplus funds to finance mergers instead of paying out taxable dividends 
or buying taxable shares. Authors including Jensen (1986), Goold and Campbell (1987), Very 
(1993) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) claim that if a corporation holds substantial taxable 
free cash flow then the investment into acquisitions might present an opportunity to avoid tax 
payments while at the same time achieving a positive net present value in order to maximise 
the company's financial resources. According to Halpern (1983), all of these tax influences 
on mergers result not only in avoiding tax payments but would also increase the market value 
of the equity after the acquisition. However, as claimed by Jensen's (1986) free cash flow 
theory, managers with large free cash flow and excess debt capacity often prefer to undertake 
low-benefit or even value- destroying takeovers. 
5.3.2 Managerial Motives 
Historically it has been argued that the managerial capital allocation process within a 
diversified firm is more efficient than by outside capital markets (Williamson, 1970,1975, 
Teece, 1982). Executives are claimed to be in a better position to spot bargain-priced 
companies with substantial profit prospects (Bowman, 1987, Thompson and Strictland, 1998), 
and to control the post- acquisition process, enabling managers to allocate capital more 
efficiently across competing divisions (Myers and Majluf, 1984, Williamson, 1986). Bhide 
(1990), however, stresses that external capital markets have improved their efficiency since 
the 1980s, making external capital markets an increasingly superior method of investment 
allocation. 
The growth maximisation theory refers to management pursuing an acquisitive strategy in 
order to maximise firm size (Reid, 1968 and Jensen and Murphy, 1990), increase market 
power (Stigler, 1968 and Steiner, 1975) and control a larger empire (Shrieves and Stevens, 
1979, Halpern, 1983). Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Rees (1995) stress that the 
management of a corporation often decides on acquisitions with their own short-term 
managerial interests in mind, even though these investments may destroy value for the 
shareholders. This has already been discussed in Chapter Two. Authors including MUller 
(1980), Jensen (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1989,1990) Stulz (1990) Rotemberg and Saloner 
(1994) and Goh (2006) claim that managers have an urge for corporate growth and empire 
building to satisfy their own personal motives such as improved personal image, prestige, 
power, increased indispensability and job security as well as remuneration. In this context, 
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authors including Rappaport (I 998b) and Black, Wright and Bachman (1998) criticise the fact 
that executives are often encouraged to set such growth objectives and that they are often 
compensated on such short-term measures including turnover and return on sales. 
According to the 'hubris hypothesis' by Roll (1986) and more recently Heaton (2002), 
manager's exaggerated pride or self-confidence, can also be regarded as one important 
managerial motive for acquisitions. Executives simply overestimate their ability to run even 
the most difficult types of businesses successfully together. Authors including Malmendier 
and Tate (2003) provide empirical evidence on managerial optimism regarding takeover 
returns and find that overconfident managers make more acquisitions. Managers of acquiring 
companies might believe that they hold private information of the target company and claim 
to take advantage of information asymmetry in the market. According to Halpern (1983) and 
Rees (1995), acquiring managers believe that the acquisition announcement will be 
understood as a market signal, which will result in the resolution of the information 
asymmetry and the revaluation of the formerly 'undervalued' stock of the target firin. Mfiller 
(1989) and Datta, Pinches and Narayanan (1992) see this extreme confidence of bidding 
managers as one explanation for the often- unjustified premium payments, which were already 
discussed earlier. Dess, Picken and Janney (1998) refer to this aspect as the executive's 
6egocentric machismo' (pl2), which in the extreme may restrict sound strategic planning and 
impact negatively not only on the acquisition itself but also on the core business. 
Evidence by authors including Jensen (1983) suggests that managers of target firms often 
resist takeovers to protect their private benefits of control rather than to serve shareholders 
through value-enhancing takeovers. The literature refers to a selection of managerial survival 
strategies which might range from the relatively han-niess share price amendment to the 
4green mail 36, 'poison PillS, 37, 'fair price provision ý38 and 'white knight defence 39 
36 Green mail refers to a situation in which a large block of stock is held by an unfriendly company. This forces 
the target company to repurchase the stock at a substantial premium to prevent a takeover. It is also known as a 
'Bon Voyage Bonus' or a 'Goodbye Kiss". 
37 . The term 'poison pill' refers to a class of defences that impose significant costs on the bidder by diluting his 
equity holdings, revoking his voting rights or forcing him to assume unwanted financial obligations upon 
'triggering' the pill' (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; 13). 
38 A fair price provision is a takeover defence amendment to corporate bylaws which requires special approval of 
a merger proposal, often by a super-majority of shareholders, in the event of dissent by one or more directors or 
a two-tiered tender offer for the company's shares. 
39 A 'white knight' is a company that comes to the rescue of a corporation that is being taken over. In general, it 
is considered one of the anti-takeover defence tactics used to counter tender offers. 
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(DeAngelo and Rice, 1983, Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987, Malatesta and Walkling, 1988, 
Ryngaert, 1988, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988, Berggren and Engstroem, 2006). Authors 
including Harris and Raviv (1988), Israel (1988,1991), Stulz (1988), Amihud, Lev and 
Travlos (1990) and Zwiebel (1996) refer in this context to the possibilities for companies to 
use large amounts of debt to consolidate and maintain control of the firm which in turn 
discourages potential bidders and prevents it to become a takeover target. Management avoids 
potential takeover attempts by higher debt levels and using the proceeds to concentrate 
managerial shareholdings and voting rights. This proportionately reduces the amount of 
outside equity and thus makes it harder and more expensive to displace management through 
takeovers. 
In addition, Donaldson and Lorsch (1983) argue that firms often pursue acquisitive growth as 
part of their survival strategy to avoid being taken over themselves and to defend the firm's 
independence in the long term, thus securing managerial employment. This is commonly 
referred to as the 'Pacman Defence'. Barnes (2000) adds that if management acts in 
accordance with the growth- maximization behaviour theory, then managers should prefer 
larger rather than smaller acquisitions. As argued by Palepu (1986) and Mikkelson and Partch 
(1989), since mergers are often characterised by a large bidder taking over a smaller target, 
management of small finns seek to expand the corporation in size quickly via mergers in 
order not to be taken over themselves. However, it also needs to be borne in mind that to the 
extent that agency problems are more severe in large firms where ownership control is 
weaker, one could expect large companies to underperform and thus become more attractive 
takeover targets (Nuttal, 1999). Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) argue that this defensive 
acquisition strategy is often characterised by target overpayment and thus value destruction 
for shareholders. Jensen (1983) argues that such managerial takeover defences actually 
damage economic efficiency by enabling potentially incompetent executives to enrich 
themselves, thus obstructing value-enhancing takeovers. 
Managerial ownership and acquisition activity both play key roles in the agency literature 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Leland and Pyle, 1977). From the bidder's perspective, research 
by authors including Larcker (1983) Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld (1985), You, Caves, 
Henry and Smith (1986) and Datta, Pinches and Narayanan (1992) shows that bidders with 
small or no management ownership often pay large premiums, only with the aim of increasing 
the firm's operating income, ignoring the long-term value implications. Rappaport (1998b) 
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concludes that these extremely high acquisition prices reduce the likelihood that bidding 
shareholders gain value from acquisitions. Sirower (1997) comments that these results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that managers are pursuing objectives other than wealth 
maximisation for their shareholders, as has already been stated in Chapter Two. 
From the target's perspective, an inverse relation between the probability of being a target and 
managerial ownership is being detected (Song and Walkling, 1993). As claimed by Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988), acquired firms are characterised to have smaller levels of 
managerial holdings compared to a control group. Stulz (1988) and Song and Walkling (1993) 
agree and show that firms with large managerial ownership are less likely to be a target of an 
acquisition. Song and Walkling (1993) claim that increased managerial ownership also 
reduces agency costs, which in turn reduces potential acquisition gains and decreases the 
probability of a firm becoming an acquisition target. In this context, these authors further 
argue that managerial ownership is positively related to the takeover premium being paid by 
the acquirer as managers negotiate more effectively. Managers aim to achieve the maximum 
wealth gain as a compensation for their lost benefits of incumbency (Barron, 1983, Walkling 
and Long, 1984), providing target shareholders with significantly positive returns (Song and 
Walkling, 1993). Ambrose and Megginson (1992), however, claim that insider ownership is 
not a significant determinant for a firm becoming a takeover target and there are many other 
factors influencing a takeover approach. 
As has already been discussed in this chapter, during the 1960s and 1970s conglomerate 
acquisitions were regarded as an efficient way to reduce the risk by not having all eggs in one 
basket (Amihud and Lev, 1981, Jensen 1986, Prahalad and Bettis, 1986, Bowman 1987). This 
motive, however, has become highly controversial, since it is also argued that management 
aims to increase risk through acquisitions because this in turn may result in a higher return of 
managerial company shareholdings (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987, Lewellen, Loderer and 
Rosenfeld 1989). Langetieg, Haugen and Wichern (1980) agree and confirm, that many 
takeovers cause the systematic as well as unsystematic risk 40 of the combined fin-ris to 
increase. Research by Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld (1989) concludes that a minority of 
mergers have risk-reducing outcomes and that they found only weak cross-sectional evidence 
that large managerial shareholdings more often result in risk reducing acquisitions. In sum, it 
40 Whereas systematic risk is common to all businesses, unsystematic risk is uniquely specific to one business. 
Mergers cannot eliminate the systematic variability, but unsystematic risk can be diversified away through 
mergers (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2002). 
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remains inconclusive whether managerial risk preference has an effect on their attitude 
towards M&As. 
To conclude, growth maximisation strategies are often pursued by managers for personal 
reasons, such as power, control, prestige, hubris and survival. As managerial incentives tend 
to be measured against short-term achievements, management is even encouraged to pursue 
objectives, which are not in the long-term interests of shareholders. Personally motivated 
acquisitions tend to provide no economic gain for shareholders. Any potential positive value 
gains for the target shareholders as an inducement are often more than offset by a shortfall of 
value for the bidder's shareholders (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990, Denis, Denis and 
Sarin, 1997). 
5.3.3 Corporate Control Motives 
As already pointed out in previous chapters, a great deal of theory and evidence supports the 
theory that takeovers address governance problems effectively (Marine, 1965, Jensen, 1988, 
1993, Scharfstein, 1988 and Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991). Megginson (1997) values the 
importance of a dynamic takeover market for the general health of the economy, 'because it 
weeds out inefficiencies and concentrates corporate control in the most capable hands' (P22). 
Copeland and Weston (1992) in this context, regard the growing threat of a takeover as an 
important monitoring device. They believe that the increasing risk of being taken over forces 
management to align objectives more closely with shareholders' interests. As already 
mentioned in Chapter Three, takeovers can be regarded as one of the most effective methods 
for shareholders to dispose of underperfon-ning managers without bribing them (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1988). In sum, the market for corporate control is regarded an essential device and 
antidote to eliminate inefficiencies and related agency problems. 
However, according to the managerialism. theory, it needs to be acknowledged that M&As are 
in part the result of agency problems, not the solution. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) further 
admit, that there remains some doubt about the real value of takeovers as a corporate 
governance mechanism. As takeovers are sufficiently expensive, due to most of the 
anticipated synergistic gains being paid up-front to target shareholders, not all performance 
fiascos make economic sense to be dealt with via a takeover. 
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In summary, takeovers are an approach, which is primarily driven by economic, financial and 
managerial motives and control considerations. M&As are only justifiable if they create value 
both for the target as well as the bidding shareholder. If the takeover enables the merged firm 
to create after-tax cash flows that exceed the sum of the after-tax cash flows of the individual 
firms (before the merger), then it can be concluded that value has been enhanced. 
5.3.4 The Challenge of Achieving Synergistic Gains 
The potential economic and financial benefits of M&As are considerable in theory; however, 
research has shown that such benefits are difficult to achieve in practice (Goold and 
Campbell, 1987). Authors including Grinblatt and Titman (1998) and Dickson (2000) remark 
that although synergistic gains are generally assumed to be considerable, empirical evidence 
on the extent of mergers creating synergistic advantages is limited. It is not only difficult to 
measure to what degree a merger has generated synergy but also it is even more difficult to 
establish the amount of value being created from synergies instead of other potential sources. 
Another important potential downside of M&As is referred to by Slusky and Caves (1991) as 
the unjustified high acquisition price being paid, which often destroys any potential synergy 
advantages. Thompson (1993) remarks that acquisition prices often comprise not only those 
costs representing the target's current value but also include extra premium payments 
incorporating the expected synergistic value gain. Ansoff (1987) explains these premiums 
payments from the target's point of view as a compensation for the risks which had been 
taken to develop the business in the first place. Grossman and Hart (1980) and Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997), in contrast, take the buyer's viewpoint in explaining premium payments as 
an indicator of how much additional value the buyer anticipates creating by managing the 
target firm. Sirower (1997) compares acquisition with some kind of game (acquisition game 
theory), bidders have to pay up front for the right to control the target firm with the future 
prospect to make financial profits. The risk of the gamble lies in the fact that while the 
premium payments are decided on up front, the future pay-offs are uncertain. Sirower sees the 
management challenge of achieving synergies in the fact that financial analysts already 
incorporate a target firm's anticipated future performance in their share price valuations. 
Therefore, in order to gain any synergy advantages, synergy must result in a higher than 
already expected performance gain or net present value. 
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Rappaport (1998a) remarks that companies which fail to comprehend this key equation are in 
danger of falling into the synergy trap. Sirower (1997) points out that most acquisitions fail to 
achieve significant synergy adNantages. Potential synergy advantages in form of economies of 
scale and scope as well as strategic fits are not only difficult to realise but also far too often 
more than outweighed by excessive premium payments. Synergy effects usually stay behind 
performance improvements required to cover the premium. These aspects are likely to convert 
synergy rather into a negative synergy or a2+2=3 equation, making acquisitions an 
unreliable way to create value. Considering the occurring additional costs of negotiation and 
coordinating the enlarged corporation after the acquisition, this would result in an overall 
economic loss. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) conclude that these excessive premium 
payments together with the related soft costs 41 often have a devastating impact on the 
financial position of the whole corporation. 
As pointed out by Hitt and Ireland (1985), managerial skills have a major effect on the 
corporation's ability to achieve synergies. They claim that success or defeat of M&As 
predominantly depends on the acquirer's management skills and expertise. Researchers 
including Cowling, Stoneman and Cubbin (1980) and Kumar (1984), claim that the majority 
of acquirers fail to realise efficiency improvements in the post acquisition period, particularly 
during the implementation or adjustment stage. Porter (1985) argues that synergies are 
difficult to realise since they are often founded on intangible resources, which are difficult to 
deten-nine or share. Prahalad and Bettis, (1986) and Dess, Picken and Janney (1998) see these 
difficulties arising from the target's and bidder's conflicting corporate cultures as well as from 
the target's resistance to change and loss of autonomy. Authors including Drucker (1974), 
Ansoff (1987), Thompson and Strictland (1998) and Schianchi and Mantovi (2006) see the 
varying characteristics and competitive environments presenting an enon-nous challenge for 
corporate management to make sound decisions. They criticise the bidder's executives for 
unwisely interfering in the target's management and claim that the bidder's strict corporate 
policies often have a weakening effect on the target, leading to inefficiency and value 
declines. 
With reference to Dess, Picken and Janney (1998), acquisitions are often a result of 
companies picking the wrong partners for the wrong reasons. Acquisition decisions are often 
41 Soft costs are indirect negotiation and coordination costs associated with the acquisition such as paying off 
golden parachutes and fees for advisory services such as lawyers, consultants, banks, etc. and related marketing 
expenses (Sirower, 1997). 
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incorrectly based on individual, group, and social factors but not enough on efficient strategic 
conceptual isation (Meeks, 1977, Hirsch, 1986, Roll, 1986, Haunschild, 1994, Schianchi and 
Mantovi, 2006). Rappaport (1998b) criticises bidders for rushing into irrational buying 
decisions without having a clear strategy, adequate knowledge of the target, reliable 
information on other investment alternatives and often without any post- acquisition 
integration plan. 
5.4 Research areas in the field of M&A 
Research into mergers and acquisitions plays an important role in the economic and finance 
literature. There are various particular research areas covered by a large a amount of studies, 
the most important of which include (1) transactional aspects of M&As, (2) takeover patterns, 
(3) hostile takeover and defence strategies, (4) post- acquisition performance and shareholder 
wealth creation and (5) takeover likelihood and prediction of takeover targets. The following 
section provides a brief overview of those research areas in M&A. 
5.4.1 Transactional aspects of M&As 
One field of research in the takeover literature aims to investigate aspects of agency conflicts 
arising between the acquirer, target and its bondholders (shareholders, creditors, etc. ) as well 
as representatives (e. g. investment banks) during merger negotiations. As has already been 
discussed in detail in the previous chapters, the scope of conflicts of interests between the 
parties involved potentially results in self-serving behaviour during the negotiation process. 
Research studies have shown that under the bargaining hypothesis this often results in 
overpriced acquisition premiums to the advantage of target shareholders and representatives 
(e. g. investment banks) and to the disadvantage of the acquirer (Kosnik and Shapiro, 1997, 
Servaes and Zenner, 1996, Kesner and Shapiro, 1994, Sudarsanam and Salami, 1999, 
Schwert, 2000). Another area of transactional aspects research includes the methods of 
financing an acquisition with its implications. Research studies aim to explain why the 
various methods of financing have different valuation effects on the acquirer's share values. 
These research outcomes clearly document the market reaction to the varying methods of 
financing, implying that cash offers are regarded as good news and stock offers are treated as 
bad news about the acquirer's intrinsic value (Leland and Pyle, 1977, Fishman, 1984,1989, 
Travlos, 1987, Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2002). It is also being argued that the share price 
reaction on cash or share acquisition announcements is dependent to some degree on the 
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managerial ownership structure of the acquirer (Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld, 1985, 
Amihud, Dodd and Weinstein, 1986). Other factors impacting on the decision of payment 
method include the signalling hypothesis (Hansen, 1984,1987, Myers and Majluf, 1984, 
Brown and Ryngaert, 1991) and tax implications (Amihud, Lev and Travlos, 1990, Brown 
and Ryngaert, 1991, Grinblatt and Timan, 1998, Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2002). 
5.4.2 Takeover patterns 
Another area of research focuses on takeover patterns such as the impact of economic, 
industry and regulatory changes on takeover activities in general. Industry shocks and 
economic patterns impacting on takeover activity and often resulting in takeover waves have 
been found by a number of studies including Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996), Schoenberg and Reeves (1999), Weston and Jawien (1999) and Sikora 
(2000). Authors including Shleifer and Vishny (1989) point out that during recession many 
asset buyers are credit constraint and cannot pay the full value of assets. Sellers may try to 
postpone the transfer of the firm until markets become more liquid, thereby reducing merger 
activity. Bergstr6m, Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (2005) point out that merger activity is 
much greater in prosperous periods than during recession. These findings support the view 
that market liquidity and capital market conditions influence merger activity (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989). The authors further found, that within a given merger wave, activity tends to 
focus on specific industries and that they tend to cluster over a period of two or three years 
within this given wave, signalling deal- making pressure. 
The impact of legal restrictions such as antimtakeover laws has been well researched. Grinblatt 
and Titman (1998), for example, claim that regulations are unfavourable to bidding 
companies and also disadvantageous to increased competition among bidders (see Chapter 
Three). Jarrell and Bradley (1980) and Marschall and Anderson (2006) further regard 
regulations as damaging for the bidder since legislations indirectly increase acquisition prices, 
which in turn reduces the potential return for bidding companies. Legislative enhancements 
are often regarded as delaying the completion of mergers, which again reduces the gain 
potential for the acquirer. Regulations therefore indirectly diminish the profitability of 
takeovers and in turn reduce the amount of mergers taking place. According to research by 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (1998), business control laws have not only lessened takeover 
activity but also were detrimental to shareholder wealth. Comment and Schwert (1995), 
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however, document that there appears to be little evidence of takeover deterrence as a result 
of an6takeover laws. 
5.4.3 Hostile takeover and Defence Strategies 
The area of hostile takeovers and defence strategies has seen a lot of research attention. 
Hostile takeovers as a method of exercising corporate control have already touched on in the 
Chapter Four. Research in this field provides evidence on the importance of the role of hostile 
takeovers in corporate control and in improving corporate performance. Questions being 
investigated include whether hostile takeover perform their disciplinary function successfully 
with outcomes remaining mixed (Franks and Mayer, 1996, Comment and Schwert, 1997, 
Cremers, Nair and Peyer, 2007). 
The other area of managerial defensive strategies are generally concerned with the 
effectiveness of defensive managerial strategies ranging from share price amendment, taking 
on higher debt or selling off divisions, 'white knight defence' to the 'Poison Pill' and 
'PacMan defence' (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983, Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987, Ryngaert, 1988, 
Malatesta and Walkling, 1988, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988, Sudarsanam, 1995, Holl and 
Kyriazis, 1997, Monks and Minow, 2002, Berggren and Engstroem, 2006, Ippolito, 2006, 
Cremers, Nair and Peyer, 2007). 
5.4.4 Ex-ante and Ex-post Acquisition Performance 
Two broad types of research are generally used to investigate this particular field of M&As. 
One research approach looks at the ex-ante market reaction to the announcement of a deal, 
considering both expected costs and benefits of the deal as well as the market's expectation of 
whether the deal will actually be completed. This analysis typically investigates a timeframe 
of three to five years prior and after the merger, analysing target and bidder cash flows, 
accounts, etc. (Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 1990). 
Another research approach assesses mergers after their consummation. Much of this ex-Post 
perfon-nance research evaluates the effect of takeovers on share price perfon-nance around the 
merger- announcement date, both for target and bidding shareholders and came to ambiguous 
results (Jensen and Ruback, 1983, Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988, Jarrell, Brickley and Netter, 
1988, Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker, 1992, Berger and Ofek, 1995, Loughran and Vijh, 1997, 
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Sirower 1997, Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2002, Martynova, Oosting and Renneboog, 2006). 
Grinblatt and Titman (1998) add in this context, that only the sum of both the bidder and 
target shareholder returns together deten-nines if the merger creates value. Their research 
confirms that returns to bidders around the tender offer announcement are sometimes positive, 
neutral or even sometimes negative, and the average returns vary considerably over time. The 
validity of these event studies rests, however, on the assumption that stock markets are 
efficient in evaluating the impact of the event to determine abnormal returns 42 (Rees, 1995). 
In summary, empirical research has provided only little consistent explanation of the financial 
implication of acquisitions on value ex-ante and ex-post. There is no consistent direction to 
managers confronted with acquisition opportunities who wish to maximise the wealth of their 
shareholders (Hoskisson and Hit, 1990, Flanagan, 1996, Stimpert and Duhaime, 1997). 
5.4.5 Likelihood and prediction models for takeover target 
This particular field of research differentiates between two broad types, takeover likelihood 
and takeover prediction models. Many papers have sought a relation between the prior 
performance of target firms and the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid (Hasbrouck, 1985, 
Palepu, 1986, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988a, b, Mikkelson and Partch, 1989, Ambrose 
and Megginson, 1992, Song and Walkling, 1993, Comment and Schwert, 1995). A second 
related stream of research in this field is concerned with identifying and predicting takeover 
targets ex ante in order to investigate if the investment in such a portfolio of potential 
takeover targets would result in any economic gain (Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984, Hasbrouck, 
1985, Palepu, 1986, Nuttal, 1999, Powell, 1997,2001, Bames, 2000). 
As suggested by the literature in the field of the market for corporate control, poor 
performance is likely to make a company vulnerable to takeover as a disciplinary device 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1998) see a number of 
factors potentially deten-nining whether a company is likely to be taken over and a large 
selection of studies focuses on the impact various financial and governance characteristics 
have on the likelihood of becoming a takeover target. However, despite some common factors 
there is a general absence of consensus among researchers on the variables that should be 
used to assess each firm's takeover likelihood. Variables investigated as part of takeover 
42 Abnormal returns refer to the difference between actual share returns and a market index or control group of 
stocks (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2002). 
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likelihood typically include accounting- and stock- market- based financial performance 
measures, dividend payouts, capital structure, free cash flow, asset structure, ownership 
structure, size and age. Some of the most important variables in determining acquisition 
likelihood will be discussed in more detail below. 
5.4.5.1 Takeover Likelihood and Target Performance 
Overall results in the literature are mixed with regards to target performance determining 
acquisition likelihood. While early studies show a negative relation between performance and 
the likelihood of becoming a takeover target (Palepu, 1986, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1988a, b, 1989, Mitchell and Lehn, 1990, Weisbach, 1993) the overall trend over time goes 
towards finding no significant association between hostile takeovers and firrn performance, 
implying that the disciplinary merger has statistically disappeared (Franks and Mayer, 1996, 
Argrawal and Jaffe, 2003, Bratton, 2005). Authors including Sinha (2004) found that none of 
the performance measures applied appear to be significant in influencing the likelihood of a 
takeover. Research by Bergstr6m, Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (2005) and Bratton (2005), 
in this context, explain that the relation between firm performance and takeover likelihood is 
rather complex and difficult to define and measure. 
Whereas these studies tend to focus on a sample of takeover companies to investigate their 
financial characteristics, this thesis's study concentrates on a sample of underperforming 
firms to measure the likelihood of these companies being taken over following a period of 
underperformance. This is critical since the market for corporate control should rectify 
underperfon-nance through a takeover and most studies do not focus on this particular aspect 
but investigate this area more broadly. 
5.4.5.2 Takeover Likelihood and Asset Structure 
As already been discussed in this chapter, there exists a relation between a firm's asset 
structure 43 and the probability of becoming a takeover target. It is being claimed that Erms 
43 Total assets are the sum of tangible assets (fixed plus current) and intangible assets plus investments. Tangible 
assets are the sum of physical assets such as land, building, equipment and plant as well as other long-term 
physical assets plus the sum of inventories, accounts receivable, cash and cash equivalents and miscellaneous 
short-terrn assets. Intangible assets are non-physical assets in the balance sheet such as patents, trademarks and 
goodwill as well as brand values. 
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with a high percentage of tangible assets in their total asset structure are attractive takeover 
targets for two potential reasons. These companies tend to have greater debt capacities 
(Ambrose and Megginson, 1992, Bergstr6m, Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 2005) and are 
ideal candidates for asset striping by raiders (Eddey, 1991). As has been mentioned before, 
the target's own assets can even be taken as a security for debt financing the takeover, which 
in turn reduces the bidder's direct acquisition costs. For this reason, the probability of being 
taken over is positively related to the level of tangible assets to total assets being held. 
However, it needs to be borne in mind that asset-rich targets might already take full advantage 
of their debt potential before the merger. 
5.4.5.3 Takeover Likelihood and Capital Structure 
Another stream of research into capital structure focuses in particular on the relation between 
debt and takeover likelihood (Jensen, 1986, Harris and Raviv, 1988, Israel, 1988, Stulz, 1988 
and Hart and Moore, 1990). Research by Nolan (1999) has shown that debt does not only 
prevent prosperous firms being taken over but it also simultaneously prevents poor quality 
fin-ns from engaging in M&A activity. 
As already discussed in Chapter Four and earlier in this chapter the amount of debt being held 
by a company influences its attractiveness for potential bidders. Research which support the 
view that higher debt reduces the probability of a takeover include Jensen (1986), Palepu 
(1986), Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988), Zwiebel (1996), Comment and Schwert (1997) 
and Cremers and Nair (2003). Higher debt reduces the probability of a takeover since it 
commits the manager to performance improvements and results in stricter monitoring of 
managerial action However, Cremers and Nair (2003) found that takeover targets are often 
financially distressed companies with higher levels of debt on the balance sheet. 
It is also being argued that the potential acquirer could interpret low debt ratios as the inability 
of the target company's management to maximize fin-n value (Bergstr6m, Eisenberg, 
Sundgren and Wells, 2005). However, low debt could also indicate a lack of investment 
opportunities and hence render the company less attractive to bidders (Jensen, 1986). 
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5.4.5.4 Takeover Likelihood and Size 
The firm size theory of takeovers has received large attention in the takeover literature 
(Levine and Aaronovitch, 1981, Palepu, 1986, Ambrose and Megginson, 1992, Powell, 1997, 
2001, Cudd and Duggal, 2000, Chakraborty and Baum, 2003, Sinha, 2004). One stream of 
research suggests that takeover likelihood decreases with firm size, which is based on the 
premise that there are transaction costs of takeovers related to size making it more difficult for 
potential bidders to absorb large firms. Very large firms, even with significant gains, may be 
difficult to acquire because of lack of available credit and due to the ability of larger firms to 
engage in more prolonged and costly takeover defences. Another research stream including 
authors such as Barnes (2000), however, claims that that if management acts in accordance 
with the growt4- maximization behaviour theory, then managers shall prefer larger rather than 
smaller acquisitions. Nuttal (1999) agrees and adds that to the extent that agency problems are 
more severe in large firms where ownership control is weaker, one could expect large 
companies to underperform and thus become more attractive takeover targets. 
Research by Song and Walkling (1993) further claims that target firms tend not to be of the 
smallest size but are somewhat more prominent in the middle range. 
5.4.5.5 Takeover Likelihood and Managerial Ownership 
As already been introduced in the previous chapters, it is being claimed that there is a relation 
between managerial ownership and the likelihood of becoming a takeover target. However, 
evidence remains mixed. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988a, b), Stulz (1988), Mikkelson and 
Partch (1989) and Song and Walkling (1993) find that managerial ownership is negatively 
related to takeover attempts. Firms with increased amounts of managerial ownership are more 
costly to acquire and are less likely to be the target of an acquisition attempt. Managers aim to 
achieve the maximum wealth gain as a compensation for their lost benefits of incumbency 
(Barron, 1983, Walkling and Long, 1984). Song and Walkling (1993) claim that increased 
managerial ownership also reduces agency costs, which in turn reduces potential acquisition 
gains and decreases the probability of a fin-n becoming an acquisition target. Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992), however, claim that insider ownership is not a significant deten-ninant for 
a firm becoming a takeover target and there are many other factors influencing a takeover 
approach. 
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As has been shown by the various outcomes of this large amount of research being conducted 
in the field of takeover likelihood and predictability, takeover bids appear to be the outcome 
of a complex set of factors and the problem of omitted variables always remains in any 
empirical evaluation of takeovers (Sinha, 2004). Studies have shown that on many occasions a 
finn may possess all the 'right' characteristics for being taken over but may never receive a 
bid. 
Inconsistent research results in the past can also be attributed to a number of varying 
methodological issues, model specifications, sample size, timeframe, time periods and 
differing measurements and control devices applied as well as regulatory country differences. 
As pointed out by Dodd and Ruback (1977), Bradley (1980), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) 
and Travlos (1987), varying research outcomes have also been reported on studies that 
investigate different types of mergers such as tender offers, hostile takeovers and LBOs. 
However, many studies do not incorporate these differences and mix these acquisition types. 
A related issue refers to the fact that hostile takeovers, for example, mean different things to 
different people, since there is no clear definition and since takeover which were announced 
'hostile' may in fact be concluded as 'friendly' as a result of the negotiation process. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on mergers and acquisitions as one important option 
of mitigating agency conflicts in the market for corporate control. It investigated potential 
merger motives including economic, financial and corporate control considerations as well as 
managerial aspects. Despite the importance of takeovers as a rapid-fire mechanism for 
overcoming corporate deficiencies and related agency problems with all potertial value- 
creating benefits in theory, empirical research results have shown that outcomes are 
ambiguous. Indeed, as some argue, overall costs of merger activity overshadow any marginal 
and even possibly imaginary value gains (Scherer, 1988), which is in line with the general 
sceptical view about the likelihood of acquirers getting more back from an acquisition than 
they pay for. However, it needs to be emphasised that this does neither mean that acquirers 
never succeed nor that capital markets always react unfavourably. Some management teams 
and buyers have been successful in creating value. 
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Overall, research has provided only little consistent explanation for the likelihood of 
becoming a takeover target and there is no reliable direction for investors confronted with 
acquisition opportunities who wish to maximise economic gain. One main reason for these 
unsatisfactory research outcomes can be found in the varying methodologies and the large 
amount of differing variables applied to all kind of models. Another reason lies in that studies 
often do not differentiate between varying merger types. Whereas most studies tend to focus 
on a sample of takeover companies to investigate their financial characteristics, this thesis's 
study concentrates on a sample of underperforming fin-ns to measure the likelihood of these 
companies being taken over following a period of underperformance. This is critical since the 
market for corporate control should rectify underperfon-nance through a takeover and most 
studies do not focus on this particular aspect but investigate this area more broadly. 
The following chapter provides an overview of the study's methodological approach and 
model which aims to investigate whether the market for corporate control is efficient in the 
sense that underperfori-ning firms are being taken over as a consequence of their inefficiency 
and whether underperforming firms can be identified ex-ante according to a set of specific 
financial characteristics. 
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Chapter Six 
Research Design and Methodology Outline 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an outline of the research design and methodology for this thesis. It 
introduces the overall research objectives for this study and presents the corresponding 
hypotheses. This chapter further outlines the methodological approach and introduces the 
model, which will be applied to test the proposed hypotheses. An analysis of 
underperformance and its measurements Tobin's q (Tsq) and Cumulative Abnon-nal Return 
(Car) will be provided. One further aim of this study is ID investigate and contrast financial 
characteristics of underperforming firms by comparing underperforming companies taken 
over, with underperforming companies not taken over. The model's independent financial 
variables are introduced and their application to the model explained. The chapter concludes 
with a description of the data and the sample used for this study and presents and discusses 
available statistical software packages as well as justifies the chosen application. 
6.2 Research Objectives 
The overall aim of this thesis is to test the relationship between managerial underperformance 
and takeover likelihood. As discussed in detail in this study's literature review, there exists 
the view that a takeover offers one of the most efficient devices in the market for corporate 
control to overcome agency problems since it rapidly transfers resources and control from 
inefficient managers to efficient ones. Jensen (1986) takes the view that takeovers are a direct 
response to the breakdown of internal corporate governance systems and agency conflicts in 
companies. Research by many authors including Manne (1965), Scharfstein (1988), Ang, 
Cole and Lin (2000), Daines (2002) and Monks and Minow (2002) support the view that 
M&As are a good means of solving governance and agency problems. 
As pointed out in Chapter Three, externally controlled governance mechanisms prevail in 
Anglo-Saxon countries with takeovers playing an important role as a means of reversing non, - 
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value maximising strategies of underperforming companies 44 . Therefore, this study will focus 
on countries where the external markets for corporate control are said to work actively as a 
disciplinary device, namely the US, UK and Canada (Chernoff, 1996, Schiffrin, 1996). 
This thesis proposes to investigate one aspect of the disciplinary motive for takeovers. This 
study is not concerned with the issue of whether a performance improvement occurs after the 
takeover but rather aims to investigate in a first instance whether the market for corporate 
control works, meaning whether companies are actually taken over as a consequence of 
underperformance. For the purpose of this study, this thesis will extract a sample of 
underperfonning companies by applying the performance measures of Tsq and Car to stock 
market-listed companies in the US, UK and Canada over a period of 17 years (1988 until 
2004). This long time period was chosen in order to obtain a large sample of underperforming 
companies which have actually been taken over. The exact measurement of underperformance 
will be explained in detail in Section 6.4. 
In a second step, this study examines financial characteristics 45 of underperforming 
companies in order to investigate the reasons for why some underperforming companies are in 
fact being taken over (Group 1) and other underperforming companies are not (Group 11). This 
study only investigates actual takeovers (Group 1) and not takeover announcements, which 
may not result in an actual takeover. The exact selection of the two sample groups will be 
explained in sections 6.5. The following figure presents the sample structure for clarification. 
44 The absence of a market for corporate control in most of Continental Europe is attributable to the structure of 
capital markets with a small number of quoted companies and concentrated ownership in the hands of a small 
number of large investors (Franks and Mayer, 1996). 
45 Although the literature review has highlighted the importance of governance characteristics (ownership and 
board structure, etc. ), the lack of information for such a large sample and long time period made it impossible to 
examine such variables in the analysis. 
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Figure 1: Sample Structure of Underperforming Firms 
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This clustering into two groups already implies that the capital market does not (totally) work 
but this thesis aims to investigate the degree of efficiency of the market for corporate control 
and aims to determine the resulting likelihood of acquisition. This study examines if there are 
any differences between the financial characteristics of these two groups in order to provide a 
justification and explanation for the varying outcomes in ten-ns of underperfon-ning companies 
being taken over (Group 1) and underperforming companies not being taken over (Group 11). 
The selection of financial characteristics to forrn part of an explanatory or predictive model 
raises several problems. Firstly, it remains uncertain which variables are related to the 
probability of a takeover since the market for corporate control may be motivated by different 
factors at different times in different countries. Secondly, not only are several alternative 
measurements available as proxies for a particular financial characteristic, but it is often 
unclear which is the best, since alternatives are not so much substitutes but have overlapping 
informational content, leading to potential multicollinearity in the estimation data and 
misspecification of and bias in, the statistical model estimates (Palepu, 1986). 
Independent variables applied in this study include the two variables already used to measure 
underperformance (Tsq and Car). In addition, capital structure, asset structure and firrn size 
will be analysed. Based on these financial characteristics this thesis aims to deten-nine the 
likelihood of acquisition as a result of managerial underperfon-nance. 
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The objectives for this thesis are as follows: 
OBJECTIVE ONE: 
1. Investigating if the market for corporate control actually works by measuring to what 
degree companies are taken over following a period of underperformance in the US, UK 
and Canada. Measurements of underperformance are a combination of Tobin's q and 
cumulative abnormal return. 
OBJECTIVE TWO: 
2. Testing for a relationship between financial characteristics and takeover likelihood of 
underperforming companies in the US, UK and Canada. Financial variables under 
investigation include underperfon-nance (Tsq and Car), capital structure, asset structure 
and firm size, accounting also for industry and economic effects. 
The study is divided into separate phases of investigation. Firstly we test whether 
underperformance is actually followed by a takeover (Objective One). Secondly, an 
investigation into separate financial characteristics of underperfon-ning companies is 
undertaken to test what influence these financial variables have on the likelihood of becoming 
a takeover target, incorporating and accounting for economic and industry effects (Objective 
Two). The independent variables under investigation will be explained and discussed in the 
following Section 6.3. 
In addition to the individual financial company variables a number of corresponding industry 
and economy control variables will be determined. As has been shown by a number of studies 
(Liebeskind and Opler, 1994, Berger and Ofek, 1995, Comment and Jarrell, 1995, John and 
Ofek, 1995), takeovers tend to occur in waves which appear to be related to certain economic 
circumstances characterized by, for example; short- and long-term interest rates, inflation and 
generic economic prosperity. This thesis will apply GDP as a measurement of a country's 
general economic condition since it incorporates the effects of the above-mentioned 
indicators. 
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This thesis also accounts for industry effects to adjust to the fact that industries vary 
considerably from each other in their financial variables and characteristics (Tsq, asset 
structure, capital structure and size). For this reason, individual firm characteristics always 
need to be related to their industry counterparts 46 . Therefore this analysis uses the financial 
variables (e. g. Tsq, asset structure, capital structure and size) in absolute terms as well as 
expressed as a variance (difference) to their industry counterparts. 
6.3 The Hypotheses 
According to the research objectives introduced above, the following hypotheses will be 
investigated as part of this study. The hypotheses are structured in line with both objectives 
One and Two, according to the four financial variables under investigation. The inclusion of 
economic and industry effects will be investigated separately for modelling reasons 
(hierarchical regression), which will be explained in Section 6.7. 
6.3.1 Hypothesis One - Underperformance 
H10: There is no relation between the degree of underperfonnance and takeover likelihood. 
H11: There is a positive relation between the degree of underperfonnance and takeover 
likelihood. 
Mao: There is no relation between underperformance and takeover likelihood taking into 
account industry and economic effects. 
Mal: There is an increasing positive relation between underperfonnance and takeover 
likelihood taking into account industry and economic effects. 
The literature claims that the market for corporate control is one of the most efficient devices 
to rectify managerial underperformance and inefficiencies in corporations. Takeovers are 
often regarded as a direct response to the breakdown of internal corporate governance systems 
in companies and agency conflicts (Manne, 1965, Jensen, 1986, Palepu, 1986, Scharfstein, 
1988). As a consequence, a positive relation between the degree of underperformance and 
takeover likelihood can be assumed. 
46 For example, there are industries, which have typically high asset specificities (e. g. manufacturing) and thus 
this needs to be considered for and related accordingly to each individual firm. 
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Hypothesis HI a provides an extended investigation into the relationship by including a set of 
industry effects and economic variables (GDP). Statistically there is the possibility that tfie 
inclusion of industry and economic effects might change the level of significance. therefore 
this will be tested accordingly. 
6.3.2 Hypothesis Two - Capital Structure 
H20: There is no relation between capital structure and the likelihood of underperfon-ning 
companies being acquired. 
R21: The level of corporate debt is negatively / positively related to the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired. 
Mao: There is no relation between capital structure and the likelihood of underperforming 
companies being acquired taking into account industry and economic effects. 
Mal: The level of corporate debt is negatively / positively related to the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired taking into account industry and economic 
effects. 
As already discussed in the literature review, the amount of debt being held by a company 
influences its attractiveness for potential bidders. However, so far research outcomes remain 
contradictory in terms of debt being positively or negatively related to takeover likelihood. On 
the one hand, it is being argued that higher debt reduces the probability of a takeover since it 
commits the manager to performance improvements and it results in stricter monitoring of 
managerial action. It is further being claimed that a potential acquirer could interpret low debt 
ratios as the inability of the target company's management to maximize firm value. The 
majority of studies assume that the level of corporate debt is negatively related to the 
likelihood of being taken over. Research, which support this view include Jensen (1986), 
Palepu (1986), Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988), Zwiebel (1996), Comment and Schwert 
(1997), Cudd and Duggal (2000) and Bergstr6m, Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (2005). 
On the other hand, there is research indicating a positive relation between debt levels and 
takeover likelihood. Research by authors including Cremers and Nair (2003), for example, 
found that takeover targets are often financially distressed companies with higher levels of 
debt on the balance sheet. It can be argued that acquiring companies with financial slack or a 
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low- debt-to- equity ratio view a company with high levels of debt (debt-burdened) as a good 
takeover target in order to optimise their own capital structure which is even seen as a cheaper 
option than issuing new debt. 
The variable used to test this hypothesis is total leverage, which is calculated by dividing total 
debt by the sum of total debt, market value of equity and preferred stock. This thesis 
compares the capital structure variable outcomes of Group I with Group 11 in order to detect 
any variations. 
Hypothesis H. 2a provides an extended investigation into this relation by including a set of 
economic and industry effects. Statistically there is the possibility that the inclusion of 
industry effect might change the level of significance, therefore this will be tested 
accordingly. 
6.3.3 Hypothesis Three - Asset Structure 
H30: There is no relation between the asset structure and the likelihood of underperfon-ning 
companies being acquired. 
H31: The proportion of tangible assets to total assets is positively related the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired. 
Mao: There is no relation between the level of tangible assets and the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired taking into account industry effects. 
Mal: The proportion of tangible assets to total assets is positively related to the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired taking into account industry effects. 
According to the literature, a relationship between a firm's asset structure 47 and the 
probability of becoming a takeover target has been detected. As already pointed out in 
Chapter Five, firrns with a high percentage of tangible assets in their total asset structure are 
attractive takeover targets for two potential reasons. These companies tend to have greater 
47 Total assets are the sum of tangible assets (fixed plus current) and intangible assets plus investments. Tangible 
assets are the sum of physical assets such as land, building, equipment and plant as well as other long-term 
physical assets plus the sum of inventories, accounts receivable. cash and cash equivalents and miscellaneous 
short-terin assets. Intangible assets are non-physical assets in the balance sheet such as patents, trademarks and 
good-vvill as Nvell as brand values. 
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debt capacities (Ambrose and Megginson, 1992) and are ideal candidates for asset stripping 
by raiders (Eddey, 1991). For this reason, the probability of being taken over is positively 
related to the level of tangible assets to total assets being held. 
The variable used to test this hypothesis is the proportion of tangible assets being held to total 
assets. This thesis will apply this variable and compare outcomes between Group I and Group 
11 in order to detect any variations. 
Hypothesis H3a provides an extended investigation into this relation by including an industry 
effect variable. Statistically, there is the possibility that the inclusion of the industry effect 
variable might change the level of significance, therefore this will be tested accordingly. 
6.3.4 Hypothesis Four - Size 
H40: There is no relation between firm size and the likelihood of being acquired. 
H41: Firm size is negatively / positively related to the likelihood of being taken over. 
Mao: There is no relation between the company size and the likelihood of underperforming 
companies being acquired taking into account industry effects. 
Mal: Finn size is positively / negatively related to the likelihood of underperfon-ning 
companies being acquired taking into account industry effects. 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the size of a firm can have an impact on the likelihood of 
becoming an acquisition target. One stream of research suggests that takeover likelihood 
decreases with firm size, which is based on the premise that transaction costs of takeovers are 
related to size, making it more difficult for potential bidders to absorb large firms. Very large 
firins may be difficult to acquire because of the lack of available credit and due to the ability 
of larger firms to engage in more prolonged and costly takeover defences. In addition, a 
smaller firm might also be easier to be integrated into the acquirer's operation, hence smaller 
firms should be preferred over large ones (Levine and Aaronovitch, 1981, Palepu, 1986, 
Ambrose and Megginson, 1992, Powell, 1997, Cudd and Duggal, 2000, Chakraborty and 
Baum, 2003, Sinha, 2004). Thus, it can be argued that firrn size is negatively related to 
takeover likelihood. 
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However, in accordance with the growth-maximisation behaviour theory, the literature claims 
that large companies are more attractive to acquirers. Large companies do not only provide 
smaller companies with a rapid source of expansion but it is also being argued that agency 
problems are more severe in large firms, potentially resulting in underperfon-nance and thus 
these companies may become an attractive takeover target (Nuttal, 1999, Barnes, 2000). For 
this reason, some researchers assume that firm size is positively related to takeover likelihood 
although there is generally more support in the literature for a negative relationship. 
There is generally no consensus in the variable specification for size. Many studies use the 
logarithm of annual total assets, the logarithm of annual total sales or market capitalisation as 
well as the number of employees as a measure of size. For the purpose of this study the 
logarithm of total assets seemed to be most appropriate since it is important to also account 
for the exact amount of assets the acquirer is actually purchasing in a transaction. This thesis 
will apply this variable and compare outcomes between Group I and Group 11 in order to 
detect any variations. 
Hypothesis H4a also includes an industry effect variable of size. Statistically, there is the 
possibility that the inclusion of the industry effect variable might change the level of 
significance, hence this will be tested accordingly. 
The following table provides a surnmarised overview of all proposed hypotheses and their 
expected signs. 
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Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses under Investigation Expected sign, 
as suggested by 
the literature 
1111 There is a positive relation between the degree of + 
underperformance and takeover likelihood. 
Mai There is an increasing positive relation between underperfori-nance + 
and takeover likelihood taking into account industry and economic 
effects. 
1121 The level of corporate debt is negatively / positively related the 
likelihood of underperfori-ning companies being acquired. 
112a, The level of corporate debt is negatively / positively related to the 
likelihood of underperforming companies being acquired taking 
into account industry and economic effects. 
1131 The proportion of tangible assets to total assets is positively + 
negatively related to the likelihood of underperforming companies 
being acquired. 
113ai The proportion of tangible assets to total assets is positively + 
negatively related to the likelihood of underperforming companies 
being acquired taking into account industry effects. 
1141 Firm size is negatively / positively related to the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired. 
114a, Firm size is positively/negatively related to the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired taking into account 
industry effects. 
6.4 Analysis and Measurement of Underperformance 
This section provides an introduction and discussion of underperformance with its relevant 
measurements to be applied in this thesis. If managers are pursuing goals other than value 
maximisation then it results in firm underperformance. As stated by Palepu (1986) and 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988a, b), targets of takeovers are often firms which have 
underperformed others in the same industry. As a result, company performance would be 
lower than that of value- maximising firms (Asquith, 1983, Kennedy and Limmack, 1996). 
Existing empirical work in this field does indeed suggest that takeover targets are more likely 
to be less profitable and efficient and hence are to be disciplined by the market for corporate 
control (Singh, 1971,1975, Meeks, 1977, Levine and Aaronovitch, 1981, Cosh, Hughes and 
Singh, 1984, Padgett and Shabbir, 2005). 
A variety of financial ratios are applied widely as key variables to measure corporate 
performance. However, in the economic and finance literature there is no common agreement 
on the application of a particular set of financial ratios to measure perfon-nance. Particular 
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controversy exists with regard to whether accounting- or stock market-based measures are the 
more appropriate to be applied. Authors including Bromiley (1986), Thompson (1993) and 
Quian (1997) regard accountin g- based measures as more appropriate and claim that they 
accurately reflect the fin-n's economic performance. However, accounting- based ratios have 
been criticised for being single period measurements, which do not take into account the cost 
of capital and which ignore any future outlook (Dubuvsky and Varadarajan, 1987, Hoskisson, 
Hitt, Johnson and Moesel, 1993). Seth (1990), Black, Wright and Bachman (1998) and 
McMenamin (1999) further criticise the ambiguous and subjective accounting allocation 
procedures, which are dependent on personal preferences and individual country practices. 
McMenamin (1999) see further difficulties in using accounting- based ratios as a means of 
performance measure due to the fact that the numerator and the denominator may be taken 
from separate financial statements 48 . Although accounting- based measures have oftenbeen 
condemned in the financial and economic literature (Fisher and McGowan, 1983, Benston, 
1985) they are still commonly used for reasons of availability. 
According to authors such as Goold, Campbell and Alexander (1994) and Flanagan (1996), 
stock market-based measurements are good indicators of a firm's performance since they 
stand for a firm's future value and incorporate a company's investment decision in its stock 
value. This opinion goes in line with Fama's (1970) efficient market hypothesis 49 , whic h 
suggests that all available infori-nation is immediately impounded without bias in stock prices. 
Rappaport (1998b) adds that investors instantly readjust, possibly occurring incorrect share 
price valuations. Mills (1994) concludes: 'There is no way to beat the market' (p 12). 
6.4.1 Applied Measurements of Underperformance 
Given that this thesis is primarily concerned with the operation of the market for corporate 
control in disciplining underperforming management, a set of measurements need to be found 
in order to assess managerial underperfon-nance. Measurements applied in this study will be 
Tobin's q and cumulative abnormal return, which will be applied in combination. The exact 
measurement and definition of managerial underperformance is critical to this study and only 
48 For example, whereas the profit refers to the Profit and Loss Account covering a whole period, the net assets 
or equities refer to the Balance Sheet, which investigates a single point of time. 
49 The efficient market hypothesis (semi-strong form) assumes that the stock market immediately adjusts share 
prices to reflect any new information as soon as it becomes publicly available. The key foundation of the 
efficient market hypothesis lies in the two assumptions that investors are rational in their trading action Md 
guided only on new information and not on intuition (Fama, 1970). 
105 
companies with a three-year moving average Tsq value of below I and a negative three-year 
Cumulative Abnormal Return value falling within exactly the same time interval will be 
defined as underperforming firms. Since Tsq generally has an upward-bias arbitrage, meaning 
values for Tobin's q tend to be overstated, it is of importance that companies need to fulfil 
both criteria simultaneously. 
The period of three- year underperformance was considered to be the most reasonable choice. 
The selection of a shorter period to for example, two years would have potentially resulted in 
a much bigger sample, however, the distortion effect would become much larger, meaning 
that one particularly bad year of underperformance could potentially overshadow the average 
perfon-nance. Increasing the window of underperformance to for example, four years would 
reduce the sample drastically and would only filter out companies, which are considerably 
underperforming. Therefore choosing the window of three years of underperforinance appears 
most reasonable. 
The following sections will introduce and explain the exact measurement and calculation of 
Tobin's q (Section 6.4.1.1) and cumulative abnormal return (Section 6.4.1.2). 
6.4.1.1 Tobin's q (Tsq) 
Tobin's q is a well-accepted measurement of performance (Hasbrouck, 1985, Lang, Stulz and 
Walkling, 1991, Servaes, 1991). The Tsq ratio divides the market value of all of the firm's 
debt plus equity (market value of common stock and preferred stock) by the replacement 
value of the firm's Wal assets (Lloyd and Jahera, 1994, Perfect and Wiles, 1994)50 . The 
following formula will be applied to calculate Tobin's q: 
(MVOE + TD) / TA, (1) 
where MVOE refers to the market of equity, TD refers to total book value of debt and TA 
represents total assets. 
50 Tsq can also be expressed as the present value of future cash flows divided by the replacement cost of tangible 
assets (Hall, Ladermanns and Mundy, 1988, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988a, b) which is in particular 
applicable for unlisted firms. 
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Tsq has been applied by numerous studies in the financial and economics literature to identify 
the extent to which firms have positive net present value (NPV) opportunities (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989, Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1991, Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1994, 
Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1998). Schwartz (1982) and Hasbrouck (1985), for 
example, found that using Tsq makes it possible to distinguish between well-managed (high 
Tsq) and poorly managed firms (low Tsq). Hasbrouck (1985) further argues that target 
companies have relatively low values of Tsq, which suggests that target shares are often 
selling at a value below their replacement cost. Servaes (1991, p409) states that 'the best 
takeovers in terrns of value creation, are those where a high Tsq firm takes over a low Tsq 
firm. ' The author concludes that interpreting Tobin's q as a measurement of managerial 
performance supports the view that better perfon-ning firms create value by taking over poorly 
performing companies. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988a, b) agree and note that the 
probability of a takeover is strongly negatively related to Tobin's q. 
As pointed out by Lang and Stulz (1994), Tsq also measures the contribution of the fin-n's 
intangible assets to its market value. They argue that management's actions directly affect the 
value of intangible assets since managerial entrenchment can be regarded as an intangible 
asset with negative value. Hence, management can add or subtract value from the firm's total 
assets whose replacement value is the denominator of the Tsq formula, making Tobin's qa 
good measure of managerial underperfon-nance. 
The measure Tobin's q avoids many but not all of the difficulties associated with accounting 
and capital market measures of performance (Wemerfelt and Montgomery, 1988, Jose and 
Stevens, 1986). Lang and Stulz (1994) claim that Tsq has the advantage of being comparable 
among companies regardless of size and industry effects. In particular, there is neither a need 
for risk adjustments nor normalisation. 
Calculating the market value of a firm raises a number of issues. Multiplying the average 
share price per annurn by the average annual number of ordinary shares generates the market 
value of ordinary shares. Since this does not incorporate other share capital (mainly 
preference shares), this study furthermore uses the book value of other shares in the 
calculation of the market value. Finally, the definition of market value includes the market 
value of the firm's debt. However, as pointed out by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Dickerson, 
Gibson and Tsakalotos (2002), the lack of information on the maturity of debt and on current 
107 
market prices for debt precludes any straightforward debt valuation. Therefore it is most 
common to apply the book value of debt. 
For the purpose of this study, companies will be identified as underperforming when the 
three-year moving average of Tsq falls below 1. Mathematically, the rolling Tobins'q formula 
becomes: 
<I included TQ =>I 
excluded 
20-1ý k+3 
-d 3 where, 
TQ = 1: Up (2) k ---0 
ýII l=k. 
+d I 
6.4.1.2 Abnormal Returns / Cumulative Abnormal Return (Car) 
Abnonnal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are established stock market-based 
measurements of performance, commonly used for an event time methodology (Weisbach, 
1988, Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). Under the assumption of the semi-strong market 
efficiency, companies with inefficient management should be penalised by poor share prices. 
As a consequence of low share price performance, underperforming companies are likely to 
become attractive acquisition targets (Manne, 1964,1965). The measurement of Car helps to 
identify firms, which underperform their peer group in terms of share price perfon-nance after 
controlling for industry, size and time-varying systematic risk effects. 
6.4.1.2.1 Abnon-nal Retums 
This model argues that returns on security j are linearly related to returns on a 'market' 
portfolio. Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between a finn's security returns and 
the return of an equal- and value-weighted market portfolio for a certain period. The 
differences are known as residuals; thus, 
Ull =A CRj, - ERJ, ý (3) 
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where 
Up = the residual for securityj in time period t. This is the difference between the 
actual return and the expected return. The residual Uj, is expected to have a mean 
value of zero. 
ACRJI = the actual return on securityj in time period t; and 
ERJI = the expected return on securityj in time period t. 
The expected return ER,, is derived from the following market model relationship, suggested 
by Sharp (1963), which can be mathematically described as: 
ERjt = a, + Pj R,,, +ej, 9 
where 
R. 1 = the return on a value-weighted market portfolio 
in period t; 
(4) 
aj, Pj security specific parameters to be estimated and vary from one security to another. 
a represents the intercept and 0, is known as systematic risk and expresses the 
covariance between the returns on securityj and the returns on the market index. 
The exact calculation of beta is described in Section 6.4.1.2.3. 
eit = random disturbance term of securityj in time period t. This stochastic error tenn. 
assumes to be independently normally distributed and satisfies the normal 
assumptions of a linear regression model. 
Thus the expected return for period t is calculated by: 
ai + pj (5) 
The parameters di and Pi. are calculated by regressing monthly returns for securityj on the 
monthly returns of the market index. The market model in its original version, however, is 
criticised for two main reasons, (I) being that it assumes Pj to stay constant over the period 
under investigation and (2) that it does not allow for value-weighted size differences. 
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In order to overcome this problem this thesis uses an adjusted market model, which allows for 
time- varying systematic risk (0,, ) and size, as applied by lbbotson (1975), Dimson and Marsh 
(1986), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) and Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1993). The 
abnon-nal return for firrn j in month t, ABR,, is thus computed as: 
ABRjt = Rj, - sjf - 
(pjl 
- PJR., - Rf, 
), 
where 
Rj, = the return to fin-nj in period t; 
Sj, = the return of the firm's corresponding peer group in period t; 
The calculation of the peer group return requires the selection of a directly comparable 
industry group composed of firms from the same industry (Datastream item 
, iNDY&sq5I ) also taking into account firin size as measured by total sales. Companies 
included in the peer group need to have a total sales figure which is only up to 50 % 
above or below the total sales figure of the company under investigation. Since the 
peer group already only incorporates companies of similar size, a simple average of 
the peer group's return is applied. The peer group is calculated on an annual basis and 
hence its composition is likely to change year-on-year. 
P,, = the systematic risk of fin-n j in period t; 
P, 
jI = the systematic risk of the 
firm's peer group, which is simply the average of the betas 
of all securitiesj in the peer group portfolio, thus: 
n 
Pj, 
n j=l 
k, = the return of the security's overall industry in period; t 
There are a number of possibilities to calculate an industry return, two of which are 
common in finance theory and practice. The industry return can be a weighted return 
index, weighting each company according to its market value of equity (MVOE), 
meaning, companies with a higher MVOE will account for a greater proportion within 
the industry index. For example, the German DAX Index and the S&P500 Index 
51 Please refer to Table 4 Datastrearn Mnemonics of Master Data and their Definitions in Section 7.2 for an 
explanation INDXFS. 
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follow this procedure. The altemative procedure would be to simply equally weigh 
each company within the portfolio/index, meaning calculating the non-weighted 
average portfolio return. The Dow Jones Index applies this procedure. 
This thesis tested both methods and came to the conclusion that a weighted return 
index produces the more appropriate results and hence this procedure was followed. 
Companies, especially those listed in the NASDAQ and TSX Venture, which tend to 
include small and very volatile firrns, often record extremely positive and negative 
monthly returns. By simply taking the non-weighted average index return, those 
volatile firms would affect and skew the average industry return index 
disproportionately. 
R ft = -f the risk ree rate in period t (in the US, UK and Canada used correspondingly). 
6.4.1.2.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1993) explain that computing abnormal returns for individual 
companies forms the basis for producing Car for the observation period. The average 
abnormal return for a particular time period is calculated as the sum of the abnormal returns 
for individual companies. Car of a company's security is measured as the sum of the average 
residuals over a specific time period, thus: 
T 
CAR, L UJI 
i=k 
(8) 
For the purpose of this study, underperfon-nance is further defined as Car being negative over 
a period of three cumulative years on a rolling monthly basis. Mathematically, the general 
fonn of the Car formula therefore becomes: 
CAR <0 
included I, 
ý! 0 excluded j 
where, 
240-1( 36+k 
CAR (9) 
k---O 
ýttk-+dlUll 
6.4.1.2.3 Calculation of Beta 
The derivation of average monthly betas for each stock applied by Datastream is based on the 
methodology described by Cunningham (1973). This method assumes that stock market 
movements and individual equity movements are inter-related and that the relationship can be 
described as: 
=axp, (10) 
where y is the movement within the equity and x is the movement in the market expressed 
as a logarithm as detailed in Step I below. The terms a and P are the coefficients. 
Cunningham (1973) showed that the a coefficients are effectively constant across all stocks 
and that they are important to this description only in that they are necessary for the derivation 
of the P for a stock. The calculation of beta can be broken up into the following four steps: 
Step One: Monthly equity prices over the last 60 months are converted to a series of 
logarithmic index changes, using the following formula for each stock: 
log 
Pr icej 
(11) 
Similarly, the monthly price indices are converted for each market. These 
values are used in the calculation described in Step Two below. 
Step Two: For each equity the alpha and beta coefficients 0ý E and 
PE 
are calculated as 
follows: 
(Nj: E*M-j]E*j: M) PE 
ý: ý 
*I: M2 NM 2) 
(ý]E-PE *jM) 
N 
(12) 
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1 (1] E)2 
aE :-* 1] E2 
N-1 N 
[J(E-OýE 
-M*PE )]2 PE 
"": 
(N 
. 
-1)* 
JM2 
_(ZM)2 
where, E is the logarithmic index change for a stock, M is the logarithmic index change for a 
market and N is the number of periods - 1. 
Step Three: The average alpha and beta for the markets (am andgm) are derived as the sum 
of equity values over the number of equities, and the variance of the market 
beta, Pm I can then be calculated as: 
JVAR. P, 
PM 
N-1 - 
(JOE )2 
N 
(13) 
where: E is the logarithmic index change for a stock; 
M is the logarithmic change for a market; and 
N is the number of periods - 1. 
Step Four: Finally, the beta estimate and correlation are calculated for each stock. The 
fon-nula for this estimate is displayed below: 
p", 
= P, 
2 
YM2 
_I 
N N-1 
PE* 
(1] E) 2 J: E 2_ 
I, 
N 
]N-1 
M*(aE- am) + M2 
* (PE- Pm)] * [(N - 2) * Var. p. +I: 
M2] 
(14) 
Var-aE * [(N - 1) M' 
M)2 
The fon-nula used for beta correlation is: 
(15) 
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The beta for each individual stock forrns the basis of calculating a beta for the peer group, 
which is simply the average of the betas of all fin-ns belonging to the peer group in this 
particular year. 
6.5 Sampling Procedure of Takeover Companies 
By examining financial characteristics of underperforming companies, this study aims to 
investigate in a second step the reasons for some underperforming companies in fact being 
taken over (Group 1) whereas other underperforming companies are not (Group 11). (Pbase 
refer to Figure I in Section 6.2. for a sample structure. ) For the purpose of this study a sample 
of takeover companies needs to be identified in each of the three countries over the period 
under investigation and then matched against the sample of underperforming firins. As a 
result, Group I only incorporates those companies which are underperforming and taken over. 
Takeovers were identified via SDC Platinum, an M&A database by Thomson Financial, 
which stores information on worldwide merger and acquisiion deals. Group 11 in contrast 
refers to underperforming companies, which have not been a successful acquisition target. 
These two groups forrn the basis for meeting the objectives of this study, as has already been 
stated in Section 6.2: 
a) Investigating F the market for corporate control actually works by measuring to 
what degree companies are taken over following a three-year period of 
underperformance in the US, UK and Canada. Measurements of underperformance 
are a combination of Tobin's q and cumulative abnormal return. 
b) Testing for a relationship between financial characteristics and takeover likelihood 
of underperforming companies in the US, UK and Canada. Financial variables 
under investigation include underperformance (Tsq and Car), capital structure, 
asset structure and firm size, accounting also for industry and economic effects. 
To ensure that the takeover is associated with this underperformance it needs to take place 
within a time period of 24 months following the occurrence of underperformance. An increase 
of this 24-month time period to for example 36 months would limit the possibility of the 
takeover being directly related to the occurrence of underperformance. Reducing the time 
period to for example 12 months would limit the sample. Since this study only considers 
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effective dates of takeovers and not takeover announcement dates, 12 months do not appear 
long enough for the legal and regulatory implications to take full effect and to actually 
complete the takeover. Therefore the timeframe of up to 24 months from the event of 
underperfort-nance appears to be the most reasonable. 
The variables, which will be calculated for the three-year period of underperformance, are 
described in the table below. An industry control variable for cumulative abnon-nal returns, 
however, is obsolete since this ratio already incorporates an industry component in its formula 
by definition. 
Table 2: Independent Variables under Investigation 
I Independent Variables I Description 
Tobin's q (MVOE + TD) / TA 
Cumulative Abnormal See Section 6.4.1.2.1 
Return 
Asset Structure TA - IA / TA 
Capital Structure TD / (TD + MVOE + PS) 
Firm Size Lo2 TS (natural Lmzarithm of total sales) 
Industry Tsq The individual company's Tsq variance 
from the norý-weighted 
average Tsq for the industry as a whole 
Industry Asset Structure The individual company's asset ratio variance 
from the non-weighted 
average asset ratio for the industry as a whole 
Industry Capital Structure 
The individual company's debt ratio variance from the nor-1--weighted 
average debt ratio for the industry as a whole 
Industry Firrn Size The 
individual company's firm size ratio variance from the non-- 
weighted average firrn size ratio for the industry as a whole 
GDP Gross domestic product 
6.6 The Approach to Modeling 
This section outlines the detailed research design and introduces the model applied for this 
study. It provides an introduction into and discussion of regression and probability analysis, 
which forrns the basis of this study's model used to investigate the likelihood of 
underperfon-ning companies being taken over following a period of underperformance. 
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6.6.1 Regression Analysis 
In order to test the above hypotheses a regression analysis will be applied. Menard (2001) 
states that in single linear regression analysis it is possible to test whether two variables are 
linearly related and to calculate the strength of this linear relationship. This relationship 
between the variables can be described by the following equation: 
a +PX, (16) 
where Y is the variable being predicted and X is a variable whose values are being used to 
predict Y. The population parameters (x and P are to be estimated. The parameter a (intercept) 
represents the value of Y when X=0. The parameter P represents the change in Y associated 
with a one-unit increase in X or the slope of the line that provides the best linear estimate of 
Y and X. 
The multiple linear regression model is used to study the relationship between a dependent 
variable and more than one independent or explanatory variable (Greene, 2003). In multiple 
regression there are several Predictor variables. If n denotes the number of independent 
variables, the equation becomes as follows: 
y=a+ PIXI + P2X2 + 
*** 
+ PnXn 
ý (17) 
and A, P,, are called partial slope coefficients, reflecting the fact that any one of the n 
predictor variables X, X...... X,, provides only a partial explanation or prediction for the value 
of Y. The equation is sometimes written in a form which explicitly recognises that the 
prediction of Y and X may be imprecise, 
PIXI +P2X2+***+PnXn +69 (18) 
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where E is the error term 52 ,a random variable which represents the error in predicting 
Y from X (Menard, 200 1). The observed value of Y is the sum of two parts, a deterministic 
part and the random part E. 
According to Menard (2001) and Greene (2003) there are several assumptions which must all 
be met for the classical linear regression model to be applicable: 
Linearity: +E . The model specifies a linear relationship 
Ya+ PIXI + P2X2 ++P? 
'Xn 
betweenY and X 0-9xn 
Measurements: 
All independent variables are interval, ratio, or dichotomous and the dependent 
variable is continuous, unbounded and measured on an interval or ratio scale. 
Full rank: There is no exact linear relationship between any of the 
explanatory/independent variables in the model. This assumption is necessary 
for estimating the parameters of the model. 
Exogeneity of the independent variables: 
E[E, Ix,,... x,, 
]=0. This states that the expected value of the disturbance at 
observation i in the sample is not a function of the independent variables noted 
at any observation point, including this one. This means that the independent 
variables will not carry useful information for prediction of E,. 
Homoscedasticity and non-autocorrelation: 
Each distributionE, has the same finite variance, cr', and is uncorrelated with 
every other disturbance, E,. This assumption limits the generality of the model. 
52 Greene (2003) refers to the term c as a random disturbance because it disturbs an otherwise stable relationship. 
The disturbance arises for several reasons. primarily because the model cannot capture every influence on an 
economic variable in a model, no matter how elaborate. The net effect, which can be positive or negative, of 
these omitted factors is captured in this disturbance. 
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Exogenously generated data: 
The data in (XI X2 ...., x, 
) 
may be any mixture of constant and random 
variables. The process of generating the data operates the assumptions of the 
model - that is, independently of the process that generates E, * 
Normal distribution: The disturbances E, are normally distributed. 
Since linear regression analysis requires the dependent variable to be continuous and the 
explanatory variables to be either continuous or categorical, the classical form of linear 
regression cannot be used in situations where the dependent variable takes a discrete number 
of mutually exclusive and collectively exclusive values (Borooah, 2003), as is the case in this 
study. For such circumstances in which the dependent variable is categorical (non-- continuous) 
and the independent variables are categorical and/or continuous data, either logistic regression 
or log-linear regression models should be used. Logistic regression describes the relationship 
between one categorical response variable and one or more continuous and/or categorical 
explanatory variables. Log-linear models are preferred if in a contingency table there are a 
minimum of two response variables. It is a useful approach since it describes association 
patterns among a set of categorical response variables. 
6.6.2 The Model Applied in this Thesis 
6.6.2.1 Introduction to Probability/Prediction Models 
Prediction models employ multiple regressions, as described above, and have been employed 
by researchers to assess the impact of explanatory, independent variables on the probability 
that an event or outcome will occur. This outcome is characterised as the dependent variable. 
Prediction models summarise infori-nation contained in a firm's financial statements by using 
statistical aggregations to assess a firm's financial status. The takeover literature has 
employed this technique widely to assess the impact of financial data on the likelihood of 
becoming a takeover target (Simkowitz and Monroe, 1971, Stevens, 1973, Belkaoui, 1978, 
Dietrich and Sorenson, 1984, Palepu, 1986, and Rose, 1988, Greene, 2003). 
Overall, there are two broad types of probability analysis, namely fixed and random effects 
models. Fixed effects models are concerned with detenninistic probability, meaning that the 
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output is uniquely determined by the input, which will always produce exactly the same result 
for exactly the same input. Random effects models, on the other hand, use stochastic 
probability, meaning they will be applied to processes which have random characteristics. 
Stochastic models use random variables or refer to patterns resulting from random effeCtS53. 
As the individual outcomes of firms studied in this thesis are fixed (takeover) we will use a 
deterministic probability model. 
In general, the probability of an event, deterministic or stochastic, can have just two types of 
attributes, namely binary or multinomial. Binary choice probability models distinguish 
between just two outcomes, whereas multinornial prediction models have the possibility of 
several outcomes, meaning more than two. Many previous research studies including authors 
such as Palepu (1986) applied a binomial logit model where takeover targets were treated as 
one homogenous group. However, as already highlighted in Chapter Five, this let to 
controversy since takeovers may occur for many reasons (e. g. friendly vs. hostile, etc. ), thus a 
multinornial framework should have been preferred to a binomial choice outcome (Powell and 
Yawson, 2007). Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (I 988b) note that takeover targets are not a 
homogenous group per se and that ignoring these differences may result in biased takeover 
probabilities and poor predictive performance. However, since this thesis is only investigating 
underperforming companies as one homogenous group this critique does not apply here and a 
binary choice outcome of an event can appropriately be used in the form of either the binary 
logit or probit model (Powell, 1997). 
Various models have been applied to deten-nine takeover likelihood by researchers. The most 
prominent models applied for this probability analysis include the univariate and multivariate 
logit and probit model. Whereas earlier studies predominantly used multiple discriminant 
analysis and or factor analysis to study acquisition targets (Simkowitz and Monroe, 1971, 
Stevens, 1973, and Wansley, 1984), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988a) and Comment and 
Schwert (1995) in contrast applied a probit model for their investigation of takeover 
likelihood. However, more recent studies applied a logit model to predict mergers and 
acquisitions (Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984, Hasbrouck, 1985, Palepu, 1986, Nuttal, 1999, 
Powell, 2001). 
53 An example for situations where stochastic models are applied, meaning where the outcome is random, 
includes option pricing. 
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6.6.2.2 Conditional Logit or Probit Model with a Binary Outcome 
In logit and probit analysis the dependent response variable is defined as Y. This dependent 
variable is conditional upon the vector X, which represents all of the independent explanatory 
variables. Explanatory variables are often financial ratios and are used to measure the 
probabilityP ex-post. 
WhenY is dichotomous it can take either the value of 0 or 1. This binary form of the logit and 
probit model has only two distinct outcomes i. e. firm is acquired (Y = 1), versus not 
acquired (Y = 0), where Y is the dependent variable. Thus the probability model becomes 
n 
P(y = 1) PkXk = F(x, P) 
k=l 
P(Y=O)= I PkXk =I -F(x, P). 
k=l 
Binary models are usually designated as latent variable specification in which the response 
variable Y is linearly related to a set of n explanatory variables, 
(XI 
IX29***9Xn) 
as is defined by 
the regression relationship: 
n 
YgkXk +E 
k=l 
(20) 
here, Y are the unobserved values and E is the random disturbance (error term) with zero mean 
and its distribution function F, This is the general forrn to observe the dependency between Y 
and X. Here, F can take any form of distribution. 
P(Y = 1) = P(y > 0) 
(21) 
n 
P +E >0 
k=l 
n 
E>- 
,, 
Pk Xk 
1: 
k=l 
n 
-1 
PkXk 
k =1 
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n 
Y PkXk 
k=l 
If we substitute the general form of distribution F, by the logistic distribution L we then get Cý-- 
the famous logit model with a binary choice, as can be seen in the equation (22) below: 
nn 
eXP PkXk 
k=l P(y = 1), = I -L -I: 
PkXk 
=L 
EPkXk 
n (22) 
k=l k=l 
+ expl 
PkXk 
k=l 
The general form of the logit equation can be applied to this thesis and can thus be rewritten 
as: 
Pi'l 
I+ ex""-'P 
(23) 
where X,,, -, 
is the data matrix, in whicht -I is used to compute the probability p at time t and 
Under the assumption that E is standard normally distributed, meaning E- N(0,1) , we get the 
probit model with a binary choice, as can be seen in equation (24): 
nn 
P(y = 1) =1 -F -1 
ßkXk 
=F 
ßk Xk 0 
2: ßk Xk (24) 
k=I k=I k=I 
The general form of the probit equation can be applied to this thesis and can thus be rewritten 
as: 
P(Y = 1) =0 (x "", P). 
For the logit and probit models, 0 is the parameter to be estimated. 
(25) 
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6.6.2.3 The Estimation of the Parameterp 
There are several methods of estimating P; however, mathematically the most prominent and 
theoretically sound are the ordinary least square (OLS) estimator as well as the maximum 
likelihood method. 
In order to use the OLS estimator, all assumptions of the classical linear regression, which 
have been described in the previous section, must be met. Some of these assumptions are 
easier to meet than others, however, the assumption that the dependent variable is continuous 
has serious consequences for OLS interpretation if not met. If instead the dependent variable 
is discrete, consisting of two or more outcome categories, as is the case here (logit and probit), 
then OLS poses serious inference problems. Because of the nature of logit and probit, we 
therefore will use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the parameterp. The classical 
formula of maximum likelihood Cireene, 2003) and the applied version for this model is 
described in detail below: 
n ?I 
y -- Y2 ý-9 
Yn = Yn I 
IX) 
= 
F1 
I-F lpxk 
]fl[F 
JPkXk 
(26) P(yl -= YI 12 7- 
Yj --0 
1 
k=l Y., =1 k=l 
where (Y, = y,..., Y,, = yj take either the value 0 or I (not takeover and takeover) by n 
observations of different firms and takeovers. The equation above can thus be rewritten as: 
n 
Y, -yi 
L(p Idata) = fl 
Fj: Pkxk 
] [1-FlgkXk 
(27) 
i=l 
I 
k=l k=l 
In equation (28) below, we use the positive characteristic of a logarithm i function to simplify 
the equation above. 
nnn 
InL=Z yjlnFj 
Pk Xk +(I-yi)ln[I-FlPkXk (28) 
1=1 k=l k=l 
After this simplification, we then use the likelihood equation to compute the maximum of the 
function In L overOk * In the equation 
below we compute the first partial differentiation: 
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aln Ln 
= 1[yf, 0, k=1,..., n (29) OPk 
i =1 
F, (I - F, 
) 
nn 
where f is the density, dF, and F= FjPkXk * To simplify the equation above we 
jdjPk 
Xk 
k=1 k=I 
get the following formula: 
aln Ln0, 
= 
Dyi 
_AÄ (30) aß i=I 
n 
here, AiS the logistic cumulative distribution function. Also, note that A, 
lPkXk 
k=1 
In the next step we look for the solution x= (xl,..., x,, )'of the linear system in the equation 
above. After computing the extreme point, using the classical method of linear algebra, we 
will then test this point by using the Hessian matrix (second partial differentiation): 
a'ln L+x 
xxt 
k=l 
As can be seen from the formula above, P is the maximum of L and is called the maximum 
likelihood estimator. 
6.6.2.4 Should the Logit or Probit Model be chosen? 
One question which is often being posed is whether logit is preferred over probit, or vice- 
versa. Generally, as shown in the formulas above, differences are limited between the logit 
and the probit model. On a univariate analysis the model formulas provide similar results in 
the majority of cases (Borooah, 2003). In certain circumstances, however, results of the probit 
and logit model differ, fundamentally due to the distribution F of the error term E, logistic L 
versus normal N. Particularly, if investigation samples are extremely large with a dominance 
of occurrences in the tails of the distribution 54 , the probit model 
is preferred over logit. In 
other cases, it is more common to use the logit model. 
54 This relates to a probability moving towards 0 or 1. if this is high then a probit model should be used. 
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However, the probit model can only be applied to univariate analysis. For this reason, the 
probit model is insufficient for this thesis, which undertakes a multivariate analysis using 
hierarchical regression. Therefore, this thesis will apply the model of logit regression. 
6.7 Hierarchical Regression 
The regression model explained above will be applied hierarchically to test if there is any 
relation between the chosen independent variables and the likelihood of a takeover for 
underperforming companies for each of the three countries. It also aims to examine to what 
degree the independent variable explains the output (takeover/dependent variable), which is 
measured as probability p. 
Similar to any standard linear regression model, the output of the hierarchical regression 
analysis comprises two levels of investigation. Firstly, the effect of each independent variable 
is investigated on an individual basis (according to each hypothesis) and its unique 
contribution and explanation to the overall predictability of the regression will be tested in 
terms of strength ('odds ratio') and significance of the deten-nination 55 . This particular step of 
analysis is referred to as Test I in this thesis. As already mentioned, this study's hierarchical 
regression model additionally incorporates industry and/or economic effects into the analysis 
of each hypothesis, which is referred to as Test 2. The model tests if the inclusion of these 
control variables results in a change of significance for each hypothesis, meaning whether the 
results of Test I differ statistically from the results of Test 2. A further level of analysis tests 
the combined effect of the independent and control variable(s) of each hypothesis togethe on 
the dependent variable. This study refers to this particular step of analysis as Test 3 and 
measures its outcome in terms of strength and significance. 
In addition to applying the model to each of the four hypotheses separately on a per country 
basis, a last step of investigation of this thesis will be the application of a multinomial logistic 
regression to all ten variables together, in order to investigate their impact on the likelihood of 
becoming a takeover target for an underperforming firm in each of the three countries. This 
procedure is analogue and in line with any standard linear regression model. However, the 
uniqueness of a binary-logistic regression analysis lies in that the results are furthermore 
detailed in a classification table, which lists the output in terms of correct and incorrect 
55 The significance of determination is particularly important to test if the outcomes are not the result of pure 
coincidence, meaning that the determination coefficient is not exactly 'W. 
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allocations (predictors) before and after the regression. This aspect of the hierarchical 
regression analysis and its procedure will be explained in more detail in Section 8.5. 
6.8 Statistical Software Packages 
There are many statistical software programmes, which are widely used among 
econometricians or statisticians to evaluate statistical outcomes. The most widely used 
packages include &Views, Gauss, LIMDEP, RATS, SAS, Shazam, SPSS, Stata, MICROFIT 
and TSP. Statistical software packages in general vary, for example, in size, complexity, cost 
and the amount of programming required from the user. Because of statistical sufficiency and 
simplicity of the programme this thesis will use SPSS. 
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a detailed description of the type of research and methodology to be 
used for the empirical research. The overall objective of this thesis is to examine the 
relationship between managerial underperformance and takeover likelihood by testing if the 
market for corporate control works, meaning if companies are actually taken over as a 
consequence of underperformance. With reference to the literature, this study examines a set 
of financial characteristics, meaning underperformance (Hypothesis 1), capital structure 
(Hypothesis 2), asset structure (Hypothesis 3) and firm size (Hypothesis 4), accounting also 
for industry and /or economic effects (Hypothesis I a, 2a, 3a, 4a), to investigate the reasons for 
some underperforming companies in fact being taken over whereas other underperforming 
companies are not. 
After introducing the research objectives and its corresponding four hypotheses and four sub- 
hypothesis, this chapter outlined the methodology approach and the model concept in detail. It 
provided an analysis of underperfon-nance and a discussion of its relevant measurements 
(Tobin's q, Cumulative Abnormal Return) to extract a sample of underperforming stock 
market- listed companies in the UK, US and Canada. This chapter also described the selection 
process of the corresponding sample of takeover companies to be matched against the sample 
of underperfon-ning companies. This process resulted in the creation of two sample groups; 
underperforming companies being taken over (Group 1) and underperforming companies not 
being taken over (Group 11). This chapter also introduced and analysed the model to be 
applied in this study. The model was introduced as being binary logistic. The chapter 
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concluded with a description and analysis of available statistical software packages including 
this study's choice being the statistical software SPSS. 
The following chapter will provide a detailed step-by-step approach of the data compilation 
and clearing process necessary for the creation of a sample of underperforming companies. 
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Chapter Seven 
Data Description and Sample Processing 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the data compilation process, which is a particular vital part of this 
thesis's methodology, since the sample of underperfon-ning firms fon-ns the basis for the 
overall investigation. The data compilation process will be explained step-by-step; from 
collecting the raw data for the stock market- listed companies in the UK, US and Canada from 
secondary sources, to the creation and programming of a tailor-made database, which was 
necessary to extract a sample of underperforming companies as defined in the previous 
chapter. This chapter also describes the data clearing procedure and explains the application 
of the variables of underperformance (Tsq and Car) to come up with a sample of 
underperforming companies fulfilling all the necessary requirements. This chapter will also 
describe the M&A sample data compilation process necessary to obtain a listing of 
companies, which have been taken over within the period of investigation in the three 
countries to be matched against the sample of underperforming companies. 
7.2 Data Compilation 
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, all data used in this study were gathered from 
secondary sources. The main sources of information are Datastream and SDC Platinum, 
which contain published accounts data, stock prices and M&A information worldwide. This 
study uses financial data and other company information from Datastream, which is operated 
by the company Thomson Financial. This database collects a wide selection of information 
for companies listed on most international stock exchanges, including historic accounting and 
stock market-related data as well as providing economic country- specific information. 
Required financial data and other infon-nation points were downloaded in a three-step process: 
1. Company master-data: Generic company information 
(e. g. company name, classification code, financial 
year-end information); 
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2. Financial company data: Annual accounts and monthly stock market-related 
results; and 
3. Economic data: Country- specific information (e. g. GDP) 
This study focuses on companies listed on the following stock exchanges: 
UK London Stock Exchange (LSE); 
us American Stock Exchange (AMEX); 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
(NADSAQ) 
Canada Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX); and 
Toronto Stock Exchange Venture (TSXV). 
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the takeover period under investigation falls 
between 1988 and 2004. However, as the measurements of underperfon-nance, Tsq and Car, 
require a three-year period for the underperformance evaluation, the data compilation process 
begins already with the year 1985. 
The database includes a total of 30,225 live 56 and dead 57 companies over the mentioned 
investigation period. This total sample can be divided in the following sub-samples per 
country: 
Table 3: Number of Companies Listed on the UK, US and Canadian Stock 
Exchanges over the Period 1985 - 2004 
Country Live Dead Total 
UK 2,021 4,681 6,702 
us 7,940 9,220 15,139 
Canada 3,970 4,414 8,384 
TOTAL 119910 18,315 309225 
56 Live companies referto firms, which are listed on a specific stock exchange up to the time of data collection in 
July 2005. 
57 Dead companies refer to firms, which were de-listed from a specific stock exchange during the period under 
investigation. This could have been the result of take-over. insolvency, MBOs and / or privatisation, etc. 
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The following company master-data was collected for each of the 30,225 firms. All gathered 
Datastrearn Mnemonics are presented in the following table with a brief description. 
Table 4: Datastream Mnemonics - Master Data and Definitions 
Datastream Mnemonic Description 
TYPE TYPE refers to a six-digit Datastream classification code or 
company ID. 
NAME NAME refers to the actual exact name of the company. 
GEOGN states the country where the company has its main 
stock market listing. This is important since companies will 
GEOGN only be incorporated with their main stock market listing but 
not with a second or third listing. For example, the English 
company Vodafone has its main listing in the UK but may 
also have a second listing in the US. 
INDM refers to the industry grouping, which the company 
INDM directly belongs to. For example, an airline company's direct industry grouping is matched to the 'Airlines and Airports' 
category. INDM is expressed as a letter coding. 
INDG INDXFS is identical to INDM but is expressed as a number 
coding. 
INDXFS refers to a generic or subordinated industry 
grouping. For example, the airline company which is mapped 
INDXFS to 'Airlines and Airports' 
in the INDM coding, will also be 
part of the 'Transport' category in their INDXFS coding. 
Several INDM classifications will be summarised in one 
INDXFS grouping. 
BDATE BDATE refers to the exact 
date when the company entered 
the stock market (date of first listing). 
TIME refers to the exact date the company's exit of the stock TIME 
market. This is particular important for dead firms. 
EXNAME refers to the name of the exact stock exchange 
within one country. This is particular important for the US 
and Canada where several stock exchanges are in place. 
EXNAME There are also several exchanges 
in these countries, which 
this study does not focus on and hence companies were 
excluded. Examples for excluded country- specific stock 
exchanges in the US are 'OTC, Philadelphia, Boston, Pacific, 
Midwest' and for Canada 'Alberta, Montreal', etc. 
Financial Year-End refers to the exact date of the company's 
year-end. This data point is downloaded for every year within Financial Year End 
the investigation period since it may change over time under 
investigation. 
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The next step included the collection of annual accounting and monthly stock market-related 
results for each firrn. All gathered Datastrearn variables are presented in the following table 
below and are briefly described. 
Table 5: Datastream Mnemonics - Financial Variables and Definitions 
Datastream Mnemonic Notation Description 
WC03255 TD Total Debt represents all interest bearing and 
capitalized lease obligations. It is the sum of long 
and short-term debt. 
WC02649 IA Intangible Assets represent other then fixed assets 
not having a physical existence. The value of these 
assets lies in their expected future return. 
WC01001 TS Net Sales or Revenues represent gross sales and 
other operating revenue less discounts, returns and 
allowances. 
CMA#(X) P Average Stock Price per month. 
WC03451 PS Preferred Stock represents the preferred 
shareholders' claim on share earnings and assets in 
the event of liquidation prior to the common 
shareholders. 
WC02999 TA Total Assets represent the sum of total current 
assets, long-term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net 
property plant and equipment and other assets. 
- WC09802 BETA Here, BETA refers to the annual average of 
monthly betas. Beta is calculated based on monthly 
observations extending over 5 years (i. e. 60 
months). For each of the proceeding 60 months, 
return on security (Rj) is calculated for every 
security and regressed against market rates (Rm). 
NOSH NOSH Number of Ordinary Shares represents the total 
amount of shares being issued per year by the 
company. 
UKGBILL3 RFRUK Risk Free Rate for United Kingdom 
USTBUM RFRUS Risk Free Rate for United States 
CDN3MTB RFRCN Risk Free Rate for Canada. 
MV MVOE Market Value of Equity is the share price 
multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in 
issue at calendar year end. 
Finally, the following historic economic data for the three countries under investigation were 
collected. 
130 
Table 6: Datastream Mnemonics - Economic Variables and Definitions 
Datastream Mnemonic Description 
UKDGDP UKDGDP refers to the annual real growth of the 
Gross Domestic Product for the LTK 
USDGDP USDGDP refers to the annual real growth of the 
Gross Domestic Product for the US. 
CNDGDP CNDGDP refers to the annual real growth of the 
Gross Domestic Product for Canada. 
7.3 Databank/Software Description 
An in-depth analysis for any kind of mass-data is often only practicable with the assistance of 
tailor-made programming tools. For this reason, a databank was programmed especially for 
the purpose of this investigation. This database was programmed by applying the software 
development tool 'Sun Java Development standard Edition (J2SE 1.4.2)' and the development 
tool 'IDE: Eclipse 3.02'. In comparison to any standard Windows applications such as Excel 
or Access, this Java-based database has the advantage of handling mass data virtually without 
any limit of capacity extremely fast over various dimensions. In addition, the main benefit of 
this programme lies in its user- uniqueness, since any kind of data sorting, intensive data 
calculations and analysis can be programmed according to specific user requirements. 
All company information and data points were originally downloaded from DATASTREAM 
in an Excel format and afterwards imported and converted into the Java Databank via a 
software tool called 'JXL Java Excel API 2.5.9; Log4j 1.2.9'. Furthermore, a Database Access 
Layer was incorporated which is called 'Java Database Connectivity JDBC 3.0 with MySQL 
Connector-F and RDBMS / Database Server: MySQL 4.1.7 in order to facilitate the 
programming and reporting function. 
7.4 Data Clearing Process 
As already discussed in the methodology chapter, this thesis is primarily concerned with the 
operation of the market for corporate control in disciplining underperfon-ning management. 
Thus this investigation focuses solely on underperfonning finns, which need to be identified 
in a first step. 
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For the identification and compilation of a sample of underperforming companies it was 
necessary to operate various programming tools. First of all it made a data clearing process 
necessary to facilitate the exclusion of the companies with incomplete master data (e. g. 
missing BDATE, TIME, TYPE, NAME, Financial Year End, etc. ). In addition, this clearing 
process excludes companies which are part of industry groupings, which this study does not 
focus on. The following table presents a detailed overview of industry groupings, which were 
excluded from the sample. 
Table 7: List of Industries Excluded from the Study 
Generic Industry Industry 
BANKS Banks 
INSUR insurance Non-Life, insurance Brokers, Re -Insurance, Other Insurance 
INVSC investment Consortium, investment Trust International, Investment Trust Venture & Derivates, Investment Trust Geographical Specialists 
LESUR Gambling 
LIFEA Life Assurance 
MNING Mining Finance 
RLEST Property Agencies, Real Estate Development. 
SHIN Consumer Finance, Asset Managers, Investment Banks, Other Finance, Mortgage 
Finance 
SUPSV Transaction & Payroll 
This study also considered variances in financial reporting periods. To create comparable sets 
of data with regards to the varying fiscal year end dates of companies, the sample only 
includes companies with their fiscal year ending between October I't and March 3 Ist 
58. 
Companies whose fiscal year does not fall within this time period will be excluded from the 
sample. This procedure was applied to overcome a potential weakness of the sample due to a 
potential time lag for the individual companies. Since the majority of companies report within 
the time frame October to March anyway, the sample was only reduced by a limited extent. 
7.5 Extraction of Underperforming Companies 
As previously discussed in the methodology chapter, this investigation identifies 
underperforming firms by applying two financial measurements in combination; three-year 
58 The fiscal year for companies reporting within the period I St January and 31st March will be allocated to the 
previous year (e. g. fiscal year-end 31 March 2000 is allocated to the actual accounting year 1999). 
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moving average Tobin's q and three-year cumulative abnormal return. Underperforming firms 
are defined to satisfy the following two requirements, which are tested in a two-step process: 
* Three- year moving average Tsq < 1; and 
* Cumulative three-year abnormal return < 0; 
7.5.1 Tobin's q (Tsq) 
As a first step, Tobin's q will be calculated for each firm for each available year over the 
period 1985 until 2004. In case one or more of the formula's variables are not available for 
one year for a company, the investigation will ignore this year for the analysis. If one or more 
variables are nc)n-existent for the entire time frame under investigation, this study will exclude 
the company from the analysis. 
After having calculated all possible single Tsq values for each finn over the investigation 
period, a moving three-year average Tsq value is calculated in order to see whether a 
company's three- year average Tsq falls below 1. 
7.5.2 Cumulative Abnormal Return (Car) 
Only companies with a three-year rolling average Tsq <I are considered for the application 
of the measurement Car falling below 0, which is calculated exactly for the same time 
intervals for which Tsq falls below 1. For example, if the three-year Tsq fell below I in the 
year 2000, then Car will only be calculated for the same time interval 1998 until 2000. 
For the purpose of this study it is necessary to determine a cumulative three-year Car value by 
simply adding 36 months of abnormal returns for each company. If this cumulative three-year 
Car value is negative within the same time interval as well as the rolling average three-year 
Tobin's q falling below 1, then the company under investigation is considered as 
underperfon-ning. 
It can happen that companies have several three-year time intervals with Tsq falling below I 
and Car below 0 and it is important to note that time intervals can also be overlapping, 
meaning that the three-year moving average Tsq can fall below I and Car below 0 in the year 
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2000 as well as 2001, etc. Therefore, this data-clearing process did not only extract a listing of 
underperforming company names but more importantly a much larger listing of three-year 
company data intervals of underperformance over a twenty year period. For this reason if this 
thesis refers to 'underperforming companies' by definition it means company data intervals of 
underperfon-nance. 
7.5.3 Data extraction results 
The measurements of Tsq and Car were applied to the overall sample of approximately 
70,000 three-year company data intervals available in the UK, US and Canada. The analysis 
resulted in a total of 2,241 company data intervals. 
Table 8: Number of Underperformance Intervals in the Research Period in the UK, 
US and Canada 
Country Total 
UK 920 
us 1,151 
Canada 170 
TOTAL 2,241 
7.6 M&A Data Clearing Process 
To obtain a listing of companies taken over in the countries under investigation, a second 
source of data was necessary. M&A data and information was downloaded from a specialised 
database by Thomson Financial, which is called 'SDC Platinum'. The following information 
was requested for each takeover, which occurred during the timeframe 1988 - 2004: 
9 Name of target; 
* Announcement date of the takeover; and 
0 Completion date of takeover; 
The following restrictions must apply: 
0 All target companies must be stock-market listed; 
0 The target company has been fully taken over (100 %), not only majority rights; 
9 MBOs and LBOs are excluded; and 
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* Target companies with business activities focusing on finance, investment or real 
estate are excluded. 
This investigation is only interested in companies which are taken over following a period of 
underperformance (market for corporate control). Hostile takeovers are the most predominant 
route for the market for corporate control to discipline underperfon-nance. However, it 
appeared to be difficult to extract a sample of hostile takeover targets since definitions of 
hostile takeovers vary. Thomson Financial for example, refers to hostile takeovers only if the 
completion is hostile and does not differentiate between hostile and friendly takeover 
announcements. The problem that arises here is that most takeovers, which fave originally 
been announced as hostile, come to a friendly agreement at completion and therefore will 
overall be registered as friendly by Thomson. 
Over the 17-year period under investigation only 302 hostile takeovers were recorded by 
Thomson Financial in US, UK and Canada. Unfortunately, the large majority of these 
companies are not covered by DATASTREAM and only two matches of underperforming 
firms taken over in a hostile deal were recorded. 
For this reason, although the most ideal scenario would lave been to include only hostile 
takeovers, this investigation also considers takeovers which have been completed on a 
friendly basis. However, since the focus of this study is takeovers associated with 
underperfon-nance and not the issue of the takeover being hostile or friendly, it can be argued 
that if the market for corporate control acts efficiently it should result in a takeover irrelevant 
of friendly or hostile. This provides for a larger selection of matches for underperfon-ning 
companies being taken over. 
The following table presents the outcome of companies which have been taken over based on 
the SDC Platinum database matched against the sample of underperforming companies. 
Matches were only considered if the actual takeover date as registered by SDC Platinum fell 
within a time period of 24 months after the occurrence of underperformance as has been 
discussed previously. 
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Table 9: Sample of Underperforming Firms being Taken Over and Underperforming 
Firms not being Taken Over 
Country Takeover Not Takeowr TOTAL 
UK 67 853 920 7.3% 
us 65 1,086 1,151 5.6% 
Canada 18 1 1521 170 1 10.6% 
TOTAL 1501 2,0911 2,241 1 6.7% 
It becomes evident that only a small proportion of underperforming companies were taken 
over following their underperformance. Whereas the US reports the least amount of takeovers 
following underperformance (5.6 %), Canada reports the highest ratio outcome of 10.6 
Hence it becomes apparent that the market for corporate control does not, to a large extent, 
work as claimed in the literature f)r each of the three countries. This will be investigated and 
analysed in more detail in the following chapter. 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a step-by-step explanation of the data compilation process which is a 
particular vital part of this thesis's methodology, since the sampling of underperforming firms 
forms the basis for the overall investigation. The database Datastream records a sample of 
30,225 stock market- listed companies in the UK, US and Canada over the period 1988 until 
2004. 
The data clearing process resulted in a sample of approximately 70,000 three-year company 
data intervals available in the UK, US and Canada. The application of the measurements of 
underperformance 
* Three- year moving average Tsq < 1; and 
9 Cumulative three-year abnon-nal return < 0. 
resulted in a total of 2,241 company data intervals, which reported underperfon-nance as 
defined above. 
Based on M&A data made available by Thomson Financial (SDC Platinum database) the 
sample of companies being taken over within the period of investigation in the three countries 
was matched against the results of underperfon-ning companies. Matches were only 
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considered if the actual takeover date as registered by SDC Platinum fell within a time period 
of 24 months after the occurrence of underperfon-nance. Of the sample of underperfon-ning 
companies only 7% were actually taken over in the UK, 6% in the US and II% in Canada 
implying that the market for corporate control does not work in any of the three countries 
(Objective 1). 
After having introduced and explained the data collection and clearing process for this 
empirical study the following chapter will present the results of the binary logistic regression 
model applied to test the four hypotheses for each of the three countries. 
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ChapterEight 
Logistic Regression Model: Results and Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
The following chapter presents the results of the binary logistic hierarchical regression model, 
which was applied to test the thesis' four main hypotheses and its four sub-hypotheses for 
Canada, the UK and US. The first section displays the descriptive statistic results and 
comments briefly on the outcomes for each country. After this the chapter briefly describes 
the procedure of z-standardisation and presents the z-standardised values for each of the three 
countries. The next section outlines and explains the procedure of applying the binary logistic 
hierarchical regression model. Then each of the hypotheses will be tested accordingly in the 
aforementioned three steps to determine if there is any relation between the chosen 
independent variables and the likelihood of a takeover for underperforming companies for 
each country. As a last step of investigation this thesis applies multinomial logistic regression 
to all ten variables (independent and control variables) together in order to investigate their 
impact on the likelihood of becoming a takeover target for an underperforming firm in each of 
the three countries. The chapter concludes with the analysis of the overall results of this 
binary logistic hierarchical regression model for each of the three countries. 
8.2 Summary of Overall Descriptive Statistics 
As already detailed in Chapter Seven, the table overleaf provides a brief description of each 
variable plus the abbreviation used for this thesis. 
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Table 10: Description of the Independent Variables under Investigation 
Explanatory Variables Abbreviation Description 
Tobin's q 
Tsq See Section 6.4.1.1. for a detailed 
calculation 
Car Car See Section 6.4.1.2. for a detailed 
calculation 
Asset Structure Asset Structure TA - 1A / TA 
Capital Structure Capital Structure TD / (TD + N1VOE + PS) 
Firm Size Size log Total Log TS (natural Logarithm of total sales) 
Assets 
Control Variables Abbreviation Description 
Industry Tsq The individual company's Tsq variance 
Industry Tsq Variance from the norý-weighted average Tsq for the 
in ustry as a whole 
Industry Asset The individual company's Asset Structure Industry Asset Structure Structure Variance variance from the non-weighted average 
Asset Structure for the industry as a whole 
The individual company's Capital Structure 
Industry Capital Structure Industry Capital variance from the non-weighted average Structure Variance Capital Structure for the industry as a 
whole 
Industry Size log The individual company's Size log Total 
Industry Firm Size Total Assets Assets variance from the norý-weighted 
Variance average Size log Total Asset for the 
industry as a whole 
Gross Domestic Product 
I 
GDP Year-on- year growth of gross domestic 
product 
Descriptive statistics report on the mean, median, standard deviation and minimum/maximum 
values, which cover the overall spread of the potentially occurring values. All variables have 
been clearly interval-scaled. The following descriptive statistics refer to raw (non-- 
standardised) figures. 
As can be seen from the table overleaf, ten independent variables have been applied to a total 
of 2,241 occurrences of underperfonnance in all three countries together. It needs to be kept 
in mind that according to the set filters of underperformance, outlined in Chapter Six, all 
companies display, by definition, a Tsq value below I and a negative Car value. 
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Table 11: Overall Descriptive Statistics for all Underperforming Companies 
Total Sample GDP Tso Car 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Caotal 
Stru cture 
Size 
(log 
Total 
Assets) 
Industry 
Tsq 
Variance 
Industry 
Capital 
Stru ct u re 
Variance 
Industry 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry Size 
(log Total 
Assets) 
Variance 
Valid 2241 2241 2241 2241 2241 2241 2241 2241 2241 2241 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 
. 
0264 
. 
8250 -. 3920 . 
9178 
. 
4933 19.1045 
. 
4864 1.9992 1.4484 1.0081 
Median 
. 
0297 
. 
8600 -. 3251 . 
9794 
. 
5148 18.9563 
. 
4841 1.8978 1.2152 1.0033 
Std. Deviation 
. 
01150 
. 
14774 
. 
32317 
. 
13428 
. 
23517 1.97606 
. 
16630 1.19043 
. 
69202 
. 
07572 
Minimum 
. 
00 
. 
16 -3.32 . 
19 
. 
00 14.18 
. 
03 
. 
00 
. 
29 
. 
77 
Maximum 
. 
05 1.46 
. 
00 1.00 1.00 25.08 
. 
95 10.31 7.99 1.24 
The table above shows that the average Tsq for all finns is around 0.83 with a Car value of 
-0.39. The variable Asset Structure reveals a surprisingly high value with almost 92 % of 
assets being tangible for the underperforming sample. The Capital Structure variable of the 
underperforming sample lies at around 49 %, which is difficult to comment upon since capital 
structure ratios are very much industry- dependent. However, the underperformance sample 
has a capital ratio, which is nearly twice as high as the relevant corresponding industry 
(Industry Capital Structure Variance). The descriptive statistics reveal that the firm size (log 
Total Assets) of the underperforming companies is of approximately the same size as their 
respective industry counterparts. It needs to be kept in mind that the table above refers to the 
total group of underperforming companies, meaning underperforming companies taken over 
as well as underperfon-ning firms not taken over. For clarification purposes, please find the 
descriptive statistics for each group separately (underperfonning fin-ns taken over and 
underperforming firms not taken over) in Appendix 1. 
8.3 Summary of Descriptive Statistics per Country 
The following section looks at the descriptive statistics by separating the results by country. 
Outcomes will only be commented upon if they vary from the overall sample. 
8.3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Canada 
The Canadian sample of underperfon-ning companies consists of a total of 170 companies. 
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Table 12: Overall Descriptive Statistics for all Underperforming Companies in Canada 
Canada GDP Tso Car 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Carital 
Stru cture 
Size 
(log 
Total 
Assets) 
Industry 
Tsq 
Variance 
Industry 
Capital 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Indu stry Size 
(log Total 
Assets) 
Variance 
Valid 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 
. 
0326 
. 
8111 -. 3924 . 
9180 
. 
5834 19.7124 
. 
5199 1.8740 1.3016 1.0184 
Median 
. 
0337 
. 
8350 -. 3096 . 
9928 
. 
6615 19.4983 
. 
5169 1.7664 1.2152 1.0091 
Std. Deviation 
. 
01236 
. 
15300 
. 
31334 
. 
15799 
. 
28620 1.37050 
. 
16536 1.07396 
. 
45743 
. 
05609 
Minimum 
. 
00 
. 
32 -1.50 . 
26 
. 
00 16.01 
. 
19 
. 
00 
. 
42 
. 
88 
Maximum 
. 
05 
. 
99 -. 01 1.00 1.00 22.84 . 
88 
1 
5.03 
1 
4.50 
1 
1.19 
The Canadian sample shows the highest year-on-year GDP growth of all countries, indicating 
that underperformance of the individual companies fell within years of good economic 
growth. The underperforming companies in Canada further report a considerably higher 
Capital Structure ratio 58 %, which is 88 % above the respective Canadian industry average. 
In addition, Appendix 2 provides descriptive statistic results differentiating between 
underperforming companies taken over and underperforming companies not taken over in 
Canada. 
8.3.2 Descriptive Statistics for the UK 
There are 920 underperforming companies included in the UK sample. 
Table 13: Overall Descriptive Statistics for all Underperforming Companies in the UK 
UK GDP Tsq Car 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Capital 
Stru cture 
Size 
(log 
Total 
Assets) 
Industry 
Tsq 
Variance 
Industry 
Capital 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry Size 
(log Total 
Assets) 
Variance 
Valid 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 
. 
0220 
. 
8073 -. 4112 . 
9639 
. 
4204 17.6626 
. 
5200 1.8885 1.0474 
. 
9890 
Median 
. 
0263 
. 
8400 -. 3476 1.0000 . 
4369 17.4895 
. 
5405 1.7842 1.0176 
. 
9817 
Std. Deviation 
. 
01259 
. 
15625 
. 
34111 
. 
09918 
. 
20870 1.39759 
. 
15151 1.17154 
. 
14097 
. 
07428 
Nfinimurn 
. 
00 
. 
16 -3.32 . 
19 
. 
00 14.18 
. 
03 
. 
00 
. 
29 
. 
80 
%laximum 
. 
04 1.22 
. 
00 1.00 
. 
97 22.94 
. 
88 9.57 1.75 1.22 
The UK sample reports the lowest year-on-year GDP growth of the overall sample (2.2 %). 
The descriptive statistics reveal that the UK sample of underperforming companies report a 
proportion of 96 % tangible assets, which is the highest of all three countries, however, only 
around 5% above the corresponding industry average. With regard to the log-size of the 
sample companies it can be pointed out that in the UK they are not only the smallest 
companies compared to the other two countries but it is also worth noting that the 
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underperforming companies are also smaller than their industry counterparts. Please refer to 
Appendix 3, which provides the results of the descriptive statistics differentiating between 
underperforming companies taken over and underperforming companies not taken over in 
UK. 
8.3.3 Descriptive Statistics for the US 
The US sample of underperforming companies consists of a total of 1,151 firms and is 
therefore the largest sample of the three countries. 
Table 14: Overall Descriptive Statistics for all Underperforming Companies in the US 
US GDP Ts Car 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Carital 
Stru cture 
Size 
(log 
Total 
Assets) 
Industry 
Tsq 
Variance 
Industry 
Capital 
Stru ct u re 
Variance 
Industry 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry Size 
(log Total 
Assets) 
Variance 
Valid 1151 1151 1151 1151 1151 1151 1151 1151 1151 1151 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 
. 
0290 
. 
8413 -. 3765 . 
8809 
. 
5382 20.1672 
. 
4547 2.1061 1.7907 1.0219 
Median 
. 
0297 
. 
8767 -. 3100 . 
9251 
. 
5812 20.1442 
. 
4300 2.0000 1.5343 1.0173 
Std. Deviation 
. 
00898 
. 
13793 
. 
30901 
. 
14328 
. 
23111 1.70900 
. 
17156 1.21261 
. 
79817 
. 
07616 
Minimum 
. 
02 
. 
32 -2.46 . 
19 
. 
00 14.69 
. 
09 
. 
00 
. 
29 
. 
77 
Maximum 
. 
04 1.46 
. 
00 1.00 
. 
96 25.08 
. 
95 10.31 7.99 1.24 
The US sample of underperforming firms reports the highest average Tsq and Car value of the 
three countries, which is, however, only marginally higher with a value of 0.84 and -0.38 
respectively. Therefore, the US reports the overall lowest level of underperfon-nance. The US 
sample further reports the lowest Asset Ratio of all three countries (88 %), which is, however, 
79 % higher than the corresponding industry average. This means that corresponding 
companies in the US in general tend to be structured with a proportionately higher degree of 
intangible assets. The US sample of underperforming firms comprises the largest companies 
of the three countries, which are also larger compared to their industry counterparts. Appendix 
4 provides descriptive statistic results differentiating between underperforming companies 
taken over and underperforming companies not taken over in the US. 
8.4 Z-Standardisation of the Ten Variables 
The regression model uses z-standardised values, which display the standard deviation of each 
individual value from the mean value of the total data. This data transformation has the 
advantage that each value can be directly compared across all independent variables (e. g. the 
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z-value of Tsq can directly be compared to the z-value of GDP). Table 15 below presents the 
Z-stanclardisation result of the ten variables under investigation. 
Table 15: Z-Standardisation Results of the Ten Variables 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Zscore (Tsq) Between Groups 28.616 2 14.308 14.480 . 000 
Within Groups 2211.384 2238 . 988 
Total 2240.000 2240 
Zscore (Car) Between Groups 5.893 2 2.947 2.952 . 052 
Within Groups 2234.107 2238 . 998 
Total 2240.000 2240 
Zscore Between Groups 86.130 2 43.065 44.747 . 000 (Industry Tsq Variance) Within Groups 2153.870 2238 . 962 
Total 2240.000 2240 
Zscore (GDP) Between Groups 242.866 2 121.433 136.078 . 000 
Within Groups 1997.134 2238 . 892 
Total 2240.000 2240 
Zscore Between Groups 155.274 2 77.637 83.345 . 000 (Capital Structure) Within Groups 2084.726 2238 . 932 
Total 2240.000 2240 
Zscore Between Groups 19.126 2 9.563 9.637 . 000 (Industry Capital Within Groups 2220.874 2238 . 992 Structure Variance) 
Total 2240.000 2240 
Zscore Between Groups 195.467 2 97.734 106.982 . 000 (Asset Structure) Within Groups 2044.533 2238 . 914 
Total 2240.000 2240 
Zscore Between Groups 598.159 2 299.079 407.676 . 000 (Industry Asset Structure Within Groups 1641.841 2238 . 734 Variance) 
Total 2240.000 2240 
Zscore Between Groups 838.844 2 419.422 669.923 . 000 
(Size log Total Assets) Within Groups 1401.156 2238 . 626 
Total 2240.000 2240 
Zscore Between Groups 99.490 2 49.745 52.011 . 000 
(Industry Size log Total Within Groups 2140.510 2238 . 956 Assets Variance) 
Total 2240.000 2240 
Before analysing and interpreting the actual results presented above, a brief theoretical 
background and explanation of the statistics applied is provided: 
Significance (Sig. ) 
The significance is the central result of this analysis. It deten-nines if the probability of any 
mean differences between the three countries are a result of pure coincidence. It aims to prove 
that there are no systematic differences between the data of all three countries. If the 
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probability is small or even zero, then the data for the three countries do not systematically 
differ. 
All other statistical values (sum of squares, df, mean square, F) are just components of the 
significance calculation, which are presented here for documentation purposes only and are of 
minor importance for the interpretation of this analysis. 
Sum of Squares: 
The sum of squares refers to the variance between a mean value of one case and the mean 
value of a predefined sample. For the calculation, the mean value for each case is firstly 
squared and all square values are then added up. Its result deten-nines the degree of variation 
within the sample. The results are expressed in hierarchical order as explained below: 
* The result for between groups refers to the variance of the sum of squares between 
the three groups (Canada, UK, US); 
* The result for within groups refers to the variance of the sum of squares between each 
value and the corresponding group (Canada, UK or US); and 
* The result of the total group refers to the total variance of the sum of squares for the 
overall sample of all three groups together (Canada, UK, US). 
As has already been mentioned above, the calculation of the sum of squares is only a step 
towards the calculation of significance. 
Degree of Freedom (df) 
The degree of freedom is part of the formula for calculating the significance and is purely the 
summation of the number of cases under investigation minus one (N- 1). The degree of 
freedom is always NI since the last value cannot vary freely if the total mean value is 
calculated. 
Mean Square 
The mean square refers to the sum of squares divided by the degree of freedom, which is also 
part of the formula of significance. 
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F-Distribution (F) 
The F-value is solely a test value for the significance, since it determines the distribution of 
probability. This means, there are several probability distribution types available and each 
degree of freedom combination has a particular F-distribution of probability. As a result, 
combining each F-value with its degree of freedom accordingly results in an exact value of 
probability, the significance. 
The variance analyses for each country individually and all three countries together, report 
that all values differ systematically and highly significantly from each other. The exception is 
the variable Car, which only marginally fails to achieve a5% level of significance. This 
outcome justifies and calls for a regression analysis for each of the countries separately. 
8.5 Description of the Process of Hierarchical Binary-Logistic Regression 
This section tests each of the four main hypotheses (independent variables) and its sub- 
hypotheses (control variables) by applying a binary logistic hierarchical regression model in 
order to investigate the relation between each independent variable and the likelihood of 
takeover following a period of underperformance. The binary logistic hierarchical regression 
analysis is divided into the following phases of investigation: 
Foundation Classification: 
The general process of hierarchical regression starts with introducing a classification table, 
which simply compares the number of underperforming companies being actually taken over 
for each of the three countries with the number of underperforming companies not being 
taken over. The outcome, which does not entail any regression analysis, is presented in 
percentage terms and provides a starting point for the logistical regression analysis, which 
will be undertaken separately. 
Effect of the Individual Predictors (Test 1 and Test 2) 
As already explained in Section 6.7 this study applies a hierarchical regression analysis, 
which means the regression analysis is undertaken in several phases. First of all, this study 
investigates whether there is any relation between each of the independent variables and the 
likelihood of each underperforming fin-n being taken over for each hypothesis separately (Test 
1). This study additionally applies control variables to incorporate industry and economy 
effects (Test 2) to check if the relationship outcomes differ from the outcome of the 
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independent variable (Test 1). This analysis is of particular importance since it reveals not 
only the explanatory power of each independent variable (e. g. Asset Structure) but also since 
it tests the explanatory power of a company's deviation from the industry average. This 
logistic regression applies the -2 Log likelihood 59 and the coefficient of determination 
Nagelkerke R2 60 to test the explanatory power and significance of each individual variable. In 
addition, the regression model applies an 'omnibus test', which investigates if there is any 
significance in the results of Nagelkerke R2 applying the statistical variables Chi2 61 and df 
This model is further utilised to examine how the overall prediction outcome variable p 
differs across countries as it has been stated in Section 6.2. 
Effect of all Predictors for each Hypothesis (Test 3) 
This hierarchical binary- logistic regression also investigates if there is any relation between 
the independent variable and its control variable(s) taken together (Test I and Test 2) for each 
hypothesis and the likelihood of a takeover for underperforining firms. This particular step of 
investigation is referred to as Test 3 in this study. Statistics under investigation in this logistic 
regression are also the -2 Log likelihood and the coefficient of determination (Nagelkerke R 2) 
to test the explanatory power and its significance of the independent variable and its control 
variable together for each country. The omnibus test is also incorporated for the Test 3 
analysis applying the statistical variables Chi2 and df. Test 3 is further utilised to examine how 
the overall prediction outcome variable p differs across countries as it has been stated in 
Section 6.2. 
59 The statistical variable -2 Log likelihood compares the maximum likelihood prediction of the predictor 
variables with the maximum likelihood prediction without using these predictors. This results in a probability 
relation, which will be expressed as a natural logarithm to be multiplied by -2. The outcome is used to detennine 
whether the predictor variables are meaningful in their contribution to the regression analysis and hence whether 
it makes actually sense to use those prediction variables. 
60 Nagelkerke RI determines the strength of influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable. This 
means, to what extent does the independent variable (e. g. underperformance) explain or predict the dependent 
variable (takeover) across the whole sample. The formula of Nagelkerke R2 determines how well the probability 
of the regression analysis matches the real outcomes. If the coefficient of determination reaches 100 % than all 
actual takeovers (1) and non-takeovers (0) were predicted by the independent variable. As we are using a binary 
regression, the probability always lies between zero and one. A coefficient of determination of 30 % would mean 
that 30 % of the wrong prediction (Fehleinschatzung) of the foundation classification could be eliminated by the 
independent variable information. Thus this measure determines the degree of improving the prediction of the 
foundation table (base line) through the application of this independent variable. 
61 Chi2 is also a statistical test value, which is similarly to the variance analysis (2 Log likelihood) applied to 
determine a level of significance. In contrast to the variance analysis, Ch i2 does not use a F-distribution but a 
Ch i2 distribution, which deten-nines the deviation between observed and predicted values. For each degree of 
freedom combination there is a particular probability function, meaning if we can determine the Chi2 value and 
its degree of freedom for our data sample, then it is possible to determine the probability and thus its 
significance. 
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Advanced Classirication 
The advanced classification table provides the outcome of the hierarchical binary regression 
model for each of the three countries. This analysis measures how many takeovers were 
actually predicted correctly by using this regression model. Please note, that the outcome of 
this advanced classification does not necessary lead to an improved prediction as takeovers 
can also be predicted incorrectly by this model, meaning companies which were not taken 
over where predicted as takeovers by the model. 
Multinornial Regression of all Ten Variables 
As a last step of investigation this thesis applies a multinomial logistic regression to all ten 
variables (independent and control variables) in order to investigate their explanatory power 
together on the likelihood of becoming a takeover target for an underperforming firm in each 
of the three countries. This analysis is particularly important as it takes all influencing factors 
into account, which might also result in counterbalancing effects. 
8.6 Test of the four Hypotheses 
The next section will apply the hierarchical binary logistic regression to each of the 
hypotheses and will discuss their outcome in detail. 
8.6.1 Hypothesis 1 
Based on the discussion in the literature review a positive relation between underperformance 
and the likelihood of being taken over can be expected. Therefore the first hypothesis to be 
tested for each of the three countries under investigation is as follows: 
HIO There is no relation between underperformance and takeover likelihood. 
HI, There is a positive relation between underperformance and takeover likelihood. 
HIO will be accepted if the results of the data analysis for each of the three countries lead to 
the conclusion that there is no relationship between underperformance and takeover 
likelihood. 
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8.6.1.1 Foundation Classification 
The classification table below shows how many of the underperforming company time 
intervals in each of the three countries resulted in a takeover. As can be seen already, the 
proportion of underperfon-ning companies not being taken over is much greater than 
underperforming companies being taken over. 
Table 16: Simple Classification Table for all three Countries 
Country Underperforming Company Time 
Intervals 
Percentage 
Canada Total Sample 170 100.0% 
_Not 
Takeover 152 89.4% 
Takeover 18 10.6% 
UK 
_Total 
Sample 920 100.0% 
Not Takeover 853 92.7% 
Takeover 67 7.3% 
[is 
_Total 
Sarnple 1.151 100.0% 
Not Takeover 1.086 94.4% 
rTakeover 65 5.6% 
As has previously been pointed ott, without using any regression model, it becomes evident 
that the probability of an underperforming company being taken over lies at 10.6 % in 
Canada, 7.3 % in the UK and 5.6 % in the US. This outcome shows that there is a very low 
tendency towards takeover following a period of underperformance for each of the three 
countries. This classification table remains constant for each of the four hypotheses and 
therefore will only be displayed once here. As has already been stated in Section 7.6 the 
results indicated that the market for corporate control does not (at all) work as claimed in the 
literature for all three countries. This, however, does not mean that the application of a 
regression model is obsolete since the model, which has been introduced in the methodology 
chapter, will now be applied to investigate if and how this outcome of the relationship will 
change when applying logistic regression analysis. 
8.6.1.2 Application of the Logistic Regression Model to H1 
The logistic regression model to be applied is: 
I+ex 
where X,,, -, 
is the data matrix, in whicht -I is used to compute the probability p at time t. 
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Table 17: Determination Coefficient for H1 
Country -2 Log Likelihood Nagelkerke R2 
Canada 114.809 . 001 UK 480.017 . 000 US 495.762 . 010 
The regression analysis for the independent variables Tsq and Car (z- standard i sed) results 
only in a marginally improved predictability of takeover likelihood for all countries. Whereas 
Canada reports a slight increase in the deterinination of coefficient (Nagelkerke RI) of 0.1 % 
and the US of I %, the UK does not show any improvements at all. 
The omnibus test, which is presented in the table below, investigates if there is any 
significance in the results of Nagelkerke R2. 
Table 18: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for H1 
Country ChP df Sig. 
Canada Test 1 . 049 2 . 976 
UK Test 1* 
. 018 2 . 991 
us Test 1* 4.116 2 . 128 
* Test I investigates whether there is any relation between each of the independent variables and the likelihood 
of each underperforming firm being taken over. 
I 
It becomes apparent that all marginal influences on the sample are clearly not significant, 
which means the overall outcome cannot be generalised and therefore it is not possible to 
eliminate the applicability of the null hypothesis. As both variables Tsq and Car taken 
together do not show any level of significance, any further investigation into each of the two 
variables separately is superfluous, however, the relevant statistics are presented in Appendix 
5. Therefore, we must accept the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 1. 
8.6.2 Hypothesis la 
Even though the variables Tsq and Car did not prove to be of any significance, this hypothesis 
provides an extended investigation into the relationship by including a set of industry effects 
(variance of each company from the industry Tsq mean) and economic variables (GDP). 
Statistically there is the possibility that the inclusion of industry and economic effects might 
change the level of significance and hence this will be tested accordingly. 
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HI ao There is no relation between underperformance and takeover likelihood taking 
into account industry and economic effects. 
Mal There is an increasing positive relation between underperfonnance and 
takeover likelihood taking into account industry and economic effects. 
8.6.2.1 Application of the Logistic Regression Model to Hla 
The model to be tested is: 
+ ex 
where X,,, -, 
is the data matrix, in whicht -I is used to compute the probability p at time t. 
Table 19: Determination Coefficient for Ella 
Country -2 Log likelihood Nagelkerke RI 
Canada 110.705 . 049 
UK 474.390 . 015 
US 494.621 . 013 
The additional inclusion of the two variables, Industry Tsq Variance and GDP (z- 
standardised), in the logistic regression model results in a slightly higher, however, still very 
limited deten-nination coefficient (Nagelkerke R 2) of 4.9 % in Canada, 1.5 % in the UK and 
1.3 % in the US. Despite the limited additional explanatory power of industry and economic 
effects in this logistic regression analysis, it is, however, worthwhile noting that the regression 
analysis for each of the three countries shows that it has the largest additional explanatory 
impact in Canada, whereas the US does not show any change in impact at all. 
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Table 20: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for Ella 
Country Chi' df Sig. 
Canada Test 2** 4.104 2 . 128 
Test 3*** 4.153 4 . 386 
UK Test 2** 5.626 2 . 060 
Test 3*** 5.645 4 . 227 
us Test 2** 1.141 2 . 565 
Test 3*** 5.257 4 . 262 
Test 2 applies industry and/or economy control variables to test if the relationship outcomes differ from the 
outcome of the independent variable (Test 1). 
*** Test 3 investigates if there is any relation betw een the independent variable and its control variable(s) taken 
1 together (Test I and Test 2). 
Overall, it can be concluded that the change in explanatory power from Test I (the original 
two independent variables Tsq and Car) to Test 2 (industry and economy-effect variables) 
does not prove any level of significance for each of the three countries. It is, however, of note 
that the UK only just fails a 5% level of significance in this investigation. Furthermore, it can 
be stated that the two independent variables and their two industry and economy-effect 
variables taken together (Test 3) do not provide any statistical explanatory power. It is not 
possible to imply a relation beyond any pure coincidence between the independent variables 
of underperformance and its control variables together and takeover likelihood. As all 
underperformance variables together do not report any level of significance any further 
investigation into each of the two variables separately is obsolete, however, the relevant 
statistics are presented in Appendix 6. Hence for Hypothesis la the null hypothesis must be 
accepted. 
In conclusion, both independent variables (Tsq, Car) together show that they have no 
statistical explanatory power on the likelihood of being taken over as a consequence of 
underperfon-nance. This applies for each of the three countries. Including industry and 
economy effects in the regression did not result in any improvement of statistical significance 
of the independent and control variables and the null hypothesis was accepted for Hypothesis 
I and I a. 
Comparing the above results with outcomes of previous research studies it becomes evident 
that it goes in line with more recent research outcomes, which report no significant 
association between takeovers and firm perfon-nance (Franks and Mayer, 1996, Argrawal and 
Jaffe, 2003, Bratton, 2005). Authors including Sinha (2004) found that none of the 
performance measures applied, appear to be significant in influencing the likelihood of a 
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takeover. Research by Bergstr6m, Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (2005) and Bratton (2005), 
in this context, explain that the relation between fin-n perfonnance and takeover likelihood is 
rather complex and difficult to define and measure. 
8.6.3 Hypothesis 2 
In the literature it is argued that the proportion debt is positively / negatively telated to the 
likelihood of being taken over. Therefore the second hypothesis to be tested for each of the 
three countries under investigation is as follows: 
H20: There is no relation between capital structure and the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired. 
H21: The level of corporate debt is negatively / positively related to the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired. 
H20 will be accepted if the result of the data analysis for each of the three countries leads to 
the conclusion that there is no relationship between capital structure and takeover likelihood. 
8.6.3.1 Application of the Logistic Regression Model to H2 
The model to be tested is: 
ex"'fl 
I+ex i"-, o 
where X,,, -, 
is the data matrix, in whicht -I is used to compute the probability p at time t. 
Table 21: Determination Coefficient for R2 
Country -2 Log likelihood Nagelkerke RI 
Canada 114.817 . 000 
UK 478.435 . 004 
us 498.055 . 004 
Taking only the independent variable Capital Structure (z- standard i sed) into consideration it 
becomes apparent that there is no relation between this variable on its own and the likelihood 
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of being taken over following a period of underperformance. The detennination coefficient 
(Nagelkerke RI) lies below 0.1 % in Canada and 0.4 % in the UK and US. 
Table 22: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for H2 
Country Chi2 df Sig. 
Canada Test 1 
. 042 1 . 838 
UK Test 1 1.600 1 . 206 
us Test 1 1.823 1 . 177 
Test I investigates whether there is any relation between each of the independent variables and the likelihood 
1 of each under performing firm being taken over. I 
As can be seen from the omnibus test table above, the marginal influence of the independent 
variable on the sample is clearly not significant. Any additional statistics are presented in 
Appendix 7. The displayed data show that the null hypothesis should be accepted overall. 
8.6.3.2 Hypothesis 2a 
Even though the variable Capital Structure did not prove to be of any significance, this 
hypothesis provides an extended investigation into the relation by including an industry effect 
variable (expressed as the variance of each company's capital structure to the mean industry 
capital structure). Statistically there is the possibility that the inclusion of industry effects 
might change the level of significance and hence this will be tested accordingly. 
Mao: There is no relation between capital structure and the likelihood of 
underperfonning companies being acquired taking into account industry 
effects. 
Mal: The level of corporate debt is negatively / positively related to the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired taking into account industry 
effects. 
8.6.3.3 Application of the Logistic Regression Model to H2a 
The model to be tested is: 
+ ex""-'P 
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where Xi,, -, 
is the data matrix, in whicht -I is used to compute the probability p at time t. 
Table 23: Determination Coefficient for R2a 
Country -2 Log likelihood Nagelkerke R2 
Canada 112.864 
. 024 UK 476.621 
. 009 US 496.632 
. 008 
Taking the additional variable Industry Capital Structure into consideration for the logit 
regression analysis then the determination of coefficient for the independent and control 
variable together increases to 2.4 % for Canada and 0.9 % and 0.8 % for the countries UK and 
US respectively. Although the explanatory power of the two variables increases the most for 
Canada, it needs to considered that the overall Nagelkerke RI remains extremely minimal for 
this regression analysis. 
Table 24: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for H2a 
Country Chi2 Df Sig. 
Canada Test 2** 1.953 1 
. 
162 
Test 3*** 1.994 2 
. 
369 
UK Test 2** 1.814 1 
. 
178 
Test 3*** 3.414 2 
. 181 
us Test 2** 1.423 1 
. 
233 
Test 3*** 3.246 2 
. 
197 
Test 2 applies industry and/or economy control variables to test if the relationship outcomes differ from the 
outcome of the independent variable (Test 1). 
*** Test 3 investigates if there is any relation between the independent variab le and its control variable(s) taken 
I together (Test I and Test 2). 
Based on the results presented in the omnibus test table above, none of the countries reports 
any change of significance in explanatory power if the second explanatory variable (Test 2) is 
run by the logit regression analysis. Taking the independent and control variable together, 
(Test 3) no statistical significance is apparent in each of the three countries, implying that the 
null hypothesis is accepted for Hypothesis 2a. Additional statistics are shown in Appendix 8. 
It can be concluded that the variable Capital Structure on its own does not report any 
statistical significance for companies being taken over as a consequence of their 
underperformance for each of the three countries. In addition, there is neither a statistical 
significance change in explanatory power from Test I to Test 2 nor any significance for the 
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variables Capital Structure and the control variable Industry Capital Structure together (Test 
3) in any of the three countries. Thus the null hypothesis is accepted for Hypothesis 2 and 2 a. 
As already discussed in the literature review, research studies, which focused on the relation 
of capital structure and the likelihood of being taken over report contradictory outcomes; 
whereas researchers such Jensen (1986), Palepu (1986), Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz 
(1988), Zwiebel (1996), Comment and Schwert (1997), Cudd and Duggal (2000) and 
Bergstr6m, Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (2005) report that the level of corporate debt is 
negatively related to the likelihood of being taken over, other studies including research by 
authors including Cremers and Nair (2003) indicate a positive relation between debt levels 
and takeover likelihood. This study, which focuses solely on underperforming companies, did 
not reveal any significance in the relation between capital structure and takeover likelihood at 
all and therefore stands in contrast to all of the research outcomes above. 
8.6.4 Hypothesis 3 
Research claims that the proportion of tangible assets in relation to total assets is negatively 
related to the likelihood of being taken over. Therefore the third hypothesis to be tested for 
each of the three countries under investigation is as follows: 
H3 0: There is no relation between the proportion of tangible assets to total assets and 
the likelihood of underperforming companies being acquired. 
H13 1: The proportion of tangible assets to total assets is positively related to the 
likelihood of underperfon-ning companies being acquired. 
H30 will be accepted if the result of the data analysis for each of the three countries leads to 
the conclusion that there is no relationship between the proportion of tangible assets and the 
likelihood of underperforming companies being acquired. 
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8.6.4.1 Application of the Logistic Regression Model to H3 
The model to be tested is: 
ex', 1-10- Pi'l - I+ex I ", -, p 
where X,,, -, 
is the data matrix, in whicht -I is used to compute the probability p at time t. 
Table 25: Determination Coefficient for H3 
Country -2 Log likelihood Nagelkerke RI 
Canada 114.706 . 002 
UK 479.897 . 000 
US 484.107 . 039 
The logistic regression analysis, which only takes into account the independent variable Asset 
Structure in -Astandardised form, results in no improvement of the determination coefficient 
(Nagelkerke R2) for the countries Canada and the UK (below 0.1 % and 0.2 % respectively). 
For the US, there exists a limited explanatory power between the variable Asset Structure and 
takeover likelihood with a determination coefficient of 3.9 % being detected. However, as a 
result of the high number of underperforming company year intervals in this country sample, 
the determination coefficient has only small explanatory power. 
Table 26: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for H3 
Country Chi2 Df Sig. 
Canada Test 1 
. 
153 1 . 
696 
UK Test 1 . 
138 1 . 
710 
us Test 1 15.771 1 . 
000 
* Test I investigates whether there is any relation between each of the independent variables and the likelihood 
of each underperforming firm being taken over. 
I 
As can be seen from the omnibus test table above, the marginal influence of the independent 
variable on the sample is clearly not significant for Canada and the UK. For this reason, the 
null hypothesis must be accepted for the countries Canada and UK and hence no further 
analysis is undertaken. However, significance at the I% level is detected in the US. Out of 
this reason the table below provides a further analysis into the coefficients of determination 
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for the individual predictors in this country. Additional statistics for all countries are 
presented in Appendix 9. 
Table 27: Variables in the Equation for H3 
95,0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
Country Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
us Z Asset Structure 
. 000 1 . 6861 . 578 . 814 
The most important predictors for this kind of analysis is again the significance, however, 
statistical relevance is also allocated to the value Exp(B)62 as well as the Interval of 
Confidence 63 of the Exp(B). 
It can be stated that an increase by one standard deviation of the Asset Structure variable 
results in a decrease of the likelihood of takeover by at 68.6 % in the LIS. There is a negative 
relationship between the independent variable Asset Structure and the likelihood of being 
taken over. However, the explanatory power is only moderate, since it needs to be considered 
that an increase by one standard deviation is a considerable change whereas the resulting 
decrease in takeover likelihood is relatively moderate (68.6 %). It furthen-nore needs to be 
noted that the reduction in takeover likelihood to 68.6 % is only a best guess for the US 
sample. Considering the Interval of Confidence, it becomes evident that with a probability of 
95 %, the correct value of this probability change ranges between a reduction of 57.8 % and 
81.4 %. This interval of confidence can be regarded as wide thus implying a poor quality of 
prediction. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the null hypothesis should be accepted overall for the 
countries Canada and the UK, however, a significance at the I% level was detected for the 
62 The value Exp(B) is used to measure the change in probability if the value of a predictor is increased by one 
standard deviation, which is commonly referred to as 'odd ratios'. Exp(B) determines how strong the effect of 
the change in one standard deviation is on each predictor and its corresponding sign (positive or negative 
relation). Exp(B) values of below I mean that the probability declines and values of above I mean that the 
probability increases by this factor. 
63 The value Exp(B) is only an estimate and depending on how good the regression analysis works the estimate 
of the value Exp(B) can be more or less accurate. The interval of confidence of the Exp(B) value determines the 
potential accurateness of Exp(B). This statistical variable measures the interval in which the real value of Exp(B) 
lies, assuming a probability of 95 %. The Interval of Confidence is usually expressed by its lower and upper 
value. It can be generally said the wider the interval of confidence, the poorer the quality of the prediction. The 
narrower the interval of confidence, the better the predictability. 
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US. The Exp(B) was, however, only moderate and since the interval of confidence was 
relatively widely spread, the quality of prediction remains poor. 
8.6.4.2 Hypothesis 3a 
This hypothesis investigates the relation of the variable Asset Structure further by including 
an industry control variable (expressed as the variance of each company's asset structure to 
the mean industry asset structure). Statistically, there is the possibility that the inclusion of the 
industry effect variable might change the level of significance and therefore this will be tested 
accordingly. 
Mao There is no relation between the level of tangible assets and the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired taking into account industry 
effects. 
Mal The proportion of tangible assets to total assets is positively related to the 
likelihood of underperforming companies being acquired taking into account 
industry effects. 
8.6.4.3 Application of the Logistic Regression Model to H3a 
The model to be tested is: 
I+ex 
where X, 
', 
is the data matrix, in whicht -I is used to compute the probability p at time t. 
Table 28: Determination Coefficient for Ma 
Country -2 Log likelihood Nagelkerke RI 
Canada 107.850 . 082 
UK 479.897 . 000 
us 483.891 . 039 
The inclusion of the industry effect variable for the country Canada results in a clear increase 
(change from Test I to Test 2) of the deten-nination coefficient from 0.2 % to 8.2 %. The 
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countries UK and US do not report a change in explanatory power as a result of analysing the 
industry effect variable; the determination coefficient remains below 0.1 % and at 3.9 % 
respectively. 
Table 29 below provides an investigation of significance for the three countries. 
Table 29: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for H3a 
Country ChP Df Sig. 
Canada Test 2** 6.856 1 . 009 Test 3*** 7.009 2 . 030 UK Test 2** 
. 001 1 . 979 
Test 3*** 
. 138 2 . 933 us Test 2** 
. 216 1 . 642 Test 3*** 15.987 2 . 000 Test 2 applies industry and/or economy control variables to test if the relationship outcomes differ from the 
outcome of the independent variable (Test 1). 
*** Test 3 investigates if there is any relation between the independent variab le and its control variable(s) taken 
together (Test I and Test 2). 
It should be noted that the change from Test I (Asset Structure variable) to Test 2 (Industry 
effect variable) results in a significance at the 5% level in Canada. In contrast, the regression 
analysis of the variable industry effect results in no change of significance for the countries 
UK and US. The regression analysis of the independent and control variables together (Test 3) 
results in a statistical nork- significance in Canada and the UK. In the US the statistical 
significance at the I% level continues to exist for both variables taken together. 
For this reason, the null hypothesis must be accepted for the UK, hence no further analysis is 
undertaken. Significance at the 5% level was detected for Test 2 in Canada and at the I% 
level for Test 3 in US. Out of this reason the table below provides a further analysis into the 
coefficients of determination for the individual predictors in the countries Canada and US. 
Table 30: Variables in the Equation for H3a 
95,0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
Country Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Canada Z Asset Structure . 149 . 727 . 472 1.121 
Z Industry Asset Structure 
Variance . 
009 2.287 1.225 4.272 
us Z Asset Structure . 000 . 667 . 543 . 820 
Z Industry Asset Structure 
Variance I . 
635 
I 
1.061 
I . 
830 
I 
1.358 
I 
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The variable Industry Asset Structure Variance proves to be significant at the I% level in 
Canada. The increase of the asset variable by one standard deviation results in an increase of 
takeover likelihood to approximately 2.3 times, as a best estimation. The Interval of 
Confidence ranges between 1.2 times and 4.3 times of the original probability, which leads to 
the conclusion of a poor quality of prediction. In the US a statistical significance of the 
relation between the variable Asset Structure and takeover likelihood becomes apparent and 
its relation is negative. If the asset value increases by one standard deviation it results in 
decrease of the takeover likelihood of the underperforming company sample to approximately 
66.7 % of the original probability. The Interval of Confidence ranges between 54 % and 82 
which also leads to the conclusion of a poor quality of prediction. Additional statistics for all 
countries are presented in Appendix 10. 
The advanced classification table below shows that the results remain unchanged for the 
countries UK and US since the application of the logistic regression model comes to a similar 
result. In Canada, however, one takeover has been predicted correctly, the degree of correct 
allocation increases from 89.4 % to 90 % just by using the infon-nation of the Asset Structure 
variables and its control variable. 
Table 31: Advanced Classification Table for all Three Countries 
Country Underperforming Company 
Time Intervals 
Predicted Percentage 
Canada Total Sample 170 
Not Takeover 152 0 100.0% 
Takeover 17 1 5.6% 
Overall Percentage 90.0% 
IIK Total Sample 920 
Not Takeover 853 0 100.0% 
Takeover 67 0 . 0% 
Overall Percentage 92.7% 
(is Total Sample 1.151 
Not Takeover 1086 0 100.0% 
Takeover 65 0 0% 
Overall Percentage 
In summary, Hypothesis 3 investigated the impact of the variable Asset Structure on the 
likelihood of underperfon-ning firms being taken over and it can be stated that the variable 
Asset Structure on its own (Test 1), has a significant negative influence of limited explanatory 
power in the US, however not in the countries Canada and the UK. Only Canada reports a 
significant change of explanatory power from Test I to Test 2. The other countries, UK and 
US, in contrast, do not report a change in explanatory power by re-running the regression 
analysis with the industry control variable. Considering the variables Asset Structure and 
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Industry Asset Structure Variance together (Test 3), the US continues to report an overall 
statistically negative significance on takeover likelihood. The Canadian and UK samples 
report no significance of the Asset Structure and its control variable taken together and 
takeover likelihood. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the null hypothesis should be accepted for the UK. 
Significance at the 5% level was detected for Test 2 in Canada and at the I% level for the 
Model in US. However, the Interval of Confidence for the Canadian underperformance 
sample ranges between 1.2 times and 4.3 times of the original probability implying a poor 
quality of prediction. For the US, the Interval of Confidence ranges between 54 % and 82 %, 
which also leads to the conclusion of a poor quality of prediction. Whereas the results of the 
advanced classification table show no changes for the countries UK and US, Test 3 predicted 
takeovers correctly in Canada, thus the degree of correct allocation increases from 89.4 % to 
90 %just by using the information of the Asset Structure variables and its control variable. 
As has already been discussed in the literature review, there should be a positive relation 
between a firm's asset structure and the probability of becoming a takeover target. Studies 
found that firms with a high percentage of tangible assets in their total asset structure are 
attractive takeover targets for two potential reasons. These companies tend to have a greater 
debt capacity (Ambrose and Megginson, 1992) and are ideal candidates for asset stripping by 
raiders (Eddey, 1991). For this reason, the probability of being taken over is positively related 
to the level of tangible assets to total assets. 
This study, which focuses solely on underperforming companies, did reveal varying outcomes 
for the three countries. For Canada the relation between Asset Structure and takeover 
likelihood is positive at the 5% level, however, with a poor quality of prediction (Interval of 
Confidence). This means that the asset variable on its own cannot confidently explain any 
takeover likelihood in Canada. The UK did not report any significant levels and therefore our 
results stand in direct contrast to the above studies. In addition, the relation between Asset 
Structure and the likelihood of underperforming firms being acquired is significantly negative 
at the I% level in US with poor quality of predictability. Therefore similarly to the Canada 
the Asset Structure variable on its own has no relevance in predicting takeover likelihood of 
underperfon-ning companies. 
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8.6.5 Hypothesis 4 
Research argues that the size of the target companies is positively / negatively related to the 
likelihood of underperforming firms being taken over. Therefore the fourth hypothesis to be 
tested for each of the three countries under investigation is as follows: 
H4o There is no relation between firm size and the likelihood of underperforming 
companies being acquired. 
H41 Finn size is positively / negatively related to the likelihood of underperforming 
companies being acquired. 
8.6.5.1 Application of the Logistic Regression Model to H4 
The model to be tested: 
exi, 1-iß 
i't I+ex j"-, ß 
where X,,, -, 
is the data matrix, in whicht -I is used to compute the probability p at time t. 
Table 32: Determination Coefficient for H4 
Country -2 Log likelihood Nagelkerke RI 
Canada 114.780 . 001 
UK 479.400 . 002 
US 499.742 . 000 
Taking into consideration only the size variable Size log Total Assets (z- standard i sed) as an 
influencing variable then there are only very minimal levels of determination coefficient 
(Nagelkerke R2) detectable. Canada reports 0.1 %, UK 0.2 % and the US below 0.1%. 
The next table overleaf presents the 'omnibus test' for Hypothesis H4 (Test of Significance). 
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Table 33: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for H4 
Country Chi2 Df Sig. 
Canada Test 1 . 078 
1 . 780 
UK Test 1 . 635 1 . 426 
us Test 1 . 136 1 . 713 
* Test I investigates whether there is any relation between each of the independent variables and the likelihood 
of each underperforming firm being taken over. 
As can be seen in the table above the independent variable Size is clearly nor-k- significant in 
determining the relationship between size of underperforming companies and takeover 
likelihood in all three countries. As already previously mentioned, the logistic regression 
analysis can already be interrupted at this point since the table of coefficients will come to the 
same conclusion. Additional statistics are presented in Appendix 11. 
8.6.6 Hypothesis Ma 
The last hypothesis to be tested additionally includes an industry effect variable of size (taln) 
(expressed as the variance of each company's log size to the mean industry log size). 
Statistically, there is the possibility that the inclusion of the industry effect variable might 
change the level of significance and hence this will be tested accordingly. 
H4aO There is no relation between company size and the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired taking into account industry 
effects. 
H4a, Firm size is positively/negatively related to the likelihood of underperfonning 
companies being acquired taking into account industry effects. 
8.6.6.1 Application of the Logistic Regression Model to H4a 
The model to be tested is: 
+ 
where X,,, -, 
is the data matrix, in whicht -I is used to compute the probability p at time t. 
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Table 34: Determination Coefficient for Ma 
Country -2 Log likelihood Nagelkerke R2 
Canada 114.649 
. 
003 
UK 479.394 
. 
002 
US 499.660 
. 
001 
As can be seen from the table above, taking the Industry Size log Total Assets Variance (z- 
standardised) as an influencing variable into consideration, there are only very minimal levels 
of determination coefficient detectable. Canada reports an increase from 0.1 % to 0.3 % and 
the US from below 0.1 % to 0.1 %. The deten-nination coefficient remains unchanged for the 
UK. There is an extremely limited increase in the determination coefficients of the sample for 
two of the three countries under investigation. 
Table 35: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for H4a 
Country Chi2 Df Sig. 
Canada Test 2** . 131 1 . 717 
Test 3*** . 209 2 . 901 
UK Test 2** . 006 1 . 936 
Test 3*** . 641 2 . 726 
us Test 2** . 083 1 . 774 
Test 3*** . 218 2 . 
897 
Test 2 applies industry and/or economy control variables to test if the relationship outcomes differ from the 
outcome of the independent variable (Test 1). 
*** Test 3 investigates if there is any relation betw een the independent variable and its control variable(s) taken 
1 together (Test I and Test 2). 
It can be concluded that the independent variable Size log Total Assets (Test 1) does not have 
any statistical impact on the likelihood of underperforming firms being taken over in each of 
the three countries. The Industry Size variable (Test 2) does not have any changing effect on 
the level of significance for each of the three countries. The inclusion of both size variables 
together (Test 3) also results in no statistical significance of the relationship to the likelihood 
of underperfon-ning firms being acquired. Additional statistics are presented in Appendix 12. 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the size of a fin-n can have an impact on the likelihood of 
becoming an acquisition target. One stream of research suggests that takeover likelihood 
decreases with firm size, which is based on the premise that there are transaction costs of 
takeovers related to size making it more difficult for potential bidders to absorb large firms 
(Levine and Aaronovitch, 1981, Palepu, 1986, Ambrose and Megginson, 1992, Powell, 1997, 
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2001, Cudd and Duggal, 2000, Chakraborty and Baum, 2003, Sinha, 2004). However, in 
accordance with the growt4- maxim i sati on behaviour theory, the literature claims that large 
companies are more attractive to acquirers. Large companies do not only provide smaller 
companies with a rapid source of expansion, but it is also argued that agency problems are 
more severe in large firrns, potentially resulting in underperformance and thus these 
companies may become an attractive takeover target (Nuttal, 1999, Bames, 2000). Research 
by Song and Walkling (1993) finds that target firms tend not to be of the smallest size but are 
somewhat more prominent in the middle range. 
Our study, which focuses solely on underperforming companies, did not reveal any 
significance in the relation between size and takeover likelihood at all and therefore stands in 
contrast to all of the research outcomes above. 
8.7 Application of the Logistic Regression Model to All Ten Independent 
Variables Together 
To conclude this logistic regression analysis an additional binary- logistic regression with all 
ten independent variables of the four hypotheses is conducted. The foundation classification 
table remains unchanged for this analysis and thus is not displayed again. Please refer to 
Table 16. The table below presents the results of the detennination coefficient (Nagelkerke 
R') for all ten variables. 
The model to be tested is: 
I+ex 
where X,,, -, 
is the data matrix, in which t-I is used to compute the probability p at time t. 
Table 36: Determination Coefficient for all Ten Variables 
Country -2 Log likelihood Nagelkerke R 
2. 
Canada 90.858 . 268 
UK 469.586 . 028 
us 471.752 . 069 
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The results for each of the three countries show varying degrees of explanatory power for the 
influence of the ten independent variables on the likelihood of underperforming firms being 
acquired. In Canada the determination coefficient of all ten independent variables taken 
together reaches a level of 26.8 %, which is not high, however, remains a noteworthy level. In 
the UK, in contrast, the deten-nination coefficient of all ten independent variables reaches only 
2.8 % and in the US 6.9 %. 
The next table below presents the omnibus test for all ten variables (Test of Significance). 
Table 37: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for all Ten Variables 
Country Chi2 df Sig. 
Canada Test 1* 24.001 10 . 008 
UK Test 1* 10.449 10 . 402 
us Test 1* 28.126 10 . 002 
* Test I investigates whether there is any relation between each of the independent variables and the likelihood 
of each underperforming firm being taken over. I 
For nearly a quarter of the sample in Canada the deten-nination coefficient is highly 
significant at the I% level, which leads to the conclusion that the influences of all ten 
independent variables taken together are clearly of no coincidence. A similar outcome can be 
drawn for the much weaker determination coefficient in the US; here the high number of 
occurrences of underperfon-nance impacts on the level of significance. The logistic regression 
analysis does not show any clear significance for the ten independent variables in the UK. For 
this reason no further analysis is being undertaken for the UK underperfon-nance sample. 
A further investigation includes a test of the impact of each of the ten variables on the 
significance of the relationship. Statistics in detail are presented in Appendix 13. 
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Table 38: Variables in the Equation for all Ten Variables 
95,0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
Country Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Canada Zscore (Tsq) 
. 054 2.517 . 986 6.424 
Zscore (Car) 
. 752 1.100 . 611 1.980 
Zscore 
(Industry Tsq Vadance) . 006 . 142 . 035 . 569 
Zscore (GDP) 
. 132 1.723 . 850 3.494 
Zscore 
(Capital Stru cture) . 
025 4.139 1.192 14.369 
Zscore 
(Industry Capital Structure Variance) . 008 . 080 . 012 . 518 
Zscore 
(Asset Structure) . 036 . 574 . 341 . 965 
Zscore 
(Industry Asset Structure Variance) . 012 2.974 1.268 6.976 
Zscore 
. 879 . 858 . 121 6.081 (Size log Total Assets) 
Zscore 
(Industry Size log Total Assets) . 643 . 684 . 137 3.409 
us Zscore (Tsq) . 201 . 780 . 533 1.142 
Zscore (Car) . 029 . 760 . 594 . 973 
Zscore 662 1.126 . 662 1.914 (Industry Tsq Vafiance) . 
Zscore (GDP) . 946 1.012 . 720 1.422 
Zscore 
. 634 . 885 . 536 1.461 (Capital Structure) 
Zscore 
. 393 . 782 . 445 1.374 (Industry Capital Structure Variance) 
Zscore 
. 000 . 645 . 520 . 799 (Asset Structure) 
Zscore 809 1.032 . 796 1.339 (Industry Asset Structure Variance) . 
Zscore 
. 683 1.187 . 
520 2.710 
(Size log Total Assets) 
Zscore 
. 759 . 900 . 
460 1.762 
(Industry Size log Total Assets) I I II 
Canada 
Comparing the relevance of the individual independent variables on the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired in Canada, five of the ten variables show strong 
explanatory power. The strongest influence has the variable Industry Capital Structure 
Variance, which means that an increase by one standard deviation reduces the likelihood of a 
takeover for the underperforming firm to an Exp(B) value of 8% of the original takeover 
likelihood. The independent variable with the second strongest explanatory power is Industry 
Tsq Variance. An increase by one standard deviation results in a decline of takeover 
likelihood to approximately 14 % of the original takeover likelihood. An increase of the 
variable Capital Structure by one standard deviation in contrast increases the takeover 
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likelihood to more than four-times the level. By increasing the standard deviation by one, the 
independent variable Industry Asset Structure Variance increases its takeover likelihood to 
just three times the original level and the independent variable Asset Structure reduces its 
takeover likelihood to just over 50 % of the original likelihood in the foundation classification 
table. 
To conclude, for Canada the independent variables Capital Structure and Industry Asset 
Structure Variance report a positive relationship whereas the independent variables Industry 
Capital Structure Variance, Industry Tsq Variance and Asset Structure report a negative 
relation with the likelihood of underperforming firms being acquired. The ranking of the 
independent variables according to their descending explanatory power is: Industry Capital 
Structure Variance, Industry Tsq Variance, Capital Structure, Industry Asset Structure 
Variance and Asset Structure. 
us 
In the US only Car and Asset Structure report a significance at the 5% level and the I% level 
respectively of the ten independent variables. If increased by one standard deviation the 
variable Asset Structure reports a decrease in takeover likelihood to approximately 65 %. 
Increasing the variable Car by one standard deviation results in a decline of the likelihood to 
76 % of the original probability. Both relationships are significantly negative. 
Table 39: Advanced Classification Table for all Ten Variables 
Country Underperforming Company 
Time Intervals 
Predicted Percentage 
Canada Total Sample 170 
Not Takeover 151 1 99.3% 
Takeover 15 3 16.7% 
Overall Percentage 90.6% 
UK Total Sample 920 
Not Takeover 853 0 100.0% 
Takeover 67 0 . 0% Overall Percentage 92.7% 
us Total Sample 1.151 
Not Takeover 1085 1 99.9% 
Takeover 65 0 . 0% i Overall Percentage 94.3%1 
The regression classification table above shows that there are no variations to the original 
classification table for the sample of underperformance in the UK; there is no regression 
function of any significance. 
168 
Looking at the sample of underperforming companies in Canada it becomes evident that three 
of a total of 18 takeovers were classified correctly according to the logistic regression analysis 
of all ten variables together. However, it needs to be mentioned that one takeover case was 
identified incorrectly as a takeover target by the regression function. The number of predicted 
takeovers which have actually not taken place following a period of underperformances 
increases the probability of not being taken over from 89.4 % to 90.6 %. 
The underperformance sample of the UK does not report any relationship of the ten 
independent variables taken together on takeover likelihood of underperforming companies. 
For the US there is, despite the level of significance in the regression function (albeit with a 
weak determination coefficient), a decline in the successful allocation of takeover cases for 
the overall sample. The number of actual takeovers following a period of underperfon-nance 
decreases slightly from 94.4 % in the original classification table to 94.3 % after applying the 
regression model to the sample. The reason for this change lies in the fact that one case of 
underperformance was classified incorrectly as being acquired by the regression function 
while none of the actual takeovers were forecasted correctly. 
In summary it can be concluded that for the Canadian sample five of the ten independent 
variables are statistically significant, however, with an overall weak determination coefficient 
of only approximately 25 % of the total variability of the independent variables (takeover 
yes/no). The independent variables Capital Structure and Industry Asset Structure Variance 
report a positive relationship to takeover likelihood and the independent variables Industry 
Capital Structure Variance, Industry Tsq Variance and Asset Structure a negative relationship. 
For the US it can be concluded that there is only a weak relationship between the ten 
independent variables together and the likelihood of underperfon-ning firms being taken over. 
However, the high number of occurrences of underperformance in this country, result in that 
this weak relationship reports a level of significance. The independent variables Asset 
Structure and Car report a negative relationship with takeover likelihood of underperforming 
firms. 
Overall it can be concluded that, since there is either no significance (UK) or only a weak 
significance (Canada, US) being detected for the relation of the ten variables taken together 
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and the likelihood of underperfon-ning firms being acquired and since this significance has a 
wide spread interval of confidence, the predictability and its quality is poor. 
8.8 Conclusion 
Chapter Eight detailed the results of the hierarchical binary logistic regression model, which 
was applied to test the thesis' four main hypotheses and its four sub-hypotheses for Canada, 
the UK and US. As a starting point, the chapter presented the descriptive statistic and z 
standardisation results for each country and commented on them briefly. A simple analysis of 
the number of takeovers of underperforming companies resulted in a first conclusion that the 
market for corporate control does not work. The aim of this thesis, however, focused on 
testing each of the stated hypotheses in terms of whether there is any relation between the 
chosen independent and control variables and the likelihood of a takeover following a period 
of underperfon-nance for each country. The outcome of each hypothesis is summarised briefly 
below. 
Hypothesis 1, which tested whether there is a positive relation between the degree of 
underperformance and takeover likelihood, was rejected as both independent variables Tsq 
and Car (Test 1) show that they have no statistical explanatory power for the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being taken over. Hypothesis la, which added industry and 
economy effects to the above regression model (Test 2, Test ý, did not result in any 
improvement of statistical significance. This applies for each of the three countries. Therefore 
the general argument, often used in the industry, that the market for corporate control works 
in disciplining underperforming management through takeover mechanisms is therefore 
invalid and must be rejected. This outcome goes in line with recent research outcomes by 
authors including Franks and Mayer (1996), Argrawal and Jaffe, (2003), Sinha (2004) 
Bergstr6m, Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (2005) and Bratton (2005). 
Hypothesis 2, which investigated if the level of corporate debt is negatively / positively 
related to the likelihood of being taken over, was rejected as no statistical significance was 
reported. The inclusion of industry and economic effects (Hypothesis 2a) resulted in no 
further significance improvements. Therefore none of the two contradicting arguments 
generally used in the literature, which proposed that capital structure is either positively 
related (Cremers and Nair, 2003) or negatively related to takeover likelihood (Cudd and 
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Duggal, 2000, Bergstr6m, Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 2005) could be verified for our 
sample of underperforming companies for the chosen investigation period. 
Hypothesis 3 investigated the impact of the variable Asset Structure on the likelihood of being 
taken over. Our study, which focuses solely on underperforming companies, did reveal 
varying outcomes for the three countries. The logistic regression analysis for the UK sample 
did not show any significance for Hypothesis 3 and 3a at all and thus the null hypothesis was 
accepted. The relation between Asset Structure and the likelihood of underperforming firms 
being acquired (Test I- 3) is significantly negative at the I% level in the US with poor 
quality of predictability. This negative relation stands in contrast to the literature and 
empirical research. For Canada the relation between Asset Structure and takeover likelihood 
is positive at the 5% level, however, with a poor quality of prediction (Interval of 
Confidence). This means that the asset variable on its own cannot confidently explain any 
takeover likelihood in Canada. Even though the Canadian sample outcomes show parallels to 
previous research including authors (Eddey, 1991, Ambrose and Megginson, 1992) it must be 
noted that the Interval of Confidence is very wide, implying a poor quality of prediction. 
Hypothesis 4, which tested if firm size is positively / negatively related to the likelihood of 
underperforming firms being taken over, concluded that firm size (Test 1) has no statistical 
impact in each of the three countries. The inclusion of industry and economic effects in 
Hypothesis 4a (Test 2, Test 3) did not have any effect on the level of significance for each of 
the three countries. Therefore the null hypothesis needs to be accepted for all three countries 
and stands in contrast to research outcomes by authors including Nuttal (1999), Barries 
(2000), Cudd and Duggal (2000), Chakraborty and Baum (2003) and Sinha (2004). 
As a last step of investigation this thesis applied multinomial logistic regression to all ten 
variables together (independent and control variables) in order to investigate their impact on 
the likelihood of becoming a takeover target for an underperforming firm in each of the three 
countries. This analysis is particularly important as it takes all influencing factors into 
account, which might also result in counterbalancing effects. The underperfon-nance sample 
of the UK does not report any relationship of the ten independent variables taken together on 
takeover likelihood of underperfon-ning companies. For the Canadian sample five of the ten 
independent variables are statistically significant, however, with an overall weak 
determination coefficient of only approximately 25 % of the total variability of the 
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independent variables (takeover yes/no). The independent variables Capital Structure and 
Industry Asset Structure Variance report a positive relationship to takeover likelihood and the 
independent variables Industry Capital Structure Variance, Industry Tsq Variance and Asset 
Structure, a negative relationship in Canada. For the US it can be concluded that there is only 
a weak relationship between the ten independent variables together and the likelihood of 
underperforming finns being taken over. However, the high quantity of occurrences of 
underperformance in this country results in a level of significance despite the reported weak 
relationship. The independent variables Asset Structure and Car report a negative relationship 
with takeover likelihood of underperforming fin-ns. 
It can be concluded that, since there is either no significance (UK) or only a weak significance 
(Canada, US) being detected for the relation of the ten variables taken together and the 
likelihood of underperforming firms being acquired and since this significance has a wide 
spread interval of confidence, the predictability and its quality is poor. 
Overall, the hierarchical binary logistic regression model, which was applied to test the thesis' 
four main hypotheses and its four sub-hypotheses for Canada, UK and US found out that the 
probability of takeovers following a period of firm underperformance (disciplinary takeovers) 
did not prove to be significant. This outcome is supported by recent studies including Franks 
and Mayer (1996), Argrawal and Jaffe (2003) and Sinha (2004), who all concluded that there 
is no significant association between takeovers and firm performance, implying that the 
disciplinary takeover is statistically noný-existent. Thus the market for corporate control does 
not work effectively through takeovers. 
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Chapter Nine 
Summary and Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
In this thesis the relationship between underperfon-nance and takeover likelihood was 
examined theoretically and empirically using stock- market- based measurements and 
accounting-based financial data from companies in the UK, US and Canada over a period of 
17 years (1988 - 2004) applying hierarchical binary logistic regression analysis. 
According to the theory the market for corporate control plays an important role for corporate 
governance and agency conflicts. There exists the view that managers often pursue goals 
other than value maximisation resulting in poor corporate performance. According to the 
agency theory, this problem arises from the separation of ownership and control and its 
resulting incentive misalignment between the principal and agent. According to the literature, 
takeovers are regarded as one of the most efficient devices in the market for corporate control 
since it rapidly transfers resources and control from inefficient managers, to efficient ones. 
Jensen (1986) takes the view that takeovers are a direct response to the breakdown of internal 
corporate governance systems and agency conflicts in companies. 
This thesis aimed to empirically investigate whether the market for corporate control works in 
the sense that underperforming firms are being taken over as a consequence of their poor 
performance. This study further examined financial characteristics of underperforming firrns 
in a hierarchical binary logistic regression to measure the likelihood of these companies being 
taken over following a period of underperformance. 
In this concluding chapter, we will summarise the preceding chapters and discuss the results 
of the empirical study. In addition, we will describe the contribution and the limitations of this 
thesis and introduce potential areas for further research. 
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9.2 Summary of Chapters 
The literature in the field of corporate governance and agency theory, which was discussed in 
detail in Chapter Two, investigated the implications that the separation of ownership and 
control and the resulting misalignment of management and residual claimants' interests have 
on the varying contracting parties. It was shown that the separation of ownership and control 
not only results in residual loss due to costs arising from an agent's action, such as wasteful 
management, but also through costs arising from monitoring and bonding agents in order to 
keep residual loss to a minimum. However, as pointed out by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1990), it remains illusive and incorrect to assume that existing monitoring and bonding tools 
keep managers from pursuing personal non-value maximising objectives. Another conclusioq 
which can be drawn from the literature, is the reoccurring controlling importance of 
ownership on the relationship between all contracting participants. As has been shown, a 
certain level of ownership stake being held by the various stakeholders such as shareholder, 
bondholders and management itself can impact positively on agency costs, whereas these 
positive impacts on agency conflicts disappear again beyond a certain level of ownership. 
Chapter Three introduced and discussed the corporate governance function of the market for 
corporate control, particularly investigating the effectiveness of the board of directors, legal, 
political and regulatory systems, product market competition, capital market mechanisms 
including the labour market as well as the correcting function of takeovers in monitoring and 
overcoming potential agency conflicts due to the separation of ownership and control. All 
control functions prove their relevance in theory; however, empirical research showed that 
each of them displayed weaknesses and deficiencies in practice. Overall, there is only one 
clear conclusion to be drawn from the literature in this field, which is also exemplified in 
takeovers and corporate governance mechanisms, which might be optimal in one particular 
situation for one company in one country might not be ideal for another. As Kole (1995) and 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) summarise, agency conflicts are heterogeneous across 
different firrns in different industries with differing contract environments. 
Chapter Four provided a review of research in the field of financing choices, highlighting tax 
advantages of debt, (Modigliani and Miller, 1958,1963, Fama and Miller, 1972 and Miller 
1977) and the threat of bankruptcy (M&M, 1963, Altman (1984), to provide the basis for a 
theorem of optimal capital structure (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980, Myers, 1984). The benefits 
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of debt in mitigating agency conflicts have also become an important aspect of capital 
structure considerations. It can be concluded that the various debt aspects, such as the control 
hypothesis of debt, the role of debt in reducing free cash flow/financial slack and the incentive 
effect of debt as well as its informational aspects, all play an important part in realigning 
owner and stakeholder interest in theory. However, practice has shown that agency problems 
are not overcome in reality. The important role of leverage in the field of financing 
acquisitions, removal of financial slack and/or increase in share price as well as its role as an 
antýtakeover device (Harris and Raviv, 1988) is recognised in the finance and economics 
literature. It can be concluded that the choice of capital structure is a delicate balancing act of 
continuously adjusting the debt level to achieve the maximum amount of economic benefit. 
Increased leverage provides both potential benefits as well as disadvantages to the bidder as 
well as the target company. 
In Chapter Five this thesis reviewed literature on mergers and acquisitions as one important 
option of mitigating agency conflicts in the market for corporate control. It investigated 
potential merger motives including economic, financial and corporate control considerations 
as well as managerial aspects. Despite the importance of takeovers as a rapid-fire mechanism 
for overcoming corporate deficiencies and related agency problems with all potential value- 
creating benefits in theory, empirical research has shown that outcomes are ambiguous. 
Overall, research has provided only little consistent explanation for the likelihood of 
becoming a takeover target and there is no consistent direction for investors confronted with 
acquisition opportunities who wish to maximise economic gain. One main reason for these 
unsatisfactory research outcomes can be found in the varying methodologies and the large 
amount of differing variables applied to all kind of models. Whereas most studies tend to 
focus on a sample of takeover companies to investigate their financial characteristics, this 
thesis's study concentrates on a sample of underperfon-ning firrns to measure the likelihood of 
these companies being taken over following a period of underperformance. 
Chapter Six provided a description of the type of research and methodology, which was used 
for the empirical research. The overall objective of this thesis was to test for the relationship 
between underperfon-nance and takeover likelihood by testing if the market for corporate 
control works, meaning if companies are actually taken over as a consequence of 
underperformance. With reference to the literature, this study examined a set of financial 
characteristics, meaning underperfon-nance (Hypothesis 1), capital structure (Hypothesis 2), 
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asset structure (Hypothesis 3) and firm size (Hypothesis 4), accounting also for industry and 
economic effects (Hypothesis I a, 2a, 3a, 4a), to investigate the reasons and patterns for some 
underperforming companies in fact being taken over whereas other underperforming 
companies are not. The table below provides a listing of all hypotheses including their 
expected sign. 
Table 40: Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses under Investigation Expected Sign 
III There is a positive relation between the degree of + 
underperformance and takeover likelihood. 
Hla There is an increasing positive relation between underperformance + 
and takeover likelihood taking into account industry and economic 
effects. 
R2 The level of corporate debt is negatively / positively related to the 
likelihood of underperforming companies being acquired. 
112a The level of corporate debt is negatively / positively related to the 
likelihood of underperfon-ning companies being acquired taking 
into account industry and economic effects. 
H3 The proportion of tangible assets to total assets is positively + 
negatively related to the likelihood of underperfon-ning companies 
being acquired. 
113a The proportion of tangible assets to total assets is positively + 
negatively related to the likelihood of underperforming companies 
being acquired taking into account industry effects. 
H4 Firrn size is negatively /positively related to the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired. 
114a Firm size is positively/negatively related to the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired taking into account 
industry effects. 
This chapter outlined the methodology approach and the model concept in detail. The choice 
of measurements of underperfon-nance (Tobin's q, Cumulative Abnon-nal Return) for the 
selection of a sample of underperforming stock market-listed companies as well as the 
selection process of a corresponding sample of takeover companies was described. The main 
focus of this chapter was, however, to introduce and explain in detail the modelling of this 
analysis which was introduced as being hierarchical binary- logistic. 
Chapter Seven provided a step-by-step explanation of the data compilation process. This 
study used all stock market- listed companies reported on the database Datastrearn in the UK, 
US and Canada over the period 1988 until 2004. The sample comprised a total of 30,225 
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companies. The data clearing process and the application of the measurements of 
underperformance (Tsq <1 and Car <0) were applied to the overall sample of approximately 
70,000 three-year company data intervals to identify a set of underperforming con-panies. 
This analysis resulted in a total of 2,241 company data intervals, which reported 
underperformance as defined above. Based on M&A data made available by Thomson 
Financial (SDC Platinum database) the sample of companies being taken over within the 
period of investigation in the three countries was matched against the results of 
underperforming companies (matching time period of 24 months after underperformance). 
Only 7% of underperforming companies were actually taken over in the UK, 6% in the US 
and II% in Canada, implying that the market for corporate control does not work in these 
countries (Objective 1). 
Chapter Eight detailed the results of the hierarchical binary- logistic regression model, which 
was applied to test the thesis' four main hypotheses and its four sub-hypotheses for Canada, 
UK and US. It can be summarised that Hypothesis 1,2 and 4 were rejected, which means that 
neither underperformance and capital structure nor size reported a statistical significance on 
the likelihood of underperforming companies being taken over. For these three hypotheses it 
can be concluded that the general argument of an existing relation between these variables 
and the takeover likelihood was proved to be invalid for our sample of underperforming firms. 
Especially, arguments introduced in the agency literature (e. g. Jensen, 1986), which claim that 
takeovers are the most efficient device in the market for corporate control to transfer 
resources from inefficient agents to efficient ones (Hypothesis 1), were rejected by our study 
outcomes. Furthermore, our study results confirm the general argument that the choice of 
capital structure (Hypothesis 2) can be regarded as a delicate balancing act of continuously 
adjusting the debt level to achieve the maximum amount of economic benefit. Hypothesis 3, 
which investigated the impact of the variable Asset Structure on the likelihood of 
underperforming firms being taken over, revealed varying outcomes for the three countries. 
Whereas the null hypothesis was accepted for the UK sample of underperforming firms, the 
US reported a significantly negative relation at the I% level for the variable Asset Structure 
(Test I- 3) with poor quality of predictability. For Canada the relation between Asset 
Structure and takeover likelihood is positive at the 5% level. Even though the Canadian 
sample outcomes show parallels to previous research including authors (Eddey, 1991, 
Ambrose and Megginson, 1992) it must be noted that the quality of prediction is poor. The 
following table summarises the outcomes of the stated hypotheses. 
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Table 41: Summary of Hypotheses Outcomes 
Hypotheses under Investigation Expected 
Sign 
Approved 
H1 There is a positive relation between the degree of + CN No 
underperformance and takeover likelihood. UK No 
us No 
Hla There is an increasing positive relation between + CN No 
underperformance and takeover likelihood taking UK No 
into account industry and economic effects. us No 
H2, The level of corporate debt is negatively / positively CN No 
related the likelihood of underperforming companies UK No 
being acquired. us No 
112a The level of corporate debt is negatively / positively 
l 
CN No 
re ated to the likelihood of underperforming 
companies being acquired taking into account 
UK No 
industry and economic effects. us No 
R3 The proportion of tangible assets to total assets is + CN No 
positively related to the likelihood of UK No 
underperfon-ning companies being acquired. us No 
113a The proportion of tangible assets to total %sets is + CN Yes 
positively related to the likelihood of 
underperforming companies being acquired taking 
UK No 
into account industry effects. us No 
H4 Firrn size is negatively / positively related to the CN No 
likelihood of underperforming companies being LJK No 
acquired. us No 
114a Fin-n size is positively/negatively related to the CN No 
likelihood of underperforming companies being UK No 
acquired taking into account industry effects. US No 
As a last step of investigation this chapter applied multinornial logistic regression to all ten 
variables together (independent and control variables) in order to investigate their impact on 
the likelihood of becoming a takeover target for an underperforming firm in each of the three 
countries. This analysis was particularly important as it takes all influencing factors into 
account, which might also result in counterbalancing effects. It can be concluded that, since 
there is either no significance (UK) or only a weak significance (Canada, US) being detected 
for the relation of the ten variables taken together and the likelihood of underperforming firms 
being acquired and since this significance has a wide spread interval of confidence, the 
predictability and its quality is poor. In sum, both the univariate and multinornial analysis did 
not provide any statistical relevance with an underlying narrow spread of the interval of 
conf idence. 
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9.3 Contributions and implications of the Study 
After surnmarising the results of this thesis, it needs to be assessed whether this study has 
advanced the knowledge of the role mergers and acquisitions play in the field of the market 
for corporate control. The study extends the literature and related empirical work in how 
effective the market for corporate control acts in disciplining underperforming companies 
through takeovers. 
9.3.1 Contributions of this Study 
Most previous research studies have analysed the performance of companies, which have 
actually been taken over to determine financial and governance patterns of these target firms 
to come up with a likelihood of being taken over according to these characteristics. The 
primary focus of these studies lies in investigating a sample of takeover companies, which, 
however, does not differentiate between underperforming and (over-)performing companies. 
The results of these studies are mixed and more recent studies come increasingly to the 
conclusion that the relation between firm performance and takeover likelihood is complex and 
difficult to define and measLre. The most important feature of this thesis is that the study 
focuses solely on underperforming firms and their likelihood of being taken over as a result of 
their underperformance. This is critical since the market for corporate control should rectify 
underperformance through a takeover and most studies do not focus on this particular aspect 
but investigate this area more broadly. 
Additionally, this study investigated a combination of accounting- based and stock market- 
based measurements to counterbalance any potential drawbacks of focusing on one financial 
measurement type. Many studies in this field either concentrate purely on accounting- or on 
stock market-based measurements which, as been shown in the literature can lead to 
misspecifications. One further advantage of this study is that it not only considered financial 
characteristics as explanatory variables of underperforming firms being acquired but it also 
incorporated industry and economic control variables for improving the accuracy of the 
analysis. There are many studies which neglect the potential impact of these control variables 
on the study outcomes. A further advantage of this study's model is that it did not only apply 
a binary-logistic regression but enhanced its model through the application of a hierarchical 
order. This thesis' model not only allowed for an investigation on a univariate level but also 
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measured the actual change in significance by adding industry and/or economic control 
variables to the regression analysis. 
Furthermore, most studies investigate takeovers in one particular country, with a bias towards 
the US market, without contrasting outcomes between countries. Our study, however, focused 
on individual countries where externally controlled governance mechanisms such as takeovers 
prevail (Canada, UK, US) and contrasted the individual outcomes per country. Another 
important aspect of this study is the long timeframe under investigation (17 years), which 
most studies do not cover (much shorter periods). 
9.3.2 Implications of this Study 
Overall it can be concluded that the hierarchical binary logistic regression model, which was 
applied to test the thesis' four main hypotheses and its four sub-hypotheses for Canada, the 
UK and US came to the result that the probability of takeovers following a period of firm 
underperfon-nance (disciplinary takeovers) did not prove to be significant. 
Despite the general wisdom of the financial literature that Anglo-Saxon Economies are 
countries where the external markets for corporate control Te said to work actively as a 
disciplinary device through takeovers, our study could not confirm these outcomes 
statistically. There appears to be no significant association between takeovers and finn 
performance, implying that the disciplinary takeover is statistically non-existent. Thus the 
market for corporate control does not work effectively through takeovers in the three 
countries under investigation. It can be concluded that takeover motives can be described as 
heterogeneous across different firms in different industries and countries with differing 
contract environments. It has to be concluded that there is no consistent direction for investors 
confronted with acquisition opportunities who wish to maximise economic gain. 
9.4 Limitations of the Study 
The study's implications need to acknowledge the following research limitations. One 
important limitation of this study lies in the data compilation process. As has previously been 
stated, all data was gathered from secondary sources, Datastream and SDC Phtinum, both 
operated by Thomson Financial. Unfortunately, not all companies listed on these databases 
provide the full scale of financial inforination required to undertake this analysis. There are 
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many companies which do not report data at all and are purely listed by name, thus reducing 
the sample drastically in the first place. This is particularly true for very small corporations 
listed on secondary stock exchanges such as the NASDAQ and the TSX Venture. In addition, 
companies listed on Datastrearn do not necessarily match the companies listing on the SDC 
Platinum database, which resulted in a considerable reduction of the sample of takeover 
companies able to be investigated as part of this study. 
A further limitation to be mentioned is that the study dd not incorporate an analysis of 
Corporate Governance variables to measure the likelihood of companies being taken over 
following a period of underperformance. 
This study applied an event time methodology which, however, only rests on the assumption 
that stock markets are efficient in evaluating the impact of the event to determine abnon-nal 
retums. 
9.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
Future research in the field of the market for corporate control and takeover likelihood of 
underperforming companies is recommended to consider the following potential study areas: 
e As there have been changing patterns of M&A activity (merger waves) over the last 
century, it could be of interest to split up the investigation period of 17 years into 
several sub-periods (3-4) to investigate if the market for corporate control changes in 
its effectiveness through takeovers. 
9 It could also be of interest to enhance the study through the additional investigation of 
corporate govemance characteristics. Measurements could include monitoring 
mechanisms of the various stakeholders, bonding mechanisms (managerial incentive 
schemes) and board structure (e. g., supervisory versus executive board, executive 
versus non-executive directors). 
0 More research could also be undertaken into the acquiring companies. It is one side of 
the equation to investigate companies which are underperforming, however, the other 
side of the equation is what companies are there to consider the acquisition of this 
underperforming company for what reason. 
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9A further interesting point includes the investigation if underperforming companies 
are part of an attractive industry grouping or if these underperfonners are part of dying 
industry sectors. (e. g. coal mining in the UK in the 1980s). This aspect could possibly 
be incorporated into the modelling. 
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Appendix 1 
Overall Descriptive Statistics for Underperforming Companies split between Takeover 
and Non-takeovers 
1. Underperforming Companies Taken over 
Total Sample GDP Tsq Car 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Caotal 
Stru cture 
Size 
(log 
Total 
Assets) 
Industry 
Tsq 
Variance 
Industry 
Capital 
Stru et u re 
Variance 
Industry 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry Size 
(log Total 
Assets) 
Variance 
Valid 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 
. 
0274 
. 
815 -. 4278 . 
88489 
. 
45912 19.076 
. 
47251 1.83289 1.36602 1.00948 
Median 
. 
0297 
. 
847 -. 3664 . 
96308 
. 
44907 18.976 
. 
49225 1.71087 1.16601 1.00722 
Std. Deviation 
. 
0113 
. 
1538 
. 
3074 
. 
167976 
. 
232349 1.8970 
. 
167398 1.167677 
. 
775833 
. 
070864 
Minimum -. 001 .3 -1.510 . 
251 
. 
000 15.179 
. 
111 
. 
000 
. 
406 
. 
830 
Maximum 
. 
049 1.0 -. 006 1.000 . 
962 24.418 
. 
882 8.419 7.993 1.198 
2. Underperforming Companies not Taken over 
Total Sample GDP Tsq Car 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Capital 
Stru cture 
Size 
(log 
Total 
Assets) 
Industry 
Tsq 
Variance 
Industry 
Capital 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry Size 
(log Total 
Assets) 
Variance 
Valid 2091 2091 2091 2091 2091 2091 2091 2091 2091 2091 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 
. 
0263 
. 
826 -. 3894 . 
92014 
. 
49576 19.107 
. 
48745 2.01109 1.45433 1.00803 
Median 
. 
0297 
. 
863 -. 3216 . 
98070 
. 
51797 18.956 
. 
48357 1.91192 1.21944 1.00258 
Std. Deviation 
. 
0115 
. 
1473 
. 
3242 
. 
131267 
. 
235234 1.9820 
. 
166216 1.191425 
. 
685443 
. 
076071 
Minimum -. 003 .2 -3.318 . 
192 
. 
000 14.179 
. 
031 
. 
000 
. 
292 
. 
771 
Maximum 
. 
049. 1.5 
. 
0001 1.000 1.000 25.077 
. 
952 
. 
10.312 4.308 1.243 
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Appendix 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Underperforming Companies split between Takeover and Non- 
takeovers in Canada 
1. Underperforming Companies Taken over 
jotal Sample GDP Tsq Car 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Carital 
Stru cture 
Size 
(log 
Total 
Assets) 
Industry 
Tsq 
Variance 
Industry 
Capital 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry Size 
(loll Total 
Assets) 
Variance 
Valid 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 
. 
0374 
. 
808 -. 4058 . 
90391 
. 
57034 19.627 
. 
49385 1.61640 1.57480 1.01269 
Median 
. 
0407 
. 
830 -. 3333 . 
98325 
. 
53023 19.818 
. 
50053 1.63633 1.30707 
. 
99901 
Std. Deviation 
. 
0107 
. 
1282 
. 
3079 
. 
166605 
. 
268672 1.0692 
. 
111898 
. 
668313 
. 
928358 
. 
056524 
Minimum 
. 
004 
.4 -1.224 . 
433 
. 
081 17.424 
. 
223 
. 
345 
. 
624 
. 
926 
Maximum 
. 
049 1.0 -. 055 1.000 . 
962 21.141 
. 
638 3.041 4.500 1.143 
2. Underperforming Companies not Taken over 
Total Sample GDP Tsq Car 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Carital 
Stru cture 
Size 
(log 
Total 
Assets) 
Industry 
Tsq 
Variance 
Industry 
Capital 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry Size 
(log Total 
Assets) 
Variance 
Valid 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 
. 
0321 
. 
812 -. 3908 . 
91970 
. 
58490 19.722 
. 
52303 1.90451 1.26928 1.01902 
Median 
. 
0330 
. 
838 -. 3058 . 
99398 
. 
66608 19.441 
. 
52192 1.78054 1.21470 1.00926 
Std. Deviation 
. 
0125 
. 
1560 
. 
3149 
. 
157437 
. 
289002 1.4045 
. 
170593 1.109839 
. 
356666 
. 
056192 
Minimurn -. 003 .3 -1.502 . 
261 
. 
000 16.010 
. 
187 
. 
000 
. 
420 
. 
878 
Maximum 
. 
049. 1.0 -. 006 1.000 1.000 22.838 . 
884 5.032 3.212 1.189 
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Appendix 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Underperforming Companies split between Takeover and Non- 
takeovers in the UK 
1. Underperfon-ning Companies Taken over 
TotalSample GDP Tsq Car 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Catital 
Stru cture 
Size 
(log 
Total 
Assets) 
Industry 
Tsq 
Variance 
Industry 
Capital 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry 
Asset 
Stru ct u re 
Variance 
Industry Size 
(log Total 
Assets) 
Variance 
Valid 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 
. 
0233 
. 
807 -. 4165 . 
95945 
. 
38942 17.795 
. 
48657 1.86699 1.04393 
. 
99519 
Median 
. 
0273 
. 
840 -. 4308 1.00000 . 
36907 17.605 
. 
52023 1.63561 1.02122 
. 
99474 
Std. Deviation 
. 
0117 
. 
1639 
. 
2876 
. 
084371 
. 
196599 1.2920 
. 
176272 1.377064 
. 
097897 
. 
065413 
Minimum -. 001 .3 -1.288 . 
607 
. 
000 15.179 
. 
111 
. 
000 
. 
676 
. 
843 
Maximum 
. 
039 1.0 -. 006 1.000 . 
922 20.468 
. 
880 8.419 1.348 1.130 
2. Underperforming Companies not Taken over 
Total Sample GDP Tsq Car 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Ca Otal 
Stru cture 
Size 
(log 
Total 
Assets) 
Industry 
Tsq 
Variance 
Industry 
Capital 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry Size 
(log Total 
Assets) 
Variance 
Valid 853 853 853 853 853 853 853 853 853 853 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 
. 
0219 
. 
807 -. 4108 . 
96425 
. 
42288 17.652 
. 
52257 1.89016 1.04763 
. 
98855 
Median 
. 
0263 
. 
840 -. 3456 1.00000 . 
44027 17.483 
. 
54265 1.79438 1.01747 
. 
98072 
Std. Deviation 
. 
0127 
. 
1557 
. 
3451 
. 
100285 
. 
209533 1.4057 
. 
149198 1.154771 
. 
143849 
. 
074942 
Minimum -. 001 .2 -3.318 . 
194 
. 
000 14.179 
. 
031 
. 
000 
. 
292 
. 
795 
Maximum 
. 
039 1.2 -. 001 1.000 . 
965 22.936 
. 
874 9.571 1.752 1.222 
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Appendix 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Underperforming Companies split between Takeover and Non- 
takeovers in the US 
1. Underperforming Companies Taken over 
Total Sample GDP Tsq Car 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Caotal 
Stru cture 
Size 
(log 
Total 
Assets) 
Industry 
Tsq 
Variance 
Industry 
Capital 
Stru ctu re 
Variance 
Industry 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry Size 
(log Total 
Assets) 
Variance 
Valid 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 
. 
0287 
. 
825 -. 4459 . 
80277 
. 
50016 20.243 
. 
45210 1.85769 1.64022 1.02332 
Median 
. 
0297 
. 
870 -. 3625 . 
88780 
. 
51487 20.117 
. 
44822 1.79475 1.46623 1.02156 
Std. Deviation 
. 
0088 
. 
1511 
. 
3301 
. 
195459 
. 
237440 1.7790 
. 
170623 1.041680 
. 
982498 
. 
077579 
Minimum 
. 
017 
.4 -1.510 . 
251 
. 
000 15.705 
. 
123 
. 
000 
. 
406 
. 
830 
Maximum 
. 
044 1.0 -. 009 1.000 . 
931 24.418 
. 
882 5.901 7.993 1.198 
2. Underperforming Companies not Taken over 
Total Sample GDP Tsq Car 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Capital 
Stru cture 
Size 
(log 
Total 
Assets) 
Industry 
Tsq 
Variance 
Industry 
Capital 
Stru cture 
Variance 
Industry 
Asset 
Stru cture 
Variance 
IndustrySize 
(log Total 
Assets) 
Variance 
Valid 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 
. 
0290 
. 
842 -. 3724 . 
88555 
. 
54053 20.163 
. 
45488 2.12100 1.79966 1.02178 
Median 
. 
0297 
. 
877 -. 3060 . 
92753 
. 
58245 20.144 
. 
42918 2.01844 1.53887 1.01699 
Std. Deviation 
. 
0090 
. 
1371 
. 
3074 
. 
138265 
. 
230641 1.7055 
. 
171695 1.220898 
. 
785412 
. 
076110 
Minimum 
. 
017 
.3 -2.463 . 
192 
. 
000 14.690 
. 
095 
. 
000 
. 
293 
. 
771 
Maximum 
. 
044. 1.5 
. 
000 1.000. 
. 
960. 25.077 
. 
952 10.312 4.308 1.243 
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Appendix 5 
Variables in the Equation for HI 
95,0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
Country Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Canada Z Tsq 
. 911 . 973 . 609 1.556 
Z Car 
. 841 . 951 . 579 1.561 
UK Z Tsq . 975 . 996 . 787 1.260 
Z Car . 897 . 985 . 781 1.242 
us Z Tsq . 306 . 876 . 680 1.129 
Z Car . 059 . 804 . 642 1.008 
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Appendix 6 
Variables in the Equation for Hla 
95,0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
Country Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Canada Z Tsq 
. 958 1.016 . 573 1.801 
Z Car 
. 972 . 991 . 568 1.673 
Z Industry Tsq Variance 
. 485 . 792 . 413 1.522 
Z GDP 
. 084 1.699 . 931 3.100 
UK Z Tsq 
. 161 1.240 . 918 1.676 
Z Car 
. 918 . 987 . 774 1.259 
Z Industry Tsq Variance 
. 026 . 673 . 474 . 954 
Z GDP 
. 863 1.023 . 793 1.319 
us Z Tsq . 178 . 806 . 589 1.103 
Z Car 
. 032 . 772 . 609 . 
977 
Z Industry Tsq Variance . 375 1.155 . 850 1.570 
Z GDP . 711 . 939 . . 
675 1.307 
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Appendix 7 
Variables in the Equation for H2 
95,0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
Country Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Canada Z Capital Structure 
. 838 . 959 . 644 1.429 
UK Z Capital Structure 
. 207 . 834 . 630 1.105 
us Z Capital Structure . 1.72 . 834 . 659 1.077 
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Appendix 8 
Variables in the Equation for R2a 
95,0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
Country Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Canada Z Capital Structure 
. 
377 1.302 
. 
726 2.336 
Z Industry Capital Structure 
Variance . 
198 
. 
563 
. 
207 1.385 
UK Z Capital Structure 
. 
063 
. 
658 
. 
423 1.023 
Z Industry Capital Structure 
Variance . 
148 1.296 . 
912 1.840 
us Z Capital Structure 
. 
844 . 
967 
. 
689 1.357 
Z Industry Capital Structure 
. 
264 . 
801 . 543 
1.182 
Variance I I I II 
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Appendix 9 
Variables in the Equation for H3 
95,0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
Country Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Canada 7Asset Structure . 688 . 925 . 925 1.357 
UK Z Asset Structure . 703 . 941 . 941 1.286 
us Z Asset Structure . 000 . 686 . 686 . 814 
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Appendix 10 
Variables in the Equation for Ma 
95,0% C. I. r EXP(B) 
Country Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Canada Asset Structure 
. 149 . 727 . 472 
1.121 
Z Industry Asset Structure 
Variance . 009 2.287 1.225 4.272 
UK Z Asset Structure 
. 755 . 938 . 628 
1.401 
Z Industry Asset Structure 
Variance . 979 1.020 . 223 
4.657 
us Z Asset Structure 
. 000 . 667 . 543 . 
820 
Z Industry Asset Structure 635 1 061 . 830 1.358 Variance . . I I II 
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Appendix 11 
Variables in the Equation for H4 
95,0% C. I. r EXP(B) 
Country Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Canada Size log Total Assets 
. 780 . 
904 . 446 
1.835 
UK Z Size log Total Assets 
. 
422 . 1151 . 
816 1.623 
us Z Size log Total Assets 
. 713 
1.056 . 791 
1.410 
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Appendix 12 
Variables in the Equation for Ma 
95,0% C. I. r EXP(B) 
Country Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Canada Z Size log Total Assets 
. 988 . 993 . 412 2.393 
Z Industry Size log Total 
Assets Variance . 720 . 858 . 372 1.980 
UK Z Size log Total Assets 
. 697 1.190 . 496 2.852 
Z Industry Size log Total 
936 974 . 518 1.833 Assets Variance . . 
us Z Size log Total Assets 
. 657 1.128 . 662 1.922 
Z Industry Size log Total 
Assets Variance . 773 I . 
934 
I . 
588 
I 
1.484 
II 
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Appendix 13 
Variables in the Equation for all Ten Variables 
95,0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
Country Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Canada Zscore (Tsq) 
. 
054 2.517 
. 986 
6.424 
Zscore (Car) 
. 752 1.100 . 
611 1.980 
Zscore 
(Industry Tsq Vatiance) . 
006 
. 
142 
. 
035 . 569 
Zscore (GDP) 
. 
132 1.723 
. 
850 3.494 
Zscore 
(Capital Structure) . 
025 4.139 1.192 14.369 
Zscore 
(Industry Capital Structure Variance) . 
008 
. 
080 
. 
012 
. 
518 
Zscore 
(Asset Structure) . 
036 
. 574 . 
341 
. 
965 
Zscore 
(Industry Asset Structure Variance) . 
012 2.974 1.268 6.976 
Zscore 
(Size log Total Assets) . 879 . 
858 
. 
121 6.081 
Zscore 
(Industry Size log Total Assets) . 
643 . 
684 
. 
137 1 3.409 
Country Sig. Exp(B) 95,0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
UK Zscore (Tsq) 
. 076 1.338 . 970 1.844 
Zscore (Car) . 709 . 954 . 746 1.220 
Zscore 023 . 611 . 400 0.934 (Industry Tsq Vaiance) . 
Zscore (GDP) . 577 . 940 . 704 1.257 
Zscore 
. 216 . 711 . 415 1.219 (Capital Stru cture) 
Zscore 
. 574 1.142 . 719 1.817 (Industry Capital Structure Variance) 
Zscore 
. 873 1.036 . 668 1.606 (Asset Structure) 
Zscore 653 . 679 . 126 3.662 (Industry Asset Structure Variance) . 
Zscore 
. 140 2.264 . 764 6.705 (Size log Total Assets) 
Zscore 
. 274 . 642 . 290 1.421 (Industry Size log Total Assets) I I I 
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Comtry Sig. Exp(B) 95,0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
us Zscore (Tsq) 
. 201 . 780 . 533 
1.142 
Zscore (Car) 
. 029 . 760 . 594 . 
973 
Zscore 
(Industry Tsq Vadance) . 662 1.126 . 662 1.914 
Zscore (GDP) 
. 946 1.012 . 720 1.422 Zscore 
(Capital Stru cture) . 
634 . 885 . 536 1.461 
Zscore 
(Industry Capital Structure Variance) . 393 . 782 . 445 1.374 
Zscore 
(Asset Structure) . 000 . 645 . 520 . 799 
Zscore 
(Industry Asset Structure Variance) . 809 1.032 . 796 
1.339 
Zscore 
(Size log Total Assets) . 683 1.187 . 520 
2.710 
Zscore 
759 900 . 460 1.762 (Industry Size log Total Assets) . I . I I I 
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